“... in a socialist society there are still conservative strata and some thing like ‘vested interest groups.’ There still remain differences between mental and manual labor, city and countryside, worker and peasant. Although these are not antagonistic contradictions they cannot be resolved without struggle.” - Mao Zedong, A Critique of Soviet Economics, pg. 71

In Labor and Monopoly Capital, Harry Braverman characterizes management in Soviet industries as, “differing only in detail from that of capitalist countries, so that the Soviet working population bears all the stigmata of the Western working classes.”^[1] In other words, Soviet Taylorism, originally a necessity borne of economic backwardness, Civil War, and isolation, imposed upon the working classes in Actually Existing Socialist countries alienating and authoritarian conditions similar to those found in capitalist firms. If Braverman was scathing in his critique of Soviet industrial organization, he was less dismissive of Chinese managerial practices. Braverman, as had the French economist Charles Bettelheim, saw in Chinese industrial organization an alternative to the top-down structure of both capitalist firms and Soviet state enterprises. Debates about the organization of labor in China “went beyond the preoccupation with the equalitarian distribution of the products of social labor and brought to the fore the idea of a revolution in the organization of social production.”^[2]

To see if Braverman and Bettelheim were correct in their assessment, I will chart the rise and fall of participatory management through three institutions. Firstly, investigating the fate of Staff-and-Workers’ Congresses (SWCs) gives us a cross-section of the primary institution through which democratic management was institutionalized. Worker participation in management was first institutionalized through Staff and Workers’ Congresses before the conclusion of China’s revolutionary war, gutted of most substantive authority in SOE reforms of the 1990’s, and linger on to this day as a formality. Secondly, the Angang Constitution, named after the Anshan Iron and Steel Company in which it was first implemented, marked the apogee of Mao-era institutional experimentation. Formulated during the Great Leap Forward under the auspices of the Anshan Party Committee and given Mao’s stamp of approval, it promulgated a dynamic managerial regime that would, if consistently implemented, progressively erode the distinctions among cadre, labor, and management. Lastly, an examination of two divergent rebel workers’ organizations, the Workers General Headquarters and Shengwulian, both of which attempted to assert proletarian control over the state apparatus but on the basis of divergent analysis, can begin to clarify the structural limitations of bottom-up revolt within the confines of the Leninist Party-State.

A Brief Outline of the Rise and Fall of SWCs

Throughout the Mao era and into the first decade of market reforms, staff-and-workers congresses (SWCs) were a ubiquitous feature of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Workers were organized into representative bodies that would oversee production and draw rank-and-file workers into management. Established near the end of China’s revolutionary war both as a response to the necessity of restoring production in a war-torn country and from Maoist emphasis on mass mobilization, the SWCs would provide a degree of industrial democracy and impose a limit to managerial authority within the framework of a top-down planning apparatus in an arrangement which Joel Andreas dubbed “paternalist democracy.” Moreover, the structure of the party-state restricted the autonomy of workers' organizations because, in practice, decisions by mid-level cadre could overrule shop-floor democracy.

Cultural Revolution-era experiments in industrial organization would further call into question the division between mental and manual labor. The upheavals of 1966-1976 impeded the regular functioning of the SWCs, but the political status of workers was strengthened relative to cadre and managers. Moreover, the Shanghai Commune pushed for the inclusion of workers’ representatives at all levels of municipal governance. At the same time, under the rubric of the Angang Constitutions, workers were encouraged to participate in management while managers and technicians participated in manual labor. Following Deng Xiaoping’s ascent, SWCs were initially strengthened and subsequently neutralized as participatory institutions. While workers received short-term wage increases made possible through the limited market reforms of the 1980s that enabled enterprises to retain a greater share of their revenue, SWCs’ role in enterprise management were further codified and their procedures streamlined, but the proportion of rank-and-file workers in SOEs gradually diminished. By the second wave of reform, from 1997-2005, which reorganized SOEs along capitalist lines, SWCs had little impact on day-to-day factory life, and most of the resistance they could practically offer in the face of restructuring was to provide a platform for laid off workers to fight for better severance pay.

Although SWCs have been reduced to a formality in contemporary China and the Angang Constitution has been largely relegated to the margins of historical memory, the experience of democratic management in the first 40 years of the PRC offers many important insights into the relationship between workplace democracy, central planning, and market reforms. If Braverman, along with many other Marxists, was premature in heralding the Chinese model as a successful example of socialist industrial organization, they were not mistaken to view it as an innovation of the Chinese revolution whose significance goes beyond its immediate historical and political context. The fate of democratic management also reveals the weakness of institutionalized participation within the context of a monolithic Marxist-Leninist party-state. With no meaningful impact on macroeconomic decision-making, workers in post-Mao China tended to use the SWCs in an economistic manner, placing short-term wage increases and benefits above production. The Party center responded by stripping SWCs of effective power in favor of management.

CPC’s Urban Underground and the Formation of SWCs: The Birth of Democratic Management

Despite having come to power through an agrarian revolutionary war, the Communist Party of China was forged in China’s incipient labor movement and developed its first mass base in the cities prior to the Guomindang’s crackdown. In 1922, the mining town of Anyuan earned the nickname “China’s little Moscow” due to the intensive organizing of industrial workers under the leadership of Mao Zedong, Li Lisan, and Liu Shaoqi.^[3] The Communist Party not only led unions, but also founded mutual aid associations and party schools, some of which sent cadre to study in the Soviet Union.^[4] Following Chiang Kai-shek’s purge in 1927, the primarily urban Communist Party was forced to develop base areas among the peasants. By the time the civil war reignited following the breakdown of the Chongqing negotiations after World War II, the Communist Party of China’s urban underground may not have been as decisive as its rural organizations, but nonetheless constituted an integral aspect of China’s revolutionary war. The Communist Party’s urban networks organized trade unions in strategic industries, “sabotaging the [Guomindang’s] supply lines, organizations, and popular support.”^[5]

The CCP’s urban organizations would reemerge as a key element in the governance of liberated territory. As the revolutionary war was drawing to a close and China’s urban centers began to fall into the People’s Liberation Army’s hands, the party needed to systematize the management of newly liberated industrial centers to restore production. The industrial centers of Manchuria, to which the revolutionary war’s center of gravity shifted in 1947, would provide a testing ground for the party’s industrial management. Workers’ congresses, attempts to integrate mental and manual labor, as well as top-down bureaucratic planning, can all be traced back to Manchuria’s heavy industry. Accounting for half of China’s industrial output in 1951, Manchuria was also the site of early top-down planning methods, which, in the words of a 1952 economic policy paper, “should be promoted in regions of China proper in the future.”^[6] With a pressing need to make use of technical expertise while harnessing grassroots enthusiasm, the party left pre-revolutionary management in place but mobilized workers to supervise them, utilizing pre-existing underground party organizations where possible, and forming workers organizations where none had previously existed.^[7] To this end, the CCP organized industrial workers via staff-and-workers’ meetings. Drawing from practices in the Yan’an base area, workers were organized into supervisory committees endowed with supervisory powers over management.

In August 1949, before the People’s Republic of China was formally proclaimed, the provisional revolutionary government codified the role of Staff-and-workers meetings and their relationship to the factory director and cadre.^[8] All public enterprises with over 200 employees were to establish a staff-and-workers meeting with representatives chosen from grassroots production teams. According to regulations, all representatives would serve for one year and had the power to criticize decisions of the factory management committee.^[9] In practice, the power of factory party committees severely limited their autonomy, but SWMs formed an important institutional mechanism by which workers could participate in factory management and raise concerns regarding working conditions and living standards.

From New Democracy to Socialist Construction

The New Democratic stage of the Chinese revolution, which lasted until 1956, tolerated the coexistence of state and private property, while land reform would initially parcel out the land, only to collectivize it later. After the new government nationalized the assets of Kuomintang-affiliated capitalists and the comprador bourgeoisie, the state controlled a plurality of national industrial production. In 1952, after reconstruction and land reform had been completed, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) comprised 43 percent of industrial output, and only 31 percent was from private enterprises.^[10] As the Chinese Communist Party brought the private sector under state control, the mobilization of grassroots workers proved essential to increasing productivity while extending the party-state’s control over industry. The balance of class power resulting from this process produced substantive participatory institutions at the firm level but retained many inequalities between management and cadre on one hand, and workers on the other, as well as a planning apparatus that alienated direct producers from macroeconomic decision-making.

Maoist China’s industrial management, which emphasized “politics in command,” as opposed to “bonuses in command,” preserved some of the Great Leap Forward’s emphasis on moral incentives while allowing for limited material incentives. Following the post-Great Leap Forward reconstruction, from 1960-62, China’s industrial management schema had four unique characteristics. Material incentives were de-emphasized, but not abolished, in favor of moral incentives designed to inculcate an enthusiasm for labor, which in turn allowed the state to sustain a high rate of investment for the entirety of the Mao era. Moreover, utilizing ideological fervor over bonuses followed from the late Maoist strategy of ‘walking on two legs’ and transforming the ideological superstructure while pursuing modernization. Secondly, workers’ living standards depended on social benefits more than cash wages. Thirdly, workers had guaranteed job security, and, fourthly, the state actively worked to repress inequality between cadre and workers while incorporating workers into management.^[11] This system took shape between the final years of the revolutionary war and the Cultural Revolution, and was marked by oscillations between the SWCs as institutional expressions of workers’ power and mass movements of the GLF and the early years of the Cultural Revolution, until finally giving way to a material incentive-based system following Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power.

Following the founding of the PRC, the institutional basis of Mao-Era management was rapidly extended to the private sector in preparation for the transition to a planned economy. The persistence of private enterprise in the early years of the PRC is often invoked to defend the CCP’s post-reform trajectory. During the revolutionary war, as well as the New Democratic phase of the revolution, the national bourgeoisie were seen as a subordinate partner to the worker-peasant alliance. According to Mao’s logic, the national bourgeoisie’s weakness in the face of imperialism rendered it unable to assert itself as an independent political force and was thus condemned to vacillate between revolution and reaction. The CPC’s policy, therefore, was to pry the national bourgeoisie away from the Guomindang and induce them to cooperate with the revolutionary government.

The national bourgeoisie is a class that is politically very weak and vacillating. But the majority of its members may either join the people's democratic revolution or take a neutral stand, because they too are persecuted and fettered by imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism. They are part of the broad masses of the people but not the main body, nor are they a force that determines the character of the revolution…At the present stage the majority of the national bourgeoisie has a growing hatred of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek; its left-wingers attach themselves to the Communist Party and its right-wingers to the Kuomintang, while its middle elements take a hesitant, wait-and-see attitude between the two parties. These circumstances make it necessary and possible for us to win over the majority of the national bourgeoisie and isolate the minority. To achieve this aim, we should be prudent in dealing with the economic position of this class and in principle should adopt a blanket policy of protection. Otherwise we shall commit political errors.^[12]

In practice, the CPC’s conciliatory policy towards the national bourgeoisie did not imply allowing the full development of capitalism before advancing towards socialism once the productive forces had sufficiently developed. Rather, a temporary tolerance of private enterprises was followed by gradual nationalization with compensation. In the years immediately following the revolution, in which land reform and reconstruction were the order of the day, the private sector actually expanded. As China’s economy was rebuilt from 1949 to 1953, the number of private enterprises increased from 123,000 to 150,000, and the number of privately employed workers increased from 1,644,000 to 2,231,000.^[13] Nonetheless, the expansion of state-owned enterprises outpaced that of private enterprises. In 1953, the peak of the New Democratic stage of the Chinese revolution, private enterprise accounted for only 29 percent of China’s total industrial output despite the growth of the total number of private enterprises.^[14] By June of 1953, Mao Zedong defined the party’s economic goals as socialist transition in agriculture via the formation of agricultural production cooperatives and socialist transition in industry via nationalization or buying out the national bourgeoisie. The “New Democratic Social Order” was, for Mao, not a long-term state of affairs to facilitate a gradual transition to socialism after building up the productive forces for an indefinite period of time, but was to be phased out step-by-step as soon as semi-feudal production relations were abolished. In 1953, he estimated that the transition from a mixed economy to a planned economy would take 15 years.^[15] In practice, it took three years. Private enterprises were nationalized at a breakneck pace, comprising 28 percent of industrial production in 1954 and barely one percent in 1956.^[16] By the end of the first five-year plan in 1957, the private sector’s contribution to China’s industrial output was negligible.^[17]

The process of bringing private enterprise under state control involved establishing staff-and-workers’ congresses (SWCs) prior to conversion of the enterprise into a state-private joint venture, followed by nationalization. The subordination of private capital was accelerated by a series of mass movements beginning with the Five Antis campaign, a 1952 movement ostensibly directed at the eradication of corrupt capitalists who engaged in bribery, tax evasion, stealing public resources, breaking contracts with the state, and selling intelligence.^[18] The campaign not only attacked individual capitalists but dramatically altered the balance of power in private firms. Labor unions mobilized workers to ‘speak bitterness’ against their bosses. As class struggle intensified, capitalists suspended hiring and payment of wages, prompting workers and CPC cadre to form Committees for Promoting Production and Saving Costs to oversee private business’ expenditure, and in some factories, trade unions exercised de facto control over factory finances.^[19] Although the pace at which private enterprises were brought under state control may have exceeded Mao’s initial estimate, there was no doubt that the coexistence of public and private property was never meant to be a permanent state of affairs. In capitalist enterprises in the early 1950s, the owners’ managerial authority was substantially undermined by SWMs, mass movements, and price controls.^[20]

Although bringing private enterprise under public control involved organizing and empowering the workers, the planning apparatus that took shape tended to empower mid-level cadre at the expense of grassroots workers. The importance of Soviet advisors exacerbated these bureaucratic tendencies even as Soviet assistance made it possible for China to industrialize. China’s first five-year plan involved technology transfers on a massive scale, in addition to an influx of Soviet and Eastern European experts. Soviet assistance to China was invaluable for the early stages of industrialization, and the estimated 3.4 billion dollars of assistance established the foundations of China’s coal mining, oil refining, mechanical engineering, and machine tools, among many other industries.^[21]

Despite the scale of Soviet aid, China would not replicate the Soviet model wholesale. Maoist China would subsequently pursue a developmental strategy that sought to simultaneously industrialize while transforming the superstructure to render the restoration of capitalism impossible. Even before the Soviets withdrew their experts during the Great Leap Forward, differences between the Chinese Communist Party’s outlook and the Soviet Union’s advisers’ approach were evident. In 1956, a Soviet delegation to Tianjin complained about the Chinese tendency towards “wage-levelling” and the “so-called ‘democratic’ path of discussion.”^[22] While Soviet experts viewed the superiority of one-man management as self-evident, Mao wrote, “all enterprises in capitalist countries put this principle into effect. There should be a basic distinction between the principles governing management of socialist and capitalist enterprises” in his critique of Stalin’s Economic Problems of Socialism.^[23]

SWCs and Bureaucratic Planning

Following the transition from a mixed economy to a planned economy, Staff and Workers Congresses’ actual authority may never have lived up to their official description, but subsequent studies and interviews with retired workers indicate an element of substantive democracy, albeit unevenly applied. From 1953 to 1956, when the planned economy was in its infancy, quotas were relatively flexible and could be modified based on changing conditions and grassroots criticism, but after 1956, when, in official discourse, the socialist transformation of industry was complete, the ossification of a top-down planning apparatus strengthened mid-level cadre relative to both cadre and SWCs on the shop floor. Although workers’ political power was strengthened relative to factory cadres, non-negotiable demands from above sapped enthusiasm for democratic management. Li Huaiyin and Joel Andreas’ interviews with retired workers indicate that throughout the period of the planned economy, from 1956-1978, SWCs gave workers a degree of substantive authority in the workplace, despite the disruption of the PRC’s official trade unions and SWCs during the Cultural Revolution.

The process by which SWC leadership was chosen prior to the SOE reforms contrasts favorably with SWCs in contemporary state-owned enterprises, to say nothing of private industry, in which SWCs are almost unheard of. Representatives were typically nominated by teams of ten to twenty workers, which would each choose one or two representatives, or larger teams of 50-60 choosing five or six representatives. The nomination process varied from firm to firm, with some factory management committees exercising veto power over nominees, but others relying on grassroots work teams to elect representatives. According to a retired worker of the Xi’an Instrument Factory, “I was chosen as a representative many times. Representatives were not appointed by the factory leader, but were chosen from the bottom up.”^[24]

The concrete functioning of Staff-and-Workers Congresses was marked both by an attempt to transform the organization of labor and the reduction of managerial authority on one hand, and productivism more concerned with encouraging workers to join in campaigns to improve efficiency and reduce waste on the other. For rank-and-file workers, they were avenues to air a variety of concerns and grievances as well as assert authority in the workplace. Apart from democratizing the workplace and increasing productivity, workers would often use SWCs to voice safety-related or living-standard-related concerns. Representatives’ safety concerns could result in concrete action, as evidenced by production and management records and interviews with former employees. A retired worker interviewed by Li Huaiyin, who went to work at the Huanggang Prefecture Bedsheet Factory in 1967, remembers raising two proposals as a representative. His two proposals concerned quality control and the conservation of resources, both of which were accepted by management. Another retired worker from the Xi’An Instrument Factory recalled, “The proposals I remember most clearly are strengthening public security management in the factory area, strengthening the bicycle management of factory employees, and strengthening the fire fighting force in the factory area.” As a result, firefighting personnel expanded from 12 to 24.^[25]

Paradoxically, the Great Leap Forward both encouraged organizational experimentation and strengthened the bureaucracy over rank-and-file workers, with the drive towards rapid increase of production adversely affecting both the decision-making power of SWCs and workers’ enthusiasm for production. The Great Leap Forward exacerbated problems of the bureaucratic planning apparatus as quantity dominated economic considerations. Mid-level cadre were incentivized to increase quotas regardless of concrete conditions, often without concern for material constraints. In a pattern familiar to anyone acquainted with Donald Filtzer’s research on Soviet industrialization, workers often resisted pressure from above by reducing the quality of labor and producing large quantities of unusable goods.^[26]

Retired workers of Guangzhou’s TY Factory favorably recalled pre-Great Leap Forward democratic management. “If you had opinions about production or anything else, you could bring them up through production meetings, team meetings, and workshop meetings. If others thought you were right, then they would follow your suggestions.”^[27] After the TY Factory was placed under direct control of the Guangzhou Municipal Electrical and Mechanical Bureau, direct producers who had previously approached work with enthusiasm now pushed back against unrealistic targets via “perfunctory production.” If workers could not push back against demands from above, they would produce unusable goods. At the height of the Great Leap Forward, the TY Factory wasted “an amount equivalent to over 180,000 liang of gold (9000kg)” in 1959 alone.^[28]

Democratic management in light industry was similarly adversely influenced by demands from the bureaucracy. Archives of the Yong’An Textile Company No. 1 Factory indicate that Staff-and-Workers congresses, which were initially sites of debate and discussion, transformed into formalities whose only purpose was to rubber-stamp decisions made in advance. In response, workers quickly adopted an indifferent attitude towards SWCs. As one representative of the democratic management committee wrote, “relevant planning and production problems have already been discussed at the factory affairs meeting and suggestions already raised. When the democratic management meeting opens, there is nothing left to discuss.”^[29]

The Great Leap Forward was disastrous for China’s living standards, but it was also a time of social experimentation. In a climate in which communism was not a distant horizon, but an immanently achievable reality, reorganization of industrial management took place alongside communization of agriculture. The Angang Constitution, formulated in China’s industrial heartland, codified a participatory managerial structure in which party cadre and technicians would be subject to criticism from below as well as an obligation to participate in productive labor.

If the first five-year plan ossified the Leninist party-state and the Great Leap Forward simultaneously broke from Leninist orthodoxy in planning while undermining workers’ power at the shop floor, the Cultural Revolution would (partially) break the power of party cadre and reinvigorate participatory management in industry. Experiments in management innovated during the Great Leap Forward would be institutionalized on a large scale during the Cultural Revolution. After China recovered from the Great Leap Forward and until Mao’s death, from 1962 to 1976, China would pursue an industrialization program based on limited consumption and high rates of investment. This heavy-industry-centered socialist austerity was combined with mass mobilization and cultural transformation designed as “a thoroughgoing program of superstructural change designed to make possible a simultaneous restructuring of the economic base, and to render impossible any capitalist restoration.”^[30]

1. Harry Braverman. Labor and Monopoly Capital (Monthly Review Press, 1998), 9.

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2. Ibid, 10.

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3. Yu Jianrong 于建嵘, Anyuan Jilu: Yi ge Jieji de Guangrong yu Mengxiang安远记录：一个阶级的光荣与梦想 [Anyuan Record: The Glory and Dreams of a Class], (Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2011), 6.

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4. Ibid.

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5. Joseph K.S. Yick, Making Urban Revolution in China: The CCP-GMD Struggle for Beiping-Tianjin 1945-1949, (Routledge, 1995), 184.

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6. Koji Hirata, Making Mao’s Steelworks: Industrial Manchuria and the Transnational Origins of Chinese Socialism, (Cambridge University Press, 2024), 109.

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7. Joel Andreas, Disenfranchised: The Rise and Fall of Industrial Citizenship in China, (Oxford University Press, 2019), 27.

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8. Li Huaiyin 李怀印, “Chaoyue ‘dangjia zuozhu’ yu ‘kuoda minzhu’- gaige qian sanshi nian guoying qiye ‘shiti zhili’ moshi tanxi” 超越‘当家作主’与‘扩大民主’--改革前三十年国营企业‘实体治理模式探析 [beyond ‘masters of the factory’ and ‘expanded democracy’ - an analysis of the substantive governance model in the thirty years preceding reform], Open Times, May, 2020 https://www.opentimes.cn/html/Abstract/20693.html

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9. North China First Workers’ Congress 华北第一届职工代表会议, “ Guanyu zai guoying gongchang qiye zhong jianli gongchang guanli weiyuanhui yu gongchang zhigong daibiao huiyi de jueding关于在国营工厂企业中建立工厂管理委员会与工厂职工代表会议的决定”[ Decision on the Establishment of Factory Management Committees and Factory Workers' Representative Conferences in State-Owned Factory Enterprises], May 2, 1949, https://www.marxists.org/chinese/reference-books/chineserevolution/19500207/shanghai-disi9.html

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10. Chris Bramall, Chinese Economic Development, (Routledge, 2009), 90.

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11. Hao Qi, “’Distribution According to Work:’ An Historical Analysis of the Incentive System in China’s State-Owned Sector,” Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol 50, Issue 2, June 1, 2018, 5.

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12. Mao Zedong, “On the Question of the National Bourgeoisie and the Enlightened Gentry,” March 1, 1948, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_32.htm

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13. Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic, (The Free Press, 1999,) 84.

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14. Ibid.

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15. Mao Zedong, “Refute Right Deviationist Views that Depart from the General Line,” June 15, 1953, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_28.htm

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16. Bramall, Chinese Economic Development, 120.

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17. Ibid, 90.

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18. Communist Party of China, “What is the ‘Three Antis,” and ‘Five Antis’ Movement?” http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64156/64157/4418414.html

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19. Li Huayin, The Master in Bondage: Factory Workers in China 1949-2019, (Stanford University Press, 2023), 170.

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20. Meisner, Mao’s China and After, 83.

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21. Austin Jerslid, The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History, (University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 38.

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22. Ibid, 49.

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23. Mao Zedong, A Critique of Soviet Economics, (Monthly Review Press, 1977), 73.

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24. Li Huaiyin, “Chaoyue ‘dangjia zuozhu’ yu ‘kuoda minzhu’- gaige qian sanshi nian guoying qiye ‘shiti zhili’ moshi tanxi” 超越‘当家作主’与‘扩大民主’--改革前三十年国营企业‘实体治理模式探析 [beyond ‘masters of the factory’ and ‘expanded democracy’ - an analysis of the substantive governance model in the thirty years preceding reform]

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25. Ibid.

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26. Donald Filtzer, Soviet Workers and Stalinist Industrialization: The Formation of Modern Soviet Production Relations, 1928-1941, (M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1986), 120.

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27. Jia Wenjuan, “From Passion to Deception- Daily Life at the Grassroots under State Production before and after the Great Leap Forward: an Investigation of the TY Factory in Guangzhou (1956-1965)” in Factory Politics in the People’s Republic of China, ed. Joel Andreas, (Brill, 2020), 11.

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28. Ibid, 20.

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29. Wang Hua 汪 华, “gongren canyu, zhengzhi dongyuan yu guojia zhengquan jianshe” 工人参与，政治动员与国家政权建设一项关于车间民主的社会学考察（1956～1965) [Workers participation, political activists and national regime construction- a sociological investigation of shop-floor democracy], Open Times, October 2012. http://www.opentimes.cn/html/Abstract/1818.html

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30. Bramall, Chinese Economic Development, 154.

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