Introduction

Three years ago, the largest protests in the young history of Kazakhstan shook the country. They brought into focus the social, economic, and political tensions that had been simmering in a state previously considered relatively stable. The protests began in western Kazakhstan on January 2, 2022, triggered by a sharp increase in liquefied gas prices. Within a short time, they spread across the country and developed into the largest political crisis in the history of independent Kazakhstan.

Just four days after the protests began, troops from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a military alliance of six post-Soviet states that includes Kazakhstan, marched into Almaty, the country's largest city, to participate in so-called “peacekeeping measures.” The direct intervention of the CSTO internationalized the conflict and underscored the close connection between Kazakhstan’s domestic politics and the government’s pursuit of a “multi-vector foreign policy.” The fact that neither China nor the West reacted harshly to the CSTO’s interference suggests that they were united in their desire to stabilize the government under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Thus, Kazakhstan's multi-vector foreign policy proved to be an instrument for stabilizing the rule of the Kazakh elites. On January 7, Tokayev declared that order had been restored. According to official figures, 238 people died in the unrest, most of them in Almaty.

These protests revealed the deep cracks in a system that, despite economic growth, is marked by massive social inequality, authoritarian rule, and a strong dependence on foreign capital. This raises the question of how the socio-economic and political conditions in Kazakhstan have changed over the three decades of its independence–and particularly since these protests. What factors led to the unrest, and how has the country developed since then? On these topics, we speak with economist Kuat Akizhanov. In Kazakhstan, he worked in the presidential administration and various ministries, as well as serving as an associate professor at KazGUU University in Astana. Today, he is the deputy director of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Institute. He is the author of the book Finance Capitalism and Income Inequality in the Contemporary Global Economy.

Interview

Armen Spéth: To start, could you give us a brief overview of the political-economic transformation of Kazakhstan since the collapse of the Soviet Union?

Kuat Akizhanov: After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan underwent a comprehensive neoliberal transformation. In the early years of independence, the country implemented a structural reform program based on the “handbook” of the Washington Consensus. This included measures such as the “shock therapy” of price liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and opening the country to international capital. At the same time, the remnants of the socialist welfare state were completely dismantled.

In my research, I divide the rise and subsequent hegemony of neoliberal ideology in Kazakhstan into three phases: the combative phase (1989–1995), the normative phase (1995–2008), and the punitive phase (2008 to the present). The first, combative phase (1989–1995), began in the late Soviet Union and coincided with Gorbachev’s policies of Perestroika and Glasnost. Initial market-oriented programs, such as the “500 Days Program,” emerged, accompanied by the first price liberalizations. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet republics were plunged into a whirlwind of geopolitical and internal problems—each developing its own path. The second, normative phase (1995–2008), began with the adoption of a new constitution in 1995, which effectively turned Kazakhstan into an authoritarian state. Power was entirely concentrated in the hands of the executive branch and the president. The third, punitive phase (2008 to the present), began with the global economic crisis and continues to this day.

The first two phases—the combative and normative phases—are particularly important for understanding the political economy of modern Kazakhstan. They cover the period from the early 1990s to 2008 and laid the groundwork for the dominance of neoliberal ideology in the country through the depoliticization of politics, the de-ideologization of society, and the de-democratization of the regime.

Kazakhstan is often described as a “rich country of poor people.” The country’s abundant natural resources and rising commodity prices enabled GDP growth of over 9% per year in the 2000s. However, no welfare state was created. Instead, deindustrialization and the one-sided focus on resource extraction led to growth based on foreign investment. The regime can be described as an authoritarian kleptocracy that has created a rentier economy benefiting only 1% of the population.

AS: Recently, I came across some revealing statistics on the class structure of Kazakhstan. The share of agriculture in the country’s GDP fell from 34% in 1990 to just 4% in 2014. Yet the rural population remains significant at around 47%. Concerning trends are also evident in the urban marginalized population. In 2006, there were 29 informal settlements in Almaty, where one-third of the city’s population lived. These figures contrast sharply with the strong economic growth since 1991, as measured by GDP. How do you explain this discrepancy?

KA: The discrepancy between high GDP growth and poor social indicators is characteristic of Kazakhstan’s economic model, which is heavily dependent on resource exports. The redistribution of wealth benefits transnational corporations and local elites, while broad segments of the population hardly benefit.

Kazakhstan used to have a diversified economy with significant industry and agriculture. However, neoliberal “modernization” destroyed these foundations. As in the Global South in the 1960s and 1970s, we are witnessing “urbanization without industrialization” in Kazakhstan. The middle and working classes have been degraded to a precariat. More than 2.2 million people, or 24.1% of the workforce, have no fixed employment—these are officially classified as “self-employed,” a neoliberal euphemism. In the rentier capitalism of Kazakhstan, these people are superfluous to the economy.

AS: Which social groups (domestic and foreign) primarily dominate the state, and what influence do international actors, particularly international financial institutions and foreign investors, have?

KA: The neoliberal technocratic state of Kazakhstan, which emerged from the former Soviet administration of the Kazakh SSR after 1991, developed into an instrument for enriching and redistributing state property and national wealth in favor of three dominant groups: the comprador bourgeoisie, transnational capital, and the political elite. The latter is closely tied to the authoritarian regime that emerged in the early 1990s under Nursultan Nazarbayev.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet nomenklatura led by Nazarbayev quickly recognized the opportunities for personal enrichment. The role of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in establishing neoliberal regimes in post-Soviet states is well-documented. These institutions were directly involved in promoting local “Chicago Boys” who carried out the neoliberal restructuring and continue to serve the interests of compradors and foreign investors.

The power of foreign investors is evident in examples such as the introduction of the neoliberal development strategy "Kazakhstan-2030" in 1997 and the establishment of the Council of Foreign Investors, which was long chaired by former President Nazarbayev. Both the comprador bourgeoisie and the local political elite, closely tied to transnational corporations, primarily extract resource rents and make minimal investments in the national economy.

AS: How does the economic dependence on foreign capital and its representatives affect Kazakhstan’s political sovereignty?

KA: The control of key economic sectors by transnational corporations significantly undermines Kazakhstan’s political sovereignty. Production-sharing agreements with foreign investors were concluded under non-transparent conditions, and tax breaks, as well as the relaxation of labor and environmental standards, were introduced to secure investments.

A large portion of the profits from the resource industry flows back abroad. International arbitration agreements limit the state’s ability to intervene in economic policy. The focus on extracting resource rents hinders the development of the local economy and infrastructure, making the country vulnerable to external shocks. This restricts Kazakhstan's ability to pursue an independent foreign and domestic policy. As a result, the neoliberal model of non-development in Kazakhstan has led to the establishment of a de facto neocolonial regime.

AS: Kazakhstan is gaining importance in international relations. The government is aware of this and is pursuing a so-called “multi-vector foreign policy,” which aims to simultaneously cooperate with various states. However, it remains questionable whether this balancing act will be successful. The challenges of this strategy are already evident in the context of the Ukraine war. How do you assess Kazakhstan’s foreign policy?

KA: Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, based on the principle of multi-vector diplomacy, is an attempt to balance between various global and regional power centers–Russia, China, the US, and the EU. However, this strategy is fraught with difficulties. First, due to its geopolitical location, Kazakhstan is economically and politically vulnerable to Russia and China, especially against the backdrop of the growing confrontation between East and West. It is becoming difficult to maintain a balance of interests between these two global actors. China is the economic giant whose dominance we are now witnessing and which will continue into this century. With Russia, Kazakhstan shares the world’s second-longest land border and a cultural and linguistic connection that has developed over the last century. Estimates suggest that up to 90% of informational content in Kazakhstan is in the Russian language. Moreover, membership in the Eurasian Economic Union and the strong integration into Russian transport routes have closely tied Kazakhstan’s economy to Russia. Any shock to the Russian economy has immediate effects on Kazakhstan, as demonstrated by the devaluation of the tenge in November–December 2024 following a collapse of the Russian ruble against major currencies.

The war in Ukraine has created additional challenges for Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy, as pressure from Russia on Kazakhstan has increased. While the multi-vector foreign policy theoretically offers Kazakhstan the opportunity to diversify its foreign relations, its success largely depends on internal stability and the ability to pursue a more independent economic policy. This again highlights the central importance of an independent domestic and foreign economic policy. However, the strong dependence on foreign investors and companies limits Kazakhstan's ability to pursue a truly independent foreign policy.

AS: The protests in January 2022 came as a surprise to many, as Kazakhstan was previously considered a stable country. What were the main triggers, and which social groups were primarily involved?

KA: The often-emphasized “political stability” of Kazakhstan was a construct skillfully marketed by Nazarbayev and his regime. In reality, there had already been significant tensions. The economic progress, symbolized by impressive infrastructure projects such as the new capital Astana, obscured the reality of an authoritarian system that ignored socioeconomic inequality. In hindsight, it was only a matter of time before massive protests would erupt. Moreover, the country had already experienced regular mass protests of a socio-economic nature, such as the protest movement in the region of Mangistau in December 2011. The protests in Mangistau, specifically in the city of Zhanaozen in 2011, where oil workers demanded better working conditions, ended in bloodshed: security forces shot and killed at least 15 people and injured hundreds. Although this protest began as a labor dispute, its true causes are socio-economic and lie in the unenviable situation of the residents of western Kazakhstan. Since 2000, there have been constant strikes by oil workers in these “oil” regions. The income gap is pronounced, as most residents are not connected to the oil industry, and the climatic conditions in these areas are harsh. At the same time, the pro-government media conducted a campaign to discredit the workers’ legitimate demands, thereby revealing the class character of the regime itself.

By January 2022, the conditions were ripe for a “perfect storm.” In March 2019, President Nazarbayev announced his resignation but remained in power, cementing his status as “Leader of the Nation” and chairing the country’s Security Council. De facto, a dual power structure was established. In January 2022, the price of liquefied gas was drastically increased as part of the transition to a market-based pricing mechanism. In addition to economic demands, political demands were also voiced, including the actual withdrawal of Nazarbayev from politics. The most popular slogan was: “Shal ket!” (Шал, кет! translates to "Old man, go!"). This protest was a classic class protest, and the support of the striking oil workers from Zhanaozen across Kazakhstan was an example of solidarity.

AS: The events revealed power struggles within Kazakhstan’s political elite. Which groups were opposed to each other, and how stable is President Tokayev's regime?

KA: Within Nazarbayev’s authoritarian regime, there has always been a constant struggle for political influence. The kleptocratic nature of power is a defining feature, so political preferences have played no significant role in the last 20 years. The main thing is to enter the system and become either part of the neoliberal technocracy in the state apparatus or get a managerial position in a state-run company. Within the system, there were various groups whose influence was determined by their proximity to Nazarbayev personally or to members of his family. The formal transfer of power from Nazarbayev to Tokayev was the result of a personal decision by Nazarbayev. He believed that Tokayev would not challenge his own real power and privileges. On the other hand, he saw Tokayev as the optimal candidate who could be accepted by other elite groups without major opposition. After more than thirty years of constant plunder under the kleptocratic ruling of the neoliberal framework, the local comprador class has developed many rival industrial-financial clans that are suspicious of each other. These groups were certainly not willing to accept Nazarbayev's daughter Dariga or another member of his family as president.

Thus, until Kanda Kantar [Note: Қанды қаңтар translates to “Bloody January” and is a widely used term for the mass protests of January 2022], Tokayev was de facto a nominal president, a kind of British queen who reigns but does not rule. Tokayev is therefore one of the main beneficiaries of the events of January 2022, as he gained real power after the failed palace coup, while Nazarbayev declared himself a “mere pensioner.” One version suggests that Nazarbayev’s closest family members, dissatisfied with his decisions and not taking Tokayev seriously, used the peaceful protests in Almaty and deliberately deployed criminals. These were fully under the control of the security services and began to literally devastate the city. According to Tokayev’s own account, the General Staff of the Security Service informed him that “20,000 fighters had entered the city and that a plane and $50 million in cash were ready for him to leave the country.” Tokayev refused but used the pogroms to impose a curfew.

The involvement of the chairman of Kazakhstan’s Security Service (KNB) Masimov and his first deputy Satybaldy, who is Nazarbayev’s nephew, in the failed coup seems to have prompted Tokayev to revise his secret agreements with Nazarbayev. Tokayev has become very strong in the last two years. His protégés are now represented in most power structures. In any case, the political situation after Kanda Kantar has changed–the negative attitude towards Nazarbayev's regime has become widespread and open. The capital of the country regained its former name Astana, but the city’s airport still bears Nazarbayev's name.

AS: Kazakhstan is often described as a country without an effective political opposition. What is the state of the opposition overall, and what role do leftist forces in particular play?

KA: From the first days of his rule, Nazarbayev cleared the political field of any competition. As a result, the main opposition to the regime in Kazakh politics has always consisted of those who came from within the system itself, or as we say today, “mainstream” politicians. The main opposition forces operate within the dichotomy of “freedom vs. unfreedom” or “democracy vs. authoritarianism.” They have never sought to change the socio-economic structure of neoliberal capitalism. Essentially, they represent the interests of the comprador bourgeoisie and a narrow stratum of the urban middle class. Despite all the good intentions that guide them and the sacrifices many of them have made in their struggle, they offer no real change.

In the eras of normative (1995–2008) and punitive neoliberalism (2008–present), the discrediting and marginalization of leftist ideas and socialist ideology continue precisely because in Kazakhstan, as in many post-Soviet societies, there is an understanding–not only among supposedly USSR-nostalgic retirees but also among the younger generation–of the existential destructiveness of the capitalist path. Neoliberal capitalism is the fertilizer for the Kazakh political regime–be it the authoritarian kleptocracy of Nazarbayev or the emerging oligarchic plutocracy–and it is essential for its survival. Progressive socialism is the only alternative for the prosperity and survival of Kazakhstan. This is why the former Nazarbayev prosecutor took over the leadership of the social democratic party of the same name in 2006, thereby discrediting the ideas of social democracy once and for all. Similar processes can be seen in the “People’s Party of Kazakhstan,” which unites adherents of socialist ideology and leftist ideas. It is led by a former official of “old” Kazakhstan who was a political advisor to Nazarbayev for 12 years.

AS: President Tokayev promised comprehensive reforms after the protests. What changes have occurred since then?

KA: A kind of “political thaw” was initially observed after the events of Kanda Kantar. President Tokayev initially pointed to the problem of wealth inequality and the glaring income gap between the haves and have-nots. In Kazakhstan, the 50 richest people own about 50% of the total wealth of the entire adult population, or 16% of nominal GDP. And this is in an upper-middle-income country! I constantly analyze various government initiatives and programs in the field of socio-economic development–in the economy and, more broadly, in the political economy of Kazakhstan, no structural changes have occurred since 2022. There are political public relations actions such as “asset recovery,” but there is a suspicion that this has already led to a redistribution of property between “old” and “new” oligarchs. The state apparatus and its intellectuals represent the same technocracy indoctrinated with neoliberal epistemology and the mainstream (neoclassical) economic school. They simply have nothing to offer.

Kazakhstan’s intellectual community, which propagates liberal dogmas in both politics and economics, focuses on progressive neoliberalism and remains trapped in capitalist ontology. They offer no real change, or rather, they offer changes within the hegemony of capitalist ideology without challenging its foundations, as Gramsci warned. It may be significant to use gendered language, but how close this brings us to the real emancipation of women and workers is a big question. I fear that these topics are popular and allowed for discussion in Kazakhstan precisely because they divert attention from issues of economic democracy and the emancipation of workers and represent the lesser evil for the comprador regime.

In Kazakhstan, between 80 and 400 (!) women die annually at the hands of their partners–the figures vary, as less than half of domestic violence cases go to court. I do not want to diminish the importance of the fight against domestic violence, but it was only after the “Saltanat case” that a broader public discussion on this topic began [Note: Saltanat Nukenova, the partner of former Minister of National Economy Kuandyk Bishimbayev, was found dead in a restaurant owned by her husband in November last year. The incident sparked public outrage and ignited a comprehensive debate on domestic violence]. As a result, changes were made to the laws, although they had “not been a problem” for society and politicians for the last thirty years.

But since the murderer was a former economic minister (one of Nazarbayev’s followers) and the victim was a representative of the urban middle class, and the entire process was broadcast live, this tragedy was the number one topic for several months. Before this case, the beating and killing of women happened “somewhere out there,” in the villages, in the lumpen environment of mono-cities, and it did not really attract the attention of fashionable bloggers. In Kazakhstan, there have already been several cases where children from deprived families were burned alive because their parents had to leave them unattended while working night shifts in poorly paid jobs. These tragedies did not attract such sensational attention. Apparently, the alarming socio-economic situation of the working class will not interest anyone until a similar fate befalls the children of the powerful…

In short, Kazakhstan needs a “paradigm shift” to break the hegemony of neoliberal ideas. Only then will leftist ideas become a real alternative for genuine reforms. Over the past three decades, Kazakhstan has experienced significant transformations. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, development strategies have been heavily influenced by orthodox approaches of capitalist epistemology, particularly those rooted in mainstream neoclassical economics. These policies prioritized market liberalization, privatization, and integration into the global economy, with the underlying assumption that unregulated markets and rational actors would naturally lead to efficient outcomes and long-term growth.

While these policies aimed to ‘modernize’ the Kazakh economy, their outcomes have been highly controversial. Many challenges persist, including rising inequality, environmental degradation, and social discontent. Right-wing economics that serves the interest of the rich overlooks critical issues such as the unequal distribution of power and wealth and the potential for market failures in addressing public goods and social equity. In Kazakhstan, in the absence of socialist ideas and the dismantling of the socio-democratic institutions, current capitalist ontology completely failed.

If President Tokayev does not propose reforms that actually improve the socio-economic situation of the Kazakh people, he will be remembered as the second president who tried to maintain the status quo, shed blood, and made empty promises about a “Just Kazakhstan.” More and more Kazakhs understand that trust in power is waning and that real change cannot be begged for but must be fought for. Whether the authorities understand this is a big question.