Going Nowhere: Superficial Socialism and the Problem of Value

by Theryn Arnold, Nov. 18, 2026

Reviewing The Blueprint: How Socialism Can Work in the Real World by Bhaskar Sunkara, Ben Burgis and Mike Beggs, Theryn Argues that overcoming the market and value relations remains the benchmark for what a feasible socialism must accomplish.

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Verso, 2026

A Radical Destination?[1]

For decades, Marxists and socialists have debated the role of markets and their relationship to socialism. The question has usually come down to whether markets can exist without capitalism. Bhaskar Sunkara, Ben Burgis and Mike Beggs think they can, and make the case in their new book, The Blueprint: How Socialism Can Work in the Real World. It claims that socialism indeed can work in a system where “competitive markets and state planning coexist side by side.”[2] Cosma Shalizi calls it the clearest case for market socialism in a generation.[3] In October, defending the book on X (formerly Twitter), Sunkara granted that it proposes a socialized market sector for commodity production, but argued that this sector would have no wage labour, far more even incomes, and an extensive power of exit. Even if it is not the ultimate horizon, he wrote, it is “a radical destination.”[4]

This is quite an ambitious project which should be taken seriously. However, while I may commend the authors for their rigour, the object of that rigour is not the ground on which most Marxists have historically operated; that is, the argument over socialism and markets has turned on the question of value: whether commodity production can be brought under conscious social control, or whether it imposes its own laws on everyone inside it, owners or not. Instead, the authors move the question to two other grounds, namely, the injustice of the employer's power and the efficiency of prices as a way of coordinating production. Critics of market socialism can concede these points and still hold that commodity production without capitalists is not a destination beyond capitalism. Even if such a model answers complaints people have about capitalism (say: no bosses, far more equal incomes, democratic workplaces, a big public sector), it leaves the root of the problem in place: competition between producers, and the value relation behind it, will keep producing the same grievances. I return to this below.

The Model

The book's starting point is what Robert Heilbroner called "Slightly Imaginary Sweden": an expansive welfare state with free university, socialized health care and generous cash transfers.[5] The authors then build their model on top of it. Firms in the commodity-producing sector are collectively run by their workers, who choose management democratically and share in net revenue, financed by public banks rather than private capital. Natural monopolies such as energy and communications are run directly by the state, while a large non-commodity sector provides health, education, care and culture out of public budgets. A labour commission sets benchmark wages and conditions that firms must meet, while ecological costs are handled by taxes and fees that build them into market prices.

The lineage the authors trace is mostly through Oskar Lange, by far the most cited author in the book, as well as Alec Nove’s Economics of Feasible Socialism.[6] Chapter Four leans on Joan Robinson and on Diane Elson's proposal for "socialised markets," while Chapter Five draws its account of the democratic firm from Jaroslav Vanek and names David Schweickart's model of economic democracy as a key inspiration (p. 395n37). The later chapters cover incomes and housing, macroeconomic policy, the objections a sceptic (such as myself) might raise, and a closing case for socialism as the next stage of civilizational progress.

The Terrain of the Debate

The Blueprint enters an argument that was last fought in earnest in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Nove's aforementioned Economics of Feasible Socialism (1983) argued that any socialism worth having (variety and choice without bureaucratic shortage) would keep markets for most goods. His case began from scarcity: unless one assumes abundance, someone must allocate resources between competing uses. A modern economy produces goods in the millions, and in his view planning all of them without markets generates bureaucracy and inefficiency that no amount of democracy can cure, as the Soviet record showed. Large-scale, interconnected sectors such as energy and heavy industry could be centrally planned, but shoes, clothes and cabbages were better left to markets among state, socialized and co-operative enterprises. The Marxist Ernest Mandel answered in the New Left Review in 1986, defending democratically planned production against Nove's market.[7] He argued that Nove overstated the problem of complexity, since most output is intermediate goods or made to established patterns, and that the choice between bureaucratic command and the market was a false one: production could be planned through articulated self-management, with democratic councils setting priorities and producers working out the details. Above all, he argued that the market was a despotism over producers’ time and effort, enforced through lay-offs and unemployment, and that tying incomes to the profits of competing firms would push the whole economy toward irrationality. Nove replied that Mandel had drawn the line between plan and market in the wrong place: goods made to prior order are no less shaped by the market, since the demand for components derives from the market demand for whatever they go into.[8] Mandel came back in 1988 with “The Myth of Market Socialism,” narrowing the dispute to whether Marx’s socialism, a society in which commodity production, classes and the state had withered away, was desirable and possible at all. Against Nove’s realism, he set the record of actual market economies, with their periodic bankruptcies and mass unemployment, and argued that no firm under competitive pressure can act in the interest of society as a whole, however it is owned.[9]

Later that year Diane Elson intervened with "Market Socialism or Socialization of the Market?", rejecting both the market socialist model and centralized planning in favour of public institutions that would socialize the information markets generate.[10] David McNally's Against the Market (1993) carried the critique back to Marx and the classical economists.[11] In 1998 Bertell Ollman staged a new round of the argument in Market Socialism: The Debate Among Socialists, a structured exchange in which Schweickart and James Lawler each made the case for market socialism, Hillel Ticktin and Ollman made the case against, and all four then criticized and answered one another.[12]

What the Marxist side of this debate shared was a claim about value. For Mandel, McNally, Ollman and Ticktin, a market is the form in which separate producers' labour is made social after the fact, through exchange. Production for exchange means competition; competition means firms must cut costs and accumulate, and those pressures act on producers, whoever owns the firm. Elson, who wanted to keep markets, approached the problem from the other direction, proposing public institutions that would bring the market's workings under social control. McNally's objection was that she got there by reducing commodity fetishism to an information problem, so that socializing the market came to mean fair access to market information rather than decommodification.[13] The dispute was over whether those relations could be tamed or had to be abolished. Nobody on either side thought the question was simply how well prices transmit information. In this sense, The Blueprint misses the point. While Elson is cited around thirty times and enlisted as an ally, and her price commissions and network coordinators folded into the model, Mandel appears mostly as a foil: the planner (derogatory) who would whittle down product varieties by referendum (pp. 100–1, 131). McNally gets a paragraph in Chapter Four, where his argument is presented as Hayek's slippery slope run in reverse (p. 135). But McNally’s point was that the issue is not whether markets coexist with other mechanisms but whether allocation follows the profit signals of competitive markets, an argument he built from the concessions of two market socialists, Włodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski.[14] The book also misses the deeper point of McNally’s study, which places market socialism in a lineage going back to Marx’s critique of Proudhon and the other “first market socialists,” whose schemes kept exchange but tried to abolish exploitation.[15] A model with worker-owned firms trading commodities under fair conditions is close to what Marx was attacking in The Poverty of Philosophy and in the Grundrisse passages on labour money.[16] Unfortunately, The Blueprint misses this as well. Ollman's volume, the one place the Marxist case against Schweickart's model was made at length, does not appear at all, although Schweickart himself is a named inspiration. In other words, The Blueprint's genealogy keeps the institutional proposals of the debate and drops its theory of value. The authors come close to saying so themselves. In the chapter asking whether their model is even socialism, they concede that anyone who believes socialism requires overcoming the commodity form should regard their model as non-socialist (pp. 337–8). Take that, Marxists!

Where Does Profit Come From?

The aforementioned relocation of terrain starts in Chapter One. The case against capitalism is grounded in Rawls and G. A. Cohen and in the unfreedom of the workplace, a theme the closing chapter returns to with the boss who decides when you may talk and when you may use the bathroom. These are, of course, real problems and grievances, but exploitation, understood in the Marxist sense, it is not! Indeed, exploitation, in the sense of surplus labour appropriated through the wage relation, barely appears, and value relations not at all. Grounding an anti-capitalist critique in Rawls, Cohen, and workplace coercion puts the weight on distributive justice and managerial domination. While these are legitimate ethical complaints, they miss the core Marxist insight: capitalism’s foundational dynamic is the structural extraction of surplus value through value relations, regardless of how friendly or democratic a boss might be. A defender of the book could reasonably ask why this matters. If workers elect their managers, incomes are far more equal, and a large public sector provides health, education, and care, then the complaints that bring people to socialism have been answered, and insisting that the result is still commodity production looks like a purity test. Domination and inequality hurt people; the value form, as an abstraction, does not. The answer is that the value relation is what keeps producing those complaints, and the book concedes as much in four places. Its benchmark wages exist because competing worker-run firms will otherwise exploit themselves; the account of Yugoslavia blames self-managed firms’ defensive behaviour on pressures from outside them; its treatment of ecology admits co-operatives will be tempted to cut corners, and it grants that the world market will keep transferring value from South to North whoever owns the firms. In each case the grievance returns because the compulsion behind it remains.

This framing allows the authors, by Chapter Three, to summarize their critique of capitalism as a problem of inequality, unfreedom at work, and market irrationalities (p. 63). Each of these is something a reformed price system with safeguards could, in principle, correct, and that is the solution the book proposes (pp. 86–7). Chapter Four is where this matters most, because it is where the book defends the commodity-producing sector. It opens with a vignette and sets Marx's account of commodity fetishism up as the position to be defeated.[17] The case that follows is Lange's, but updated: markets aggregate dispersed information, the economy is too complex for any planner to grasp, and prices let millions of decisions coordinate without anyone commanding them. What the chapter never asks is why products take the commodity form in the first place, or where the surplus that worker-run firms will compete over comes from. For a book about the economics of socialism, there is a striking absence of any account of profit. This is where the book's paragraph on McNally (p. 135) falls short. McNally's point was that the market is a social relation through which labour is compelled and disciplined, and so cannot be borrowed as a neutral technique. The authors’ reply, that markets are easily combined with regulation, public provision and planning (p. 136), answers an argument he did not make.

The point is worth pressing. Once firms produce for exchange, their survival depends on selling at prices set by competitors, and as such, that requirement reaches into the labour process: the pace of work, the length of the working day, the choice of technique and the level of pay, whoever owns the firm. Regulation can set a floor under these pressures, as the book's benchmark wages do, but the pressures come with the market rather than from its misuse. To treat the market as one technique among others, to be combined with planning and public provision as needed, is to assume that its allocative function can be separated from the social relations through which it works, which is exactly what McNally denied. Thus, by setting commodity fetishism up as a foil and treating markets as information processors, Chapter Four inherits exactly the reading of Elson that McNally criticized.

Elson’s work is instructive here in another way; before writing about socialized markets, she wrote "The Value Theory of Labour," an account of how value expresses the social form of labour in capitalism, which McNally critiqued for treating abstract labour as transhistorical.[18] Her later institutional proposals grew out of that theory. Price and wage commissions, public information networks, and associations of buyers and sellers were meant to bring into the open the social coordination of labour that the price form conceals, so that decisions about what to produce, and how much labour to spend on it, could be made collectively and in public. The Blueprint borrows these mechanisms without the account of value that gave them their purpose. Taken out of that account, they become tools for managing market outcomes rather than for changing how social labour is organized, and working time becomes a matter of distributing hours, not of who decides how society’s labour time is allocated. Prices, for Marx, are the surface form in which value appears.[19] A book that stays at the level of prices can describe that surface in great detail but fail to explain the underlying value relations that generate them; specifically, how socially necessary labour time creates value, and how surplus labor is extracted at the point of production to yield profit.

Be Your Own Boss!

Chapter Five makes the democratic firm the centre of the model. Following Vanek, the authors argue that workers should elect management, set policy and share in net revenue, with public banks supplying finance so that no outside owner holds a claim on the firm. Some of the proposals amount to something like a firm-level basic income for worker-members.

The difficulty is that democratizing ownership is compatible with capitalism. Worker co-operatives exist now, inside capitalist economies, and they buy inputs, sell outputs, and compete like any other firm.[20] Marx saw this in the co-operative factories of his own day. They showed that production could be organized without a capitalist, but they did so, he wrote, by "making the associated labourers into their own capitalist."[21] In other words, the antagonism between capital and labour moves inside the firm rather than disappearing. The book half-concedes this. Its system of benchmark wages and conditions exists to stop democratic firms from taking what the authors call the low road: competing on cost through wage restraint and work intensification, a spiral of self-exploitation. That is an acknowledgment that competition between worker-run firms exerts the same pressure on the labour process that it exerts on capitalist ones. The benchmarks are a regulatory floor placed under that pressure. Hence, they do not remove its source. This is also the point at which Sunkara's tweet gives way.[22] A sector with no wage labour, in his sense, still produces for exchange, still answers to competitors, and still disciplines its own members to stay solvent. The capitalist as a person is gone, but the compulsion of the capitalist personified remains.[23]

Of course, readers of Cosmonaut are shouting ‘Yugoslavia’ at their screens. Indeed, it is the only country to run self-managed firms in markets at national scale. Discussion of the model waits until Chapter Nine, where the authors grant that Yugoslav workers' councils had real authority over pay, hiring and surpluses. But they argue that the later failures, from unemployment to inflation to foreign borrowing, came from the decentralized banking and fiscal system fixed by the 1974 constitution, which left the state without the tools to manage the economy. Firms hoarded jobs and resisted restructuring because they were defending themselves in an unstable environment. Their model, with unified public banks and a strong welfare state, is designed to avoid this.[24]

Unfortunately, this is insufficient: this answer concedes the point it is meant to refute. If self-managed firms behaved defensively because of the pressures around them, then the pressures of commodity production acted on workers' councils as they act on any firm. The authors' remedy is a stronger central state to manage those pressures from outside. That assumes a state can stand above commodity production and steer it, which is the question the next section takes up. Yugoslavia's fragmentation was not simply bad institutional design laid over self-management.[25] Regional republics and banks represented competing groups of self-managed enterprises in a market, so the fragmentation can be read as the political form self-managed commodity production took.

The State as Post Office

Chapter Six opens in a post office on a Saturday morning. A clerk stamps a package, a woman renews her passport, someone mails letters for a ballot initiative, and all of them are dealing with the state as a means of society's self-organization rather than a power standing over it (p. 183). The image sets the tone for what follows.

What follows is a theory of the capitalist state. The state, for these authors, is an ensemble of institutions staffed by people with ties to business, structurally biased toward capital, able to act with relative autonomy mainly in order to manage capitalism better. The footnote for this paragraph is Ralph Miliband's The State in Capitalist Society, although relative autonomy is the language of Miliband's debate opponent, Nicos Poulantzas.[26] From there, the authors conclude that socialists face a double task: to contest the state and to transform it, and that the real question is what kind of state socialists create and who controls it (p. 184). Under democratic socialism, the state becomes the organizer of social cooperation.

The Marxist tradition the book skips here asked a prior question: why does the capitalist state take the form it does at all? The state derivation debate of the 1970s and Simon Clarke's work after it answered that the separation of the political from the economic is grounded in commodity production.[27] Where social labour is coordinated through the exchange of commodities between formally free and equal owners, a public power has to stand apart from production to guarantee contract, property and money. The authors notice the separation, calling it a supposed division between the political and the economic (p. 183). But they treat it as a feature of capitalism that a socialist state could simply choose its way out of, while keeping the commodity sector that produces it. They even note that the public sector would be shaped by the market environment, facing monetary costs and budgets like everything else (p. 186). If commodity production remains, the form of state it generates should be expected to remain with it. Lenin's argument in The State and Revolution that the state has to be smashed rather than taken over was an argument about exactly this![28] The same gap shows at the scale of the world market. The authors concede that world markets transfer value from the Global South to the North and that cooperative ownership alone would not change this (pp. 351–2). Their response is a moral duty to aid development, along with the system's relative insulation from international capital flows. What the book does not consider is that worker-run firms selling on the world market would face its competitive pressures as any national capital does.[29] Strangely, China, the largest existing attempt to combine markets with a state calling itself socialist, appears in a single footnote that dismisses it as a restoration of capitalism (p. 386n66).[30]

What the History Shows

The strongest chapter is the second. It gives a clear, readable history of the Soviet command economy and of Hungary's New Economic Mechanism after 1968, the reform Hungarians nicknamed goulash communism. Its distinction between indicative planning, which sets targets and steers through incentives, and imperative planning, which issues binding orders, is useful, and readers new to these debates will come away better equipped. Assuming the history holds up, it is a fine chapter.

However, it does less than the book needs it to. A history of plans that failed is not a refutation of planning as such, any more than a history of capitalist crises is necessarily a refutation of markets. And the chapter's preferred case does not obviously support its conclusion. Hungary's reformed economy ended the 1980s heavily indebted to Western creditors, and the reformers' own trajectory ran toward capitalism rather than a stable middle ground.[31] That market reforms answered some failures of Soviet planning does not show that market socialism resolves the problems of actually existing socialism.

What a Blueprint Would Need

The Blueprint is correct that socialists owe people a credible account of the society they want, and correct that gesturing at the abolition of money is not one. But a Marxist account of socialist economy would have to begin where this book does not. It would need a theory of value to explain what commodity production does to the labour inside the hidden abode, and why a market cannot simply be borrowed as a tool. It would need an account of the world market, since no socialist economy will be built outside one. And it would need a theory of the state that starts from the form the state takes, rather than from who staffs it.

The book's brief treatment of ecology, in its reply to Erik Olin Wright's criticisms of capitalism, shows what is at stake in the absence of all three. Environmental harm is treated as an externality to be priced through taxes and policed by a strong public sector, with the concession that co-operative firms may still be tempted to cut corners (pp. 368–9). This concession reveals the whole problem with The Blueprint’s vision of market socialism. Firms that compete on cost and share in net revenue have a direct interest in every corner they can cut, and a market sector that must grow to stay solvent will keep expanding output whatever the tax rate. Pricing treats the damage as a mistake in the price signal, when it follows from production for exchange itself. The world market compounds this, since firms facing foreign competitors will press to keep ecological costs low or move the dirtiest production elsewhere. And a state whose budgets depend on a healthy commodity sector, as the authors admit theirs would (p. 186), has its own reasons not to tax that sector too hard. Climate change is precisely the kind of task a socialist economy will have to plan for directly, yetit is the task this model is least equipped to handle.

The authors of The Blueprint: How Socialism Can Work in the Real World set out to show that socialism can work in the real world. What they have shown is that a commodity economy can be run with more equality, more democracy at work, and a larger public sector than the one we have now. This is a program worth debating; socialists will certainly argue about it. Yet it is also a different program from the one the title promises, because it leaves the value relation, and the state form built on it, where it found them.

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  1. This title of this article plays on Bhaskar Sunkara (@sunraysunray), “Yes, socialized market sector for commodity production. But sector doesn’t have wage labor . . . ,” X, October 6, 2026, https://x.com/sunraysunray/status/2107536274378588198.

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  2. Bhaskar Sunkara, Ben Burgis, and Mike Beggs, The Blueprint: How Socialism Can Work in the Real World (London: Verso, 2026). The quoted description is from the publisher’s page, https://www.versobooks.com/en-ca/products/2843-the-blueprint. Subsequent page references to The Blueprint are given in parentheses in the text.

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  3. Cosma Rohilla Shalizi, “Books to Read While the Algae Grow in Your Fur, June 2026,” Three-Toed Sloth (blog), June 30, 2026, https://bactra.org/weblog/algae-2026-06.html.

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  4. Sunkara, “Yes, socialized market sector.”

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  5. Sunkara, Burgis, and Beggs, Blueprint, 364. Robert Pollin attributes the phrase to Heilbroner as his teacher: Robert Pollin, “Is Full Employment Possible under Globalization?,” Working Paper Series no. 141 (Amherst: Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, rev. April 2008), 6, https://peri.umass.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/WP141.pdf.

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  6. Alec Nove, The Economics of Feasible Socialism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983).

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  7. Ernest Mandel, “In Defence of Socialist Planning,” New Left Review I, no. 159 (1986): 5–37.

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  8. Alec Nove, “Markets and Socialism,” New Left Review I, no. 161 (1987): 98–104

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  9. Ernest Mandel, “The Myth of Market Socialism,” New Left Review I, no. 169 (1988): 108–20.

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  10. Diane Elson, “Market Socialism or Socialization of the Market?,” New Left Review I, no. 172 (1988): 3–44.

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  11. David McNally, Against the Market: Political Economy, Market Socialism and the Marxist Critique (London: Verso, 1993).

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  12. Bertell Ollman, ed., Market Socialism: The Debate Among Socialists (New York: Routledge, 1998). Notably, The Blueprint makes no mention of Ollman, Ticktin or Lawler and does not cite the volume. Chapter 5’s notes do cite Pranab Bardhan and John Roemer, eds., Market Socialism: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), twice (nn. 31 and 36). In other words, the book draws on the collection where market socialists debated among themselves, but not the one where they debated their Marxist critics.

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  13. McNally, Against the Market, 213–16.

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  14. McNally, Against the Market, 173–74, drawing on Włodzimierz Brus and Kazimierz Laski, From Marx to the Market: Socialism in Search of an Economic System (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

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  15. McNally, Against the Market, 4; see also chap. 5.

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  16. Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 6 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976), 105–212; Karl Marx, “The Chapter on Money,” in Economic Manuscripts of 1857–58, vol. 28 of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986).

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  17. Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1976), 163–77 (fetishism) and 283–339 (labour process, valorization, rate of surplus value).

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  18. Diane Elson, “The Value Theory of Labour,” in Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism, ed. Diane Elson (London: CSE Books, 1979), 115–80. For McNally’s objection, see McNally, Against the Market, 255–56n85. Here, he accuses Elson of conflating social labour and abstract labour.

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  19. I. I. Rubin, Essays on Marx’s Theory of Value, trans. Miloš Samardžija and Fredy Perlman (Detroit: Black & Red, 1972).

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  20. Sharryn Kasmir, The Myth of Mondragón: Cooperatives, Politics, and Working-Class Life in a Basque Town (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).

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  21. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 3, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 37 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1998), 286.

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  22. Sunkara, “Yes, socialized market sector.”

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  23. Søren Mau, Mute Compulsion: A Marxist Theory of the Economic Power of Capital (London: Verso, 2023). See also Theryn D. Arnold and F. Evnur Taran, “Reanimating Marxist State Theory: On the Material Force of Capital’s Silent Power,” Human Geography 19, no. 1 (2026): 173–79, https://doi.org/10.1177/19427786251367765.

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  24. Susan L. Woodward, Socialist Unemployment: The Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945–1990 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

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  25. See Catherine Samary, Yugoslavia Dismembered, trans. Peter Drucker (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995).

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  26. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: New Left Books, 1973). For the debate between them, see Nicos Poulantzas, “The Problem of the Capitalist State,” New Left Review I, no. 58 (1969): 67–78; Ralph Miliband, “The Capitalist State: Reply to Nicos Poulantzas,” New Left Review I, no. 59 (1970): 53–60.

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  27. Evgeny Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory, trans. Barbara Einhorn, ed. Chris Arthur (London: Ink Links, 1978); John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, eds., State and Capital: A Marxist Debate (London: Edward Arnold, 1978); Simon Clarke, ed., The State Debate (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991).

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  28. V. I. Lenin, The State and Revolution, in Collected Works, vol. 25 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 381–492. Lenin draws the argument from Karl Marx, The Civil War in France, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, vol. 22 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1986). To see where Lenin’s theory of the state anticipates the work of Simon Clarke, see V. I. Lenin, “The State: A Lecture Delivered at the Sverdlov University, July 11, 1919,” Marxists Internet Archive, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/jul/11.htm.

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  29. Simon Clarke, “The Global Accumulation of Capital and the Periodisation of the Capitalist State Form,” in Open Marxism, vol. 1, Dialectics and History, ed. Werner Bonefeld, Richard Gunn, and Kosmas Psychopedis (London: Pluto Press, 1992); John Holloway, “Global Capital and the National State,” Capital & Class 18, no. 1 (1994): 23–49.

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  30. On China’s reform debate and its engagement with East European market socialists, see Isabella M. Weber, How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate (London: Routledge, 2021).

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  31. Iván T. Berend, The Hungarian Economic Reforms, 1953–1988 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

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About
Theryn Arnold –

Theryn Arnold is a doctoral candidate in Geography at York University. His research examines how state configurations shape labour conditions and occupational health outcomes in battery manufacturing in Canada and China.