Withers is more honest than most DSA strategy documents, but this creates a problem. He lists programmatic unity, non-reformist reforms, the rank-and-file strategy, red unions, Panther-model mutual aid, electoral reform, and armed defense patrols. He says these ideas fit together as a unified theory of change. In fact, they are just a list. The difference between a list and a strategy is the main question Withers tries to answer, but he does not answer it.

The main idea is the non-reformist reform. Withers uses Gorz's definition: a reform that changes power relations. He then asks the state to pass laws that would weaken its own power, such as proportional representation, public financing, recallable representatives, and reduced police powers. At the same time, he admits that real change through elections is impossible because the ruling class will not peacefully relinquish power. Still, he builds his program from laws that the ruling class would need to approve. The non-reformist reform is supposed to be both achievable within the system and strong enough to challenge it. Gorz did not solve this problem, and neither does Withers.

Withers says minimal demands become transitional demands when the balance of forces threatens capitalism, and that this depends on how the state reacts. If the state gives in, the demands stay minimal and the working class is absorbed into the system. If the state resists, people become more radical. In both cases, the state decides what happens. The party does not act; it waits. This is not a real strategy for change. It is just waiting for something to happen.

This pattern repeats throughout the document. The rank-and-file strategy is supposed to democratize unions, but if that fails, the answer is to build red unions. Electoral work is supposed to challenge the state, but if participation is blocked, the answer is to use people's assemblies. Each tactic has a backup, so no tactic can ever be called a failure. This makes the document look complete, but it does not set priorities. Real strategy means choosing where to put limited people and money, and those choices rule out other options. Withers warns against focusing too much on elections in Atlanta, which shows he understands this problem. But if the three main tactics really supported each other, it would not be possible to focus too much on one. The Atlanta example only makes sense if the tactics compete for resources, which runs counter to the idea of a unified strategy.

Withers puts discipline first, but it is not the most important point. He wants programmatic unity, the power to expel members, and a national line promoted through media. But he also says DSA is a federation that cannot even hold one congresswoman accountable for her votes. This order is wrong. Discipline comes from shared analysis and shared struggles, and it only works when the party controls something that elected officials need. Withers admits that without DSA as the source of funding or votes, elected officials have no reason to listen. Still, he suggests expulsions. But you cannot gain power by expelling people when you lack leverage. The Comintern could enforce discipline because it controlled money, media, and members' political lives. DSA has only a ballot line it borrows from the Democrats. The discipline Withers wants would only be possible if DSA already had the power his strategy is supposed to create.

On the question of arming the working class, Withers moves quickly from discussing disarmament as a class issue, and examples like Chile and Berlin in 1919, to suggesting trained community defense patrols with the Socialist Rifle Association. He does this in just a few paragraphs, as one item on a list. But a revolutionary organization's approach to guns is not just another point to add after mutual aid. It is a serious issue that, if handled poorly, can cause harm or even destroy the organization. This is not decided by general statements about ruling classes, but by the real balance of forces in each situation. The fact that no ruling class gives up power peacefully is true, but it does not tell you what to do in a specific place or time. Listing the right positions is not the same as having a real strategy.

Withers describes the current thinking of many socialists. He includes all the good ideas but avoids making hard choices. He often tries to solve contradictions by saying both sides can work together. But these contradictions are important. Reform and rupture are in tension, and that is what makes the transition difficult. Discipline and a big-tent approach are also in tension, which is why elected officials sometimes leave. Limited resources mean the three main strategies compete, which is why Atlanta had to make a choice. A real strategy comes after recognizing these tensions and deciding how to handle them. Withers has not done this. His document is clear and sincere, but it confuses listing ideas with making a plan.

The American working class needs a party. It will not get one from a group that lists its tasks but does not put them in order.

In solidarity,

Anthony P. Teso (Camas, WA)