The question of whether there is such a thing as “Turkish Marxism” continues to provoke debate among scholars and activists. While Marxist theory has profoundly influenced political movements and social struggles in Türkiye for over a century, the extent to which this influence has resulted in an original or distinctive tradition remains unclear. Instead, Turkish engagements with Marxism have been shaped by a complex interplay of local realities, global ideological trends, and recurring cycles of repression and renewal. Understanding these processes requires moving beyond simple binaries of “authentic” versus “imported” Marxism and instead tracing the specific ways in which Marxist theory has been interpreted, adapted, and sometimes contested within the Turkish context.

This article examines the historical development of Marxism in Türkiye with a particular focus on the contributions—both substantive and limited—that have emerged over time. Rather than positing a single, coherent Turkish Marxism, the analysis is attentive to the changing intellectual, organizational, and political landscapes that have informed the Left’s evolution. From the earliest days of the Ottoman socialist movement to the mass mobilizations and theoretical debates of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Turkish Marxists have drawn on a wide array of international sources while also attempting to respond to the country’s unique social and political dynamics. This process has produced moments of both creativity and crisis, as well as ongoing tensions between theory and practice, universality and particularity, and orthodoxy and innovation.

By situating Turkish Marxism within its historical trajectory, this article aims to clarify the distinctive features and recurrent dilemmas that have shaped its evolution. Special attention is paid to the ways in which Turkish Marxists have engaged with questions of national identity, state formation, class struggle, and social transformation. Through this lens, it becomes possible to assess not only the enduring limitations—such as conservatism, theoretical eclecticism, and organizational rigidity—but also the genuine contributions that Turkish leftist thought and practice have made to the broader Marxist tradition.

Foundation: The Genesis of the Turkish Left (1908-1925)

The first vibrant phase of Ottoman socialism began in the aftermath of the 1908 Constitutional Revolution and subsided within five years. This era witnessed a surge of labor unrest: not long after the restoration of the constitutional regime, news of strikes began to reach Istanbul from the provinces. Workers in cities such as Salonika, Varna, Monastir, and Skopje launched strikes in response to poor working conditions and unmet demands. These developments marked the emergence of class consciousness alongside the wider contradictions of Ottoman modernization.^[1]

In Istanbul, a small but influential circle of intellectuals began to openly espouse and propagate leftist ideas. At the center of this movement stood Hüseyin Hilmi, often referred to as “İştirakçi” Hilmi. He launched the weekly journal İştirak in 1910, which quickly became the focal point for socialist thought and activism, and later announced the formation of the Ottoman Socialist Party. While Hilmi and his associates attempted to reconcile socialism with Islam, their publications were also open to non-Muslim Ottoman citizens, reflecting a cosmopolitan outlook. Nevertheless, the initial socialist initiative soon shifted toward a more liberal oppositional stance.^[2]

In early 1913, a coup by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) ushered in an authoritarian regime and a wave of political repression. The Ottoman Socialist Party was shut down and its leader, Hüseyin Hilmi, was arrested and forced into exile, effectively crippling the socialist movement before the war. World War I (1914–1918) further devastated the Ottoman Empire, culminating in its defeat and the occupation of Constantinople by Allied forces in 1918. Throughout the war, socialist activities were largely silenced under CUP rule, with many activists imprisoned or driven abroad until the armistice. After the war, with the CUP regime discredited, Hilmi returned to Istanbul and the party’s Paris branch re-established contact with his network, leading to the movement’s reorganization under the new name Turkish Socialist Party (Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası-TSF) in early 1919. The post-war political atmosphere was briefly conducive to renewed leftist activism: organizations like the Galata Socialist Club resurfaced, and the TSF forged international links by sending delegates to socialist conferences in Bern, Amsterdam, and Geneva. Some of its members even ran for parliament in the late 1919 Ottoman elections, reflecting the momentary revival of socialist participation in politics.^[3]

Following the Armistice of Mondros, Istanbul’s socialist movement saw a brief resurgence. But despite their efforts, these early socialists failed to achieve electoral success, although Hilmi gained renown for his leadership during significant labor strikes, including those involving tanners, dockworkers, and tramway employees. During this period, several other socialist and labor parties were formed—such as the Social Democratic Party, the Independent Socialist Party, and the Workers’ Socialist Party—but these groups were typically short-lived and failed to secure lasting popular support.^[4]

Meanwhile, in Anatolia, the impact of the Russian Revolution encouraged the formation of clandestine organizations such as the Green Army, which attempted to combine elements of pan-Islamism with a socially oriented economic agenda. These groups tried to legitimize cooperation with the Bolsheviks by framing Bolshevism as compatible with Islamic principles. At times, they gained real momentum—especially after attracting figures like Ottoman military commander Çerkes Ethem, who provided armed strength—but their existence was brief. By the end of 1920, the Green Army was dissolved and its members absorbed into other official or underground communist parties in Ankara.^[5]

In the early 1920s, both official and clandestine communist parties—including the Turkish Communist Party (Türkiye Komünist Partisi, TKP) and the People’s Communist Party (Halk İştirakiyyun Fırkası)—were founded. However, the broader socialist movement in Anatolia was quickly neutralized in the wake of the War of Independence. This was largely due to the emergence of the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), founded in 1923 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The CHP soon established itself as the sole ruling party in the newly founded Turkish Republic, instituting a period of single-party rule that would last until the transition to multi-party politics in 1946.

The CHP was not only the architect of the new nation-state but also the primary enforcer of state authority and national unity. Its leadership was deeply wary of all independent political organizations, especially those inspired by Marxism or the Bolshevik Revolution, fearing they might threaten the fragile process of nation-building. As a result, the CHP pursued a policy of strict surveillance and suppression of socialist and communist groups. Relations between the ruling party and Marxist circles were ambivalent during the War of Independence; while Bolshevik Russia provided financial and logistical support to the Ankara government, domestic communists were either tightly controlled or repressed.

In Istanbul, a group of young socialists who had spent time in Berlin established the Workers’ and Peasants’ Socialist Party of Türkiye in 1919. By 1921, the Aydınlık circle managed to publish a journal that would become an important outlet for Marxist thought. By the summer of 1922, the main Marxist labor organizations in Istanbul were either dominated by non-Muslim minorities or led by the Aydınlık group.^[6] In summary, the years 1908–1925 witnessed the emergence of the Turkish Left through a series of pioneering but fragile experiments. These movements reflected the complex interplay between local social dynamics, Ottoman modernization, and the global influence of socialist and communist ideas. Yet, faced with state repression under the single-party regime and internal fragmentation, the early Turkish left failed to establish lasting organizational structures or a broad-based social movement.

The period between 1908 and 1925 represents the formative era of the socialist movement in Türkiye, characterized as its initial phase of ideological and organizational accumulation. Turkish socialism in this era drew upon four principal sources: France, Germany, Bolshevik Russia, and the local conditions of Istanbul and Anatolia. French socialism influenced the earliest Ottoman socialists, who often translated and circulated propaganda originally intended for French workers. However, while French social movements provided organizational models, their theoretical impact remained limited.

A significant portion of Türkiye’s first socialist cadres, such as Şefik Hüsnü and Vedat Nedim, had educational backgrounds in Germany.^[7] These figures were shaped by the theoretical environment of the German workers' movement and the legacy of the Second International. Yet, the German influence was often confined to select theoretical slogans, with a deeper impact arising from the Spartacist wing, albeit with its own internal ambivalence toward Bolshevism. Despite exposure to international models, the first generation of Turkish socialists remained highly objectivist, often failing to recognize or adequately engage with the country’s emerging social and political dynamics—especially the significance of the Kemalist movement and the unique trajectory of the National Struggle. This intellectual and social detachment led to both theoretical underdevelopment and a disconnect from broader social forces, reinforcing a pattern in which socialist thought and activism were limited to narrow circles of intellectuals integrated into the existing urban labor movement rather than forming an autonomous tradition.^[8]

Second Generation

Following the violent repression of the early Turkish socialist movement and the Communist Party of Türkiye (TKP) in the 1920s and 1930s, the Marxist tradition in Türkiye was forced underground. The single-party regime’s strict anti-communist measures meant that overt Marxist activism became all but impossible, resulting in a clandestine existence for the TKP and its supporters. This period was marked by political isolation, state surveillance, and a reliance on covert networks, with organizational links to the Comintern and the broader Soviet sphere playing a crucial role in keeping the movement alive. The experience of illegality and marginalization, though repressive, forged a sense of discipline, resilience, and a certain political intransigence that would shape the character of Turkish Marxism for decades to come.^[9]

Despite their forced marginalization, the Marxist cadres and intellectuals of this generation made notable contributions to the theoretical development and adaptation of Marxism in the Turkish context. In the absence of legal political channels, they focused on translation work, the dissemination of classical Marxist texts, and the intellectual education of new cadres through underground study groups and literary circles. Communist poets and writers like Nâzım Hikmet used literature as a vehicle to spread class consciousness. Hikmet’s fiery poems in the 1930s and 40s reached a wide audience even as he was imprisoned for his beliefs.

Particularly significant was the engagement with debates within the international communist movement: Turkish Marxists were exposed to and often participated in ideological disputes ranging from Stalinism and Trotskyism to the national question and strategies for revolutionary organization. The necessity of adapting Marxist categories to Turkish realities—such as the structure of Turkish capitalism, the peasantry, and the unresolved agrarian question—stimulated original theoretical reflection, even if the direct output remained limited by repression. In this sense, the “second generation” preserved and renewed the intellectual core of Marxism, ensuring its survival through a combination of political praxis and theoretical labor.^[10]

This period of forced introspection did stimulate some original theoretical reflections, even if opportunities to put them into practice were scant. Marxists like Hikmet Kıvılcımlı (who spent long years in jail, participated guerrilla warfare as part of the Kuvâ-yi Milliye during the War of Independence, wrote theoretical treatises on history, economics and religion), or Şefik Hüsnü’s faction in the 1940s, attempted to analyze Turkey’s nascent capitalism and the Kemalist state from a Marxian perspective. They identified the unresolved agrarian question and the weakness of the proletariat as key issues. They also debated how to reconcile Marxist internationalism with Turkish nationalism—a dilemma sharpened by the fact that the Soviet Union was now an ally of the Turkish state during WWII. Overall, the “second generation” of Turkish communists managed to preserve core Marxist ideas and pass them on, even as they remained cut off from mass politics.^[11]

By the 1950s, as Türkiye’s political climate slowly liberalized, these theoretical foundations enabled Marxism to re-emerge not only as a political force but also as a living tradition of critical thought. The groundwork laid by the second generation—translation of major Marxist works, clandestine debates about the role of the peasantry and working class, and an understanding of imperialism and fascism’s impact on semi-peripheral societies—would directly influence the more vibrant and pluralistic Marxist currents of the 1960s. The experience of adapting universal Marxist principles to the unique conditions of Türkiye and the determination to maintain ideological rigor even in isolation constitute the lasting intellectual legacy of this generation. Their efforts made it possible for subsequent generations to move beyond a mere transplantation of Soviet Marxism and to seek a more contextually relevant, theoretically robust, and politically creative Turkish Marxism.^[12]

Massification

The period between the early 1960s and the 1980 military coup was a time of intense strategic debate within the Turkish Left, marked by the deepening split between Soviet-aligned and China-aligned currents. In the wake of the 1961 Constitution, which permitted greater political pluralism, the Turkish Workers’ Party (TİP) emerged as a legal Marxist platform, adopting a parliamentary and reformist strategy that was influenced by the Soviet line. However, by the late 1960s, a significant faction within the Turkish Left—particularly younger militants and students—began to reject the perceived limitations of the Soviet approach, looking instead to the Chinese and Cuban revolutions for models of armed struggle, guerrilla warfare, and anti-imperialist national liberation. These internal disputes over the correct path to revolution, the nature of the Turkish state, and the peasantry’s role resulted in a proliferation of organizations and a culture of ideological contestation, which would define the Left in the coming decade.^[13]

Alongside these strategic debates, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed an extraordinary expansion and massification of the Turkish Left. New waves of student movements, labor strikes, peasant protests, and urban mobilizations propelled Marxist and socialist organizations to the forefront of political life. By the mid-1970s, leftist ideologies had penetrated deeply into trade unions (notably DİSK), universities, and even segments of the rural poor. This process of massification was not monolithic: Soviet-aligned (TİP, TKP) and China-aligned (Maoist) groups developed distinct bases and practices, while independent organizations emerged around issues of Kurdish self-determination, anti-imperialism, and radical democracy.

Importantly, this period also saw the rise of a new generation of left intellectuals and cadres, many of whom emphasized local realities, anti-colonial struggles, and the need for revolutionary independence from both the Soviet and Chinese centers. Despite their divisions, these currents together transformed the Turkish Left from a marginal force into a powerful social and political actor, at times shaping the national agenda itself. Again, during this period, strategic discussions such as rural guerrilla and urban guerrilla held an important place. The movements, most of which were founded by young cadres who had emerged from the university movement, provided financial support for their movements through bank robberies.^[14] For example, prominent student leaders such as Mahir Çayan, Deniz Gezmiş, and İbrahim Kaypakkaya emerged from this milieu to found armed organizations dedicated to guerrilla warfare—financing their revolutionary struggle through these drastic measures.

However, the military coup of September 12, 1980, brought an abrupt and violent end to this period of mass leftist mobilization and ideological plurality. In the eyes of the junta, no distinction was made between the different traditions, strategic orientations, or degrees of radicalism within the Left; all were subjected to massive repression. The coup led to the imprisonment, torture, exile, or execution of thousands of militants across the entire spectrum—Soviet-aligned, China-aligned, and independent formations alike. The legacy of this repression would haunt the Turkish Left for decades, but it also provided, in hindsight, a powerful reminder of the movement’s breadth and its capacity to inspire fear in the ruling order, precisely because of its deep popular roots and organizational diversity.^[15]

After the Coup

The evolution of Turkish Marxism since the 1970s reveals a distinctive trajectory marked by the centrality of the Kurdish movement, the prominence of journal-based intellectual culture, and a persistent crisis of theoretical creativity. One of the most significant contributions to Marxist thought in Türkiye has emerged through the encounter with the Kurdish question. Initially rooted in the broader tradition of Turkish socialism, the Kurdish freedom movement transformed debates within the Left regarding national oppression, state power, and the legacies of Kemalist modernity. Early philosophical discussions—expressed in both theoretical writings and the programs of new organisations—were grounded in Marxist-Leninist frameworks but quickly evolved to incorporate anti-colonial critiques, radical democratic principles, ecological perspectives, and feminist approaches. In recent decades, concepts such as democratic confederalism, grassroots autonomy, ecological justice, and intersectional feminism have become vital reference points within Turkish Marxist discourse. This has not only resulted in novel theoretical synthesis but also led to ruptures and realignments across the Left, as ongoing debates around organizational forms, alliances, and the status of the Kurdish question continually reshape the landscape of socialist thought and practice in Türkiye.^[16]

The journal culture has been a defining feature of Turkish Marxism. In an environment where party-building and legal institutionalization were chronically interrupted, journals and periodicals emerged as the main platform for theoretical debate, ideological clarification, and intellectual networking. The proliferation of journals—from foundational periodicals to contemporary movement magazines—enabled the Turkish left to sustain dialogue with international Marxist debates and to reinterpret global theories considering local experience. Journals played a formative role in developing new currents, including Eurocommunism, Maoism, feminist Marxism, and postcolonial critique. At the same time, this strong reliance on journals as the primary site of intellectual production has often resulted in fragmentation, a tendency toward insularity, and the substitution of theoretical polemics for mass political engagement. Periodical-based polemics frequently reinforced organizational divisions, and debates were often closely tied to transient political conjunctures rather than to a sustained tradition of theoretical inquiry.^[17]

Despite the vibrancy of these traditions, the Turkish Left continues to face enduring dilemmas. Fundamental questions remain unresolved, including the approach to the Kurdish issue, the meaning of internationalism, the proper strategy for mass mobilization, and the nature of party leadership. Symbolic controversies—such as those surrounding the “flag” and the relationship to the nation-state—reflect deeper divisions over the meaning of Marxism and the direction of socialist struggle. Compared to neighboring countries, Turkish Marxism has often been marked by a lack of continuous theoretical production; immediate practical needs have regularly been translated into ad hoc theoretical positions. The repertoire of political action has remained narrow, often limited to press statements and protest demonstrations, and theoretical advances have frequently lagged developments in practice. Nonetheless, this context has fostered a unique tradition of “theorizing through practice,” in which lived experience and political struggle become the primary sites of Marxist reflection and innovation—yet also contribute to the reproduction of persistent limitations in the movement’s creative horizon.^[18]

Conclusion

In reconsidering the initial question of whether there is such a thing as “Turkish Marxism,” the evidence points less to the emergence of a distinctive, indigenous tradition and more to a pattern of adaptation and selective appropriation. Marxist thought in Türkiye has consistently been refracted through the lens of local realities—whether national oppression, state formation, or the shifting dynamics of social struggle—but it has rarely yielded a systematic or original theoretical synthesis. Instead, debates within Turkish Marxism are marked by their eclectic character, as various strands of global Marxism have been borrowed, modified, and sometimes hastily assembled to address immediate political and organizational needs.

This persistent eclecticism is accompanied by a tendency toward conservatism and intellectual gatekeeping. The discourse of the Turkish Left has often functioned as a form of boundary maintenance, privileging established dogmas and organizational loyalties over open critique and innovation. As a result, theoretical and strategic debates frequently reinforce hierarchical structures—producing caste-like, inward-looking communities that regulate entry, reward conformity, and resist the emergence of alternative perspectives. Such dynamics have not only stifled theoretical creativity but also limited the Left’s ability to engage with a broader range of social actors and contemporary challenges.

The landscape of Marxist debate in Türkiye is less a site of continuous theoretical renewal than a domain defined by its defensive posture and self-preserving routines. The reproduction of closed networks, the privileging of organizational tradition over experimental thought, and the reluctance to challenge internal orthodoxies have all circumscribed the transformative possibilities of Marxist practice. While this conservatism has provided stability and a measure of continuity in the face of external pressures, it has also resulted in missed opportunities for genuine innovation and broad-based social change, leaving Turkish Marxism with an enduring tension between adaptation and stasis, creative potential and self-imposed limitations.

1. Mete Tunçay, Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar (1908-1925), 3rd ed. (Bilgi, 1978), 31.

   ↩

2. Hıfzı Topuz, II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi (Remzi, 2003), 95.

   ↩

3. Emel Akal, İştirakiyuncular, Komünistler ve Paşa Hazretleri (İletişim, 2013).

   ↩

4. Sungur Savran, Bir İhtilal Olarak Milli Mücadele (Yordam, 2023).

   ↩

5. Erden Akbulut and Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Halk İştirakiyun Fırkası (1920-1923) (Sosyal Tarih, 2007), 33.

   ↩

6. Yalçın Küçük, Türkiye Üzerine Tezler 1908-1978, 2nd Book (Tekin, 1979), 24.

   ↩

7. Metin Çulhaoğlu, Bir Mirasın Güncelliği: Tarih Türkiye Sosyalizm, 3rd ed. (YGS, 2002), 153.

   ↩

8. Metin Çulhaoğlu, Doğruda Durmanın Felsefesi 1 (YGS, 2002), 427.

   ↩

9. Haluk Yurtsever, Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Komünist Ufuk (Yordam, 2023), 463–466.

   ↩

10. Ibid, 466–468.

    ↩

11. Mehmet Salâh, “The Turkish Working Class and Socialist Movement in Perspective,” libcom.org, https://libcom.org/article/turkish-working-class-and-socialist-movement-perspective.

    ↩

12. Haluk Yurtsever, Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Komünist Ufuk (Yordam, 2023), 468–471.

    ↩

13. Haluk Yurtsever, Yükseliş ve Düşüş: Türkiye Solu 1960-1980 (Yordam, 2021), 89–110.

    ↩

14. Ibid, 110–142.

    ↩

15. Ibid, 232–243.

    ↩

16. Kürt Özgürlük Hareketi (Versus, 2022), 13–49, 99–120; Türkiye Solu ve Kürt Siyaseti (Nota Bene, 2018), 22–71, 79–112; Yükseliş ve Düşüş: Türkiye Solu 1960-1980 (Yordam, 2021), 312–320; Yeni Bir Sol Atılım İçin (Kalkedon, 2021), 152–159; Cereyanlar (İletişim, 2017), 519–523; Doğruda Durmanın Felsefesi 2 (YGS, 2004), 286–292.

    ↩

17. Türkiye Sol Tarihine Notlar (İletişim, 2020), 217–223, 221–227; Marksizm ve Türkiye Solu (YGS, 2021), 88–102, 95–101, 120–122; Sol, Sinizm, Pragmatizm (Birikim, 2021), 101–110, 109–114; Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Komünist Ufuk (Yordam, 2023), 474–478; Yeni Bir Sol Atılım İçin (Kalkedon, 2021), 163–165.

    ↩

18. Sol, Sinizm, Pragmatizm (Birikim, 2021), 98–112, 111–120; Cereyanlar (İletişim, 2017), 520; Marksizm ve Türkiye Solu (YGS, 2021), 120–122; Doğruda Durmanın Felsefesi 2 (YGS, 2004), 298–305; Türkiye Solu 1960-1980 (Versus, 2021), 195–201, 211–219; Yükseliş ve Düşüş: Türkiye Solu 1960-1980 (Yordam, 2021), 325–332.

    ↩