For there can be no mass party, no party of a class, without full clarity of essential shadings, without an open struggle between various tendencies, without informing the masses as to which leaders and which organisations of the Party are pursuing this or that line. Without this, a party worthy of the name cannot be built, and we are building it.

-Vladimir Lenin^[1]

A Brief History of Anti-Factionalism

For the past hundred years, the internal governance of socialist and communist parties has been marked by the predominant trend of anti-factionalism. I define anti-factionalism in this piece as the suppression of the creation of internal factions within a party that pursue ideological objectives—whether this faction is recognized or informal, or representing the majority or a minority.

This practice, at least among parties of the Leninist orientation, is rooted in the early days of the Soviet Union. In 1921, during the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), factionalism and the formation of factions was formally banned following the principles of democratic centralism. Vladimir Lenin himself described the ban as temporary. When one delegate proposed an amendment which would have turned the ban permanent, he criticized it as “excessive” and “impracticable,” noting that if there were “fundamental disagreements” between delegates elected to the next congress, “the elections may have to be based on platforms.” ^[2]

Regardless of the intentions of its initial proponents, this ban on the formulation of factions would persist permanently, becoming not just a core doctrine of the governance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but a widely-held dogma in the practice of democratic centralism. Communist parties in and out of the Eastern Bloc—both those with success in gaining power, such as the Communist Party of Vietnam, and those hopelessly exempt from governance, such as the Communist Party of Great Britain—^[3]would follow the CPSU’s example of banning factionalism as contrary to the necessity of party unity in centralism.

A trend would soon emerge in Soviet history, until its dissolution in 1991: devout practitioners of this interpretation of democratic centralism would use this anti-factionalism doctrine to suppress the formation of organized opposition, only to themselves be forced into forming a faction once their views were held by a minority of the party. The closest adherents of Stalin, who supported his suppression of the Left Opposition, the Right Opposition, the United Opposition, the Bloc of Soviet Oppositions, the Decist Group of Democratic Centralism, and Ryutin’s Union of Marxist-Leninists, all under the pretenses of the ban instituted in 1921, would eventually support the Anti-Party Group’s attempt at subverting the consensus established by Khrushchev. Khrushchev would justify his suppression of the group on the same principle.^[4] Decades later, the State Committee on the State of Emergency, again consisting of adherents of this anti-factionalist doctrine, would conspire against Gorbachev’s active effort to replace the Soviet Union with a social democracy, only to be brought to a similar end.

To understand why Lenin and the Bolsheviks came to the decision to suppress factionalism, one must take into account the dire situation they were in, where there was potential of the Russian Revolution ending in military failure. The Kronstadt Rebellion, which openly aimed to overthrow the new regime, was ongoing at the time of the ban. Until the Russian Civil War was concluded, it was feared that opposition factions within the Communist Party could foster defeatism, giving the external appearance that the iron unity of the proletariat was not being forged.

Even after peace dawned upon the Soviet Union, the intention by Lenin to undo this temporary ban was largely ignored by the victors of the power struggle to succeed him. In his theoretical writings, Stalin justified the suppression of factionalism both from the standpoint of emulating the conditions that would eventually lead to the party, the state, and classes withering away, and of the assumption that the debate and disagreements that naturally arise from factionalism deters the unity of the party.^[5] The parties of the Comintern and their successors naturally followed suit—of course, to suggest that any form of factionalism could actually keep parties together and make their ranks more unified seems, at first glance, counter-intuitive. Regardless of variances in the government structures of Marxist-Leninist regimes, anti-factionalism has always been codified as a doctrine.

The study of anti-factionalism is therefore inseparable from the general study of parties following Soviet-style democratic centralism. These parties have accomplished military successes, electoral victories, and tangible economic development. Yet they have equally met with failures in attaining membership, failures in preventing splits from occurring over even minor theoretical disputes, and failures in stopping reactionaries from deforming the party to vague national chauvinism. Of course, communists should not automatically consider historical oppositionist groups as having more progressive lines than the party majorities they opposed; nor should they necessarily be valorized as martyrs against gravediggers of socialism. What should be observed by communists is that history has repeatedly shown that indiscriminate suppression of internal opposition has only led to disunity, and that there is no guarantee that the opinion of the majority is one that is the most revolutionary.

Both in and out of power, parties following anti-factionalism have suffered catastrophic fractures that, in turn, fractured the attention of workers and severely hindered their ability to fight bourgeois political forces. For example, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, under Mengistu Haile Mariam, aimed to eliminate the ethnic sectarianism of Ethiopia through the creation of a singular mass party; banning any form of organized dissidence and conducting widespread purges. Even if this was ostensibly meant to prevent separatist formations, this extreme blanket suppression ended up fuelling the pre-existing dominance of several ethnic groups; worsening the ongoing civil war and contributing to the collapse of the regime.^[6]

Elsewhere, at least a dozen political parties in Nepal claim the mantle of the “Communist Party of Nepal,” in varying degrees of actual theoretical breakage.^[7] And the communist parties of Soviet constituent republics and satellite states rapidly lost any dedication to workers liberation after the collapse of the USSR. In Eastern Europe, they gradually degenerated into socially conservative and vaguely populist parties. In Central Asia, they became apolitical, dynastic regimes focused around dictatorial cults of personalities and economic cronyism.

Yet, just because open formations of minority opinions have never been allowed to exist in any socialist state, factions have still existed. Factions exist in modern day China, as they existed in the governance of every country in the world since at least the twentieth century. Ideologically similar individuals grouping together has existed in every society from the Soviet Union, to Nazi Germany, to Francoist Spain, to the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States—regardless of whether they have been open or covert. They have existed in varying levels of formality, with more or less nebulous membership, of vague ideological conflicts that their own participants would struggle to describe—yet they have always existed in every system. In many cases, factions have consisted of devout, loyal supporters of the same central entity or leader with mutual distrust and substantial disagreement among themselves. Charismatic leaders across the political spectrum have fostered internally hostile followings, deliberately or not. In the twentieth century it was seen in Peronism’s vastly different ideological trends—from the socialist Revolutionary Peronism to neo-fascist Orthodox Peronism. In the modern day it is seen with Trump’s coalition of mutually hostile right-wing elements.

While the negation of anti-factionalism—the open exchange of tendencies, has occurred within several parties elsewhere, it has never been enshrined by the ruling party of any socialist regime. China during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is often described as “factionalist” in nature due to the open verbal and physical conflict between factions of the Red Guards and communes created by the masses. This characterization is questionable—these factions uniformly built themselves around their claims of utmost loyalty to Mao Zedong and revolutionary zeal rather than any actual willingness to create a better programme or engage in open dialogue.^[8] A study of the Shengwulian clique, a group suppressed by Maoist revolutionaries for their radical critique of Mao and his supporters from a communist perspective, lends credence to the interpretation of the Cultural Revolution as a purge against rival elements rather than any genuine effort to establish a proletarian democracy.^[9]

Anti-factionalism is ultimately critical to the absence of revolutionary sentiment in modern Chinese politics. No left-wing criticism of Xi Jinping’s policy—whether it is the general ambivalence regarding the genocide of the Palestinian people,^[10] the support of the Burmese junta and complete absence of any action towards M23,^[11] or the continued erosion of workers rights regardless of pay increases—^[12]can be formalized on a collective level. Individual criticism,^[13] of course, exists in China, but there is no stable system to coalesce action and advocate for substantial change. I also note that the Communist Party of China very pointedly does not support any communist or left-wing parties anywhere in the world, barring those already in power. All of these issues with the governance of the People’s Republic of China are pertinent to both the ideology and methodology of the party, both of which are determined by profoundly undemocratic practices naturally derived from the anti-factionalist consensus.

The informal factions of the modern day Chinese government dispute each other and spar for influence behind closed doors and through informal channels. The few factional struggles that have arisen to the surface, such as Bo Xilai’s dramatic fall from grace,^[14] clearly demonstrate that the building of socialism, if it is happening at all, is decided by a complicated bureaucracy rather than the masses. The blanket ban on factions in China has only ensured that very few individuals with substantial capital practice democracy; depriving the proletarian masses from any say in governance besides viewing the impossible facade of a unified party.^[15] Any serious analysis of China from a communist perspective must address its lack of democracy and how this correlates with its inadequacies—or arguably, refusal to genuinely participate—in the struggle against imperialism. Even if the CPC is progressive in many of its actions, vulgar campism can not be used in defense of a system incapable of ensuring the liberation of workers is truly being achieved.

Only four countries today constitutionally pursue Marxism-Leninism, three of which have adopted market-based reform and a pacifistic, non-belligerent attitude towards the West. The remaining country, Cuba, still bears a revolutionary ruling party, which can largely be explained by the existence of the inhumane embargo by the United States radicalizing the population against its imperialism. It is reasonable to suppose that a counter-revolutionary faction that would appease the US might form and come to power without the anti-factionalist doctrine, and that such prohibitions are sensible as they were in the very first years of the Soviet Union.^[16] Yet China, Laos, and Vietnam have normalized trade relations with the broader West and are not under any imminent threat of military invasion.^[17] Their prohibition of factions are clearly not measures to safeguard them from capitalist restoration—one could argue the lack of internal democratization is critical to keeping their regimes complacent with the existing economic order.

Before I move onto my fundamental argument in defense of factionalism, it is crucial to understand that my critique of anti-factionalism is not necessarily a blanket condemnation of democratic centralism as a principle. The unity afforded by democratic centralism’s requirement for all members to follow the decisions made by the party is something that has been repeatedly proven effective to carry out a program in a diverse variety of contexts—from elections to insurgencies. I do not necessarily reject democratic centralism, but rather argue that to be effectively and genuinely democratic, the minority must be allowed to disagree and organize in opposition, as long as they faithfully and resolutely carry out resolutions as other cadres are expected to do. In this end it is possible for democratic centralism to exist as a way of ensuring the political party is capable of acting as a unified force; although I critique it as a justification for silencing dissent within it. Democratic centralism which is truly democratic rather than bureaucratic is possible.^[18]

The Pro-Factionalist Model

This article describes a form of party organization that is contrasted with the anti-factionalist consensus. Because simply referring to this organizational form as “factionalism” is too broadly inclusive of cases that do not represent what I advocate for—such as the aforementioned example of power struggles between informal groups with no obligation to work towards a common goal, the neologism “pro-factionalism” is, as such, introduced here. I define “pro-factionalism” as a condition and an outlook of a political party or pre-party formation. In pro-factionalism, political factions are free to organize and advocate for their own ideological goals, and there is a mutual understanding among these factions that the co-existence of such factions is beneficial, and that said factions should ideally co-operate as concurrent trends in executing a shared political vision. This term does not apply to all factionalist scenes that have occurred within socialist parties. The Labour Party of the United Kingdom, for example, has suffered from severe deficiencies in democracy and unconstructive hostility by its moderate leadership towards its left flank. Still, the label “pro-factionalism” is applicable to other pre-existing socialist organizations.

The bedrock of pro-factionalism is the process of open discussion and debate among ideological tendencies. I argue that this process encourages rather than dissuades unity, is crucial in preventing dramatic splits and self-destructive purges, and prevents the downfall of the party majority into counter-revolutionary ideals. This is an argument backed by the dialectical method, the fallibility of individual worldviews that is rectified by the democratic exchange of perspectives, and most strikingly, the severely negative impact of anti-factionalism on the history of communist organizing.

Of course, the freedom to form factions is only one component of many when it comes to internal democracy within a socialist party. Other mechanisms are vitally important, such as internal elections, elected officials and governance being held accountable by members, and the ease of newcomers to join and organize. The principles of pro-factionalism lend to the development of these mechanisms—if collective decision-making is valued by a party’s cadres, then it follows that they will seek to establish it in the party where it does not exist.

Pro-factionalism asserts that the natural formation of tendencies can lead to organization of these factions into groups with explicitly defined memberships and programmes regarding the direction of the party. These tendencies are permitted to distinguish themselves from each other (although inseparable from the wider party), advocating for methods and perspectives that can intersect or contradict with each other in the pursuit of the ultimate goal of socialism. These ideological tendencies form as situations progress and power is acquired. Undoubtedly, they will have distinctions in membership demographics, personalities of leaders, and geographic origin; these distinctions in party membership exist with or without factional systems. As factions dispute each other through democratic and constructive processes, the presence of these distinctions in identity are de-emphasized in contrast to practical differences in theory.

It should be understood that pro-factionalism is not an apolitical mantra that all factions are equal in value. It is very well possible that a singular line or strategy will be revealed by history to be the most progressive path, and that one faction will be observed to have most precisely followed it. Factionalism should be supported, in spite of this, as no individual, or group of individuals, is infallible and will perfectly pursue said path without needing consultation and reflection.

In pro-factionalism, tendencies can be fluid and ephemeral, ceasing to exist if their goals are achieved, or splitting if differences within them become significant. This is a healthy process and should be critically distinguished from the frictions and dissolutions of political parties as a whole. When a socialist political party acrimoniously splits and its members develop separate groups, the attention and action of the working class is split as well. In contrast, factions are naturally fluid and their merging, dissolution, or fracturing does not necessarily detract from revolutionary action. More programs, theories, and newspapers might arise out of such developments—in the end, the wider party continues to exist and is the unifying organ of the proletariat.

I do not necessarily advocate for formalization or official recognition of factions by the party apparatus. While parties should certainly make no prohibition of the organization of such factions; it is neither necessary for the party to support their formation; nor is it necessary that members should join such factions or contribute to the factional struggle. It is more than possible that only a small minority of a party chooses to join factions in such a system, and that the majority remain unaffiliated and only bound by the unified line that all factions contribute towards. A healthy factional system does not require full participation. Factions are able to exert influence, field their own candidates, and progress theoretically with only a few members; and internal democracy means unaffiliated party cadres could simply support tendencies’ programs based on their own judgement.

This brings me to the two contentions of this piece—when socialists are in opposition to an existing order, they should seek to merge as many left-wing parties into a single, democratic, multi-tendency organization. When the communist party is in power to build a new system, it should seek to maintain a robust internal democracy while working towards becoming the sole party necessary for governance. These two objectives jointly aim to prevent sectarianism and ensure the success of the revolution through a revolutionary form of public democracy.

Sectarianism is the condition where mutually hostile groups actively compete for influence and power, with these groups actively desiring the marginalization or destruction of others for the sake of being other groups. It is found in both organizations without underlying factional unity and larger political scenes. Sectarianism also exists as an attitude when groups actively encourage this situation, although the individual actors of a scene need not necessarily be sectarian in attitude for it to occur.

In political parties, internal sectarianism occurs when factions do not have a mutual understanding of unity through debate and co-existence. In these cases, the majority faction may seek for undemocratic centralization to remove opposing tendencies—such as the Labour Party’s efforts to expel the Militant tendency—and minority groups may split and form other parties. Externally, sectarianism occurs among the competition of a multitude of political parties, oftentimes with similar goals and ambitions, yet with hostility or deliberate ignoring of each other. The quintessential example of a sectarian scene is Italy, where fifteen communist parties fight over intellectuals, the mantle of Bordiga, Gramsci, or Berlinguer, and actively field candidates against each other in general elections.^[19]

Pro-factionalism seeks to transcend sectarianism on the left by facilitating the deliberation of political differences too important to avoid discussing, while putting aside differences that are too trivial to warrant the disunification of the party. Sectarian scenes are oftentimes divided by strategy, policies, and the personalities of socialists, even if there are not significant conceptual differences on socialist society. In the system of pro-factionalism, these differences are accepted and permitted to exist, and party members seek to resolve these distinctions through co-operative and democratic means.

The differences between factions are crucially subordinate to the common goal that all groups in pro-factionalism have to constructively build a shared line that all of the party upholds and the common vision of the next stage of human development, socialism. All members of the party, regardless of their participation in factionalism or lack thereof, should seek to uphold the common line of the party. Through the shared commitment to this line, factions have far more in common with each other than what separates them, and their points of contention are vested in the most effective way to advance and better this line.

As a practice, pro-factionalism is not entirely in diametric opposition to popular-frontism—which I define in a modern context as agreements between independent organizations (both on the socialist left and left-liberals) not to run candidates against each other and/or to work towards shared objectives, while keeping their independent infrastructures. Popular fronts can be reasonable compromises to take on the road to political power and, historically, popular fronts have prevented the far-right from taking power in electoral democracies or unified populations against agents of neoliberalism. However, pro-factionalism is best fulfilled, both at the oppositional stage and in power, with the unification of the interests of the proletariat into a singular party. The factions of the socialist party, unlike the component parties of a popular front, are inseparable from the wider party and are not merely unified by what they oppose but a shared political line.

The popular front has shown fragility and a predisposition to collapse after threats have subsided, oftentimes from its disparate lack of programmatic unity. The New Popular Front in France, for example, despite having been elected on a broad electoral program,^[20] contains significant divergences in worldview, particularly on Palestine—^[21]and is besieged by threats of its component parties splitting apart from the coalition.^[22] This vicious, sectarian infighting demonstrates the necessity of a common line and the irrevocability of factions from it. If non-socialist forces exist within the popular front, their class interests will inevitably come into conflict with that of the socialists—a situation that is dispelled by a singular party being able to represent the working class only through a common program. Even if it is impossible to completely unify a nation's left wing without seizing the state, it is imperative to consolidate as much of it as possible.

Lastly, the pro-factionalist party, once it attains power and the capacity to reshape the state in its image, should aim towards becoming the only party necessary to govern in the interests of the proletariat. Lenin described the state as a mechanism where one class imposes its will upon another.^[23] The socialist state is therefore the imposition of the proletariat—diverse in thought but indivisible in action—on other classes. As classes erode, the necessity for independent political parties erodes as well. The existence of distinct political parties represent irreconcilable goals and the advocation of hostile class interests—communism is the abolition of such contradictions. The party must reshape the state constitution—not only to entrench socialism or expand powers, but to foster a democratic culture, encouraging frequent elections, widespread political education, and structures of review and recall to ensure the party answers to the masses. The very same mechanisms that enable tendencies to maintain the party’s revolutionary character can and should be applied to the state, which will progressively empower the singular proletarian class.

However, I do not advocate for the party to constitutionally entrench itself as a one-party-state. Until classes are completely abolished, bourgeois interests will manifest one way or another—such as by entering the ruling party, even if its internal democracy safeguards against these infiltrators from taking power. The establishment and ability for other parties to organize and be elected should remain, even if ideally they will not exist. Just as commodity production can not be abolished with the stroke of a pen, neither can completely antagonistic worldviews be eliminated immediately. The communist party should strive to make itself the only party, not through immediate declaration, but through the dismantling of capitalism.^[24]

Existing Applications of the Pro-Factionalist Model

As all workers’ states that have existed in history have suppressed factionalism, all multi-tendency pro-factionalist socialist parties available to be studied have only existed outside of uncontested power; even if some have governed as a part of a coalition government. I do not mean to imply that these projects are uniquely capable of building socialism; nor do I propose communists ignore the outcomes of parties following a more rigid structure. Either of these perspectives would amount to romantic chauvinism; only elevating those which have never been tested by the turmoil of governance. Yet the lack of opportunity for any organizational structure to prove its merits does not automatically mean it is worthless. The vanguard party was not disproven by the lack of any examples in power until the formation of the Bolsheviks.^[25] Neither has pro-factionalism been disproven as a form of organization that can lead to a more revolutionary society than whatever may have existed in the past.

Several organizations around the world today can reasonably be described as pro-factionalist in nature—Australia’s Revolutionary Communist Organization, Poland’s Akcja Socjalistyczna, Germany’s Die Linke,^[26] The Netherlands’ Revolutionary Socialist Party,^[27] and Ireland’s People Before Profit all contain cooperative tendency systems in which factions are not formally discouraged. In this article, three formations—one from the United States and two from Brazil—that demonstrate pro-factionalism in action and enable their members to openly organize in factions are explored.

While I evaluate the following parties as having been progressive—if imperfect—movements; sharing this perspective is not necessary to subscribe to pro-factionalist ideology; which is compatible with the rejection of any form of coalitionism with non-working class entities.^[28] The objective of citing these cases is not to elevate their political lines above criticism, but to demonstrate that the pro-factionalist model has existed in practice, beyond theory.

Pro-Factionalism in the United States

The initial publication of this piece comes shortly after the 2025 convention of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA). In this convention, the caucus system of the DSA has received significant outside attention, along with the passage of several resolutions to affirm and reinforce its status as an anti-Zionist political organization. The caucus model of factionalism demonstrated in the DSA served as the primary impetus for me to write this article. Many tenets of pro-factionalism written here were derived from conclusions drawn from studying and actively participating in the DSA—such as the party apparatus not needing to formally recognize factions for them to be effective.

The origins of the DSA’s caucus system derive from the legacy of the Socialist Party of America and its successors, which bore factions among the ideological trends of its time. For example, in the 1930s, the Militant Caucus was formed by centrist Marxists and Christian pacifists,^[29] and decades later, Michael Harrington's Coalition Caucus pushed for the Socialist Party to align with George McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign.^[30] These relatively unknown, and strictly internal factions were components of an US socialist tradition that has historically had few elected officials and an inconsequential challenge to the duopoly of two bourgeois parties.

Countless mass labor actions and periods of civil unrest in the twentieth century have failed to result in socialism becoming more than a peripheral thought in the imaginations of the US population. The modern-day DSA is exceptional in this tradition for its substantial electoral success, close connections to labor and activist organizations, and burgeoning membership. However ineffective its precedents have been, it has clearly become the most significant left-wing movement in the US since the First Red Scare.

The current caucuses operating within the Democratic Socialists of America have formed since the boom in membership resulting from the Bernie Sanders presidential campaign in 2016.^[31] Although only a small number of city council members and representatives openly affiliate themselves with a caucus and the majority of DSA members do not belong to any caucuses, the caucus system is critical to both the operation of the DSA and its status as the only relevant workers’ formation in US politics today. Caucuses field their own candidates for positions within the organization and are constructed around their own lines and visions of how the DSA should govern, expand, and organize. The terms “DSA Left” and “DSA Right” are usually used to denote broad wings within the DSA’s political spectrum, referring to differing emphasises placed on electoralism and base-building. Regardless of these terms, most caucuses identify as Marxist and all seek to eventually break from the Democratic party to form an independent socialist party, although differing perspectives on the exact process of this break exist among the spectrum.

The DSA is the clearest example of internal factions influencing the party to a revolutionary direction. Michael Harrington, the founder of the DSA, was both a Zionist and an avowed anti-communist,^[32] yet because of its democratic nature, the DSA has transformed to become firmly anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist. Unequivocable condemnation of Israeli settler colonialism and recognition of the Palestinian right of resistance and return have been successfully promoted by multiple DSA caucuses. Similarly, DSA caucuses have also openly fought for the censure of nominally progressive politicians who have condoned support for Israel, such Shri Thanedar and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and have at times successfully pushed the organization to cease cooperation with such figures.^[33]

Strengthening and maintaining this internal democracy will prove crucial in the ultimate task of the Democratic Socialists of America: the mass mobilization of the nation's proletariat, beyond its current membership of about a hundred thousand individuals. The ideological diversity of perspectives in the DSA is itself a draw. Because of caucuses, local DSA chapters include Maoists, Trotskyists, Marxist-Leninists, libertarian socialists, centrist Marxists, classical social democrats, and eco-socialists working under one umbrella; putting aside whatever violent conflicts their ideologues may have had with each other in the past and recognizing true enemies on the kakistrocratic-fascist right and the neoliberal center. This diversity encourages both those with inclinations towards certain ideologues and those who go without such labels to join the organization. The DSA should publicize the process of this democracy as much as possible. As long as one is in agreement that socialism is the next stage of human development, anyone, no matter how or if they describe themselves, can join it and contribute to its program or be themselves changed by it.

The DSA is the left-wing organization in the United States—no other socialist organizations hold substantial office and other “progressive” formations such as the Working Families Party and the Indivisible movement largely exist to strengthen the Democrats rather than using them as a conduit to found a new party. Despite this, the DSA is years away from attaining absolute power. It faces a multitude of great hurdles, some inherent in the task of undermining the imperial core from within and some from flaws within the DSA as an organ. Hurdles deriving from these flaws include the under-representation of racial minorities in its ranks and the lack of electoral discipline among many of its representatives in office. These are real, tangible problems within the DSA, and I do not deny that they exist or that they are detrimental to its cause. I argue, however, that these problems are not caused by the democratic, big tent nature of the DSA, and given time and serious effort, can be rectified by it.

Paradoxically, the DSA is majority white; to a greater extent than would be expected for an organization that is foundationally anti-racist and antithetical to white supremacy. This is especially jarring in the chapters of the US South and near Indian reservations, where Black and indigenous members are still severely under-represented, in contrast to the past formations such as the Black Panther Party or the American Indian Movement. Caucuses prioritizing the diversification of the DSA have sought to address this by creating and expanding working committees specifically representing non-white peoples, and ensuring that the wider organization does not ignore the recommendations and activities of said committees. Caucuses have also pushed for DSA to recruit and organize outside of its usual bases—such as among agricultural workers, incarcerated labour, and tenant unions. The freedom of criticism is not just allowed but encouraged within the DSA—less democratic formations in the rest of the Left, such as the Communist Party USA, have found themselves unequipped to deal with their deficiencies in promoting racial justice and queer liberation.^[34] Because factions can represent minority opinions, they are capable of elevating the perspective of demographic minorities and influencing the party majority to recognize their own shortcomings.

The past years have highlighted the importance of electoral discipline; the difficult task of ensuring that elected officials in the DSA properly represent the organization. To do so, they must be cadre members—actively participating in its operations and following its resolutions, rather than merely being members on paper only, who are nominally affiliated but fail to engage with their chapter or adhere to the DSA platform. This problem is congruent with the perception by these officials that the DSA is just one of many avenues for endorsements, rather than a pre-party formation. It is addressed by the continued growth of the organization and its caucuses, who unanimously desire to see members in good-standing like Rashida Tlaib or Zohran Mamdani push for the DSA line, even if differences in the strictness of discipline exist.

The growth of the DSA in cadre membership makes it increasingly unignorable as an electoral constituency and as the groundwork for anti-establishment change. In recent years, the DSA’s endorsement standards have tightened because of factional pressure, causing the dual effect of making endorsements more valuable and ensuring officials actively have to seek to gain it. Aligning themselves within the DSA’s factional scene is not and will never be a requirement for officerholders to be cadre members, but their participation in the institutions they influence is imperative.

In this article I have referred to the DSA as more than a political organization but a party; despite it not being registered as one under federal law and that its candidates run as either Democrats or Independents in general elections. Yet compared to the pre-existing Republican and Democratic parties, the DSA is far more structured as an actual political party, by any reasonable definition of the word. The DSA has membership initiation and standards, functional internal communications, clearly written bylaws, collaboratively-determined programmatic objectives. Its NPC is a directive, active decision-making body, chosen by democratic processes in stark contrast to the arcane systems which determine the relatively powerless leadership of the RNC and DNC. The two major parties are anatomically far closer to simply being ballot lines and vehicles for perpetually conflicting bourgeois interests. Their factional struggles- far more brutal and divisive than anything in the DSA- manifest outside of defined groups and through primary battles in elected offices. No matter what it is legally considered as, the Democratic Socialists of America is, by all means, a revolutionary party.

Pro-Factionalism In Brazil

Earlier in this article I mentioned that a pro-factionalist party should aspire to unify its national left-wing, and to eventually become the sole ruling party in governance. I argued this as a logical entailment following from the idea that conflicts within the working class are reconcilable and therefore can be represented by a singular proletarian party. However, this objective comes as an ideological tenet of pro-factionalism, rather than a precondition of its presence as a model. As such, the neologism remains applicable to socialist parties that do not actively aim for unification yet permit and encourage cooperative exchanges of tendencies. In the case of the Brazilian left-wing, internal tendencies are crucial to two parties—the Workers’ Party (PT) and the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL).

It is indisputable that the PT, under President Lula has massively improved the lives of working class Brazilians. PT has managed the task of winning five presidential elections; achieving unprecedented growth of the Brazilian economy, reductions in poverty in favelas, expansions for the rights of workers, pensioners, and minorities, and made significant strides in fighting violent crime that plagued everyday Brazilians.^[35] Ideologically, PT is social democratic and reformist, in contrast to the more explicitly anti-capitalist PSOL. Despite this, I view PT as clearly a proletarian party—its policies have progressively diminished the power of the bourgeois classes and empowered the poor of Brazil, closely connected to the Unified Workers' Central (CUT) and the Landless Workers' Movement (MST).

PT is, of course, strongly associated in the West with its presidents Lula and Dilma, yet it has always strived to be internally democratic rather than solely driven by charismatic leaders, a party driven by the workers that comprise it and not just the politicians that lead it. From PT’s inception in the 1980s, it has sustained a tradition of internal factions, known as “tendências,” that have persisted and coexisted within the party.^[36] Their first internal congress in 1991 recognized sixteen of these tendencies—all of which have gradually fluctuated over time, with more than a dozen factions existing today, ranging from small Marxist groups to large sub-organizations with thousands of members. Factions participate in building coalitions among themselves, creating slates to run for party positions, contribute lines and help decide the future of the party’s program and actions as the largest party by membership in Brazil.

The tendencies system of PT, despite receiving little attention in the English-language media, is critical to the operation and success of it as perhaps the most successful left-wing party in any electoral democracy of this century. Because of PT’s democratic nature, both the political programme of PT in opposition and the actions taken by its officials in administration are extensively evaluated, whether they are praised as progressive or criticized as counter-effective. It is very well imaginable that PT’s left-wing character would have withered away to a vague personalistic populism like that of Vargas without this system. Critics of PT have long argued that it has compromised with centrists and enacted neoliberal legislation—which it has undoubtedly done, but not without internal opposition from tendencies. The membership-driven approach of the party has caused many of these decisions to be repudiated, reversed, or accepted only as temporary rather than a significant shift in orientation.^[37] Regardless of its flaws, PT is proof that pro-factionalism is a model capable of governance that can uplift millions out of poverty.

Unfortunately, despite its successes making it a worthwhile model for both Latin America and the rest of the world, PT has not unified Brazil’s left into a singular party, nor is this a stated objective of any of the major Brazilian socialist parties. The Workers’ Party is extremely close to the Communist Party of Brazil (PcdoB), a Marxist-Leninist party which has always run with the PT since 1989. One may ask why the PcdoB still exists as a separate legal entity from PT, rather than a tendency, as they are highly compatible in practice. This is largely attributable to the party wanting to maintain its historical legacy as the oldest political party in Brazil, having waged a guerilla war against the military dictatorship, and its use of Marxist iconography that is generally avoided by the PT. The PT has historically had a difficult relationship on the left with the Democratic Labour Party (PDT).^[38] The PDT often critiques the policies of PT as insufficiently left-wing and challenges it electorally, spearheaded by the outspoken, confrontational personality of its leader, Ciro Gomes.

The Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) was founded in 2004 by four former elected officials of PT. These members had vocally criticized the current administration as insufficiently radical, although they were expelled specifically for voting against Lula’s policies.^[39] In significant contrast to PT’s tendency system being a largely internal aspect of its governance, PSOL’s factionalist system is publicly highlighted and emphasized, with the majority of its elected representatives being members of an internal tendency. Although it hasn’t governed state or federal governments as PT has, PSOL is the clearest example of a resolutely anti-capitalist party that enshrines pro-factionalism. PSOL’s tendencies represent different strategic strains of the same proletarian movement to abolish the current state of things, and are given considerable autonomy as long as they follow the party's general statute and program.^[40]

The radicalism of PSOL places it much closer to the socialist orientation of the DSA than PT—all tendencies fundamentally promote the end of capitalism and imperialism, and most identify as Marxist or communist.^[41] The large number of tendencies, many of which have their own youth organizations, publications, and international relations have not resulted in the fracturing of the party, but an active, sizable membership—three times larger than that of the DSA and considerable electoral success.

PSOL’s tendencies often center on areas that PT has come short of addressing—such as elevating transgender figures and refusing to compromise on the rights of indigenous Brazilians—and they take pride in their philosophical roots. Rather than simply languishing in obscurity as ideologues for microsects, the doctrines of thinkers such as Ernest Mandel, Nahuel Moreno, Nicos Poulantzas, and Henri Lefebvre are applied in the practice of union leaders, elected officials, and evaluated by the masses.

If the democratic, highly intellectual, yet unambiguously working-class nature of PSOL is expanded even further to governance and penetration to all sectors of Brazilian society, a dictatorship of the proletariat in the purest sense could emerge. This ultimately raises the question of how the Left in Brazil could be unified into a single, multi-tendency party that can explicitly fight the increasingly fascistic, Christian Zionist, and narcoterroristic right-wing to create a secular, socialist Brazilian republic.^[42] The four aforementioned parties have taken no significant steps toward a merger. More ambiguously working-class parties on the center-left, such as the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), the Green Party (PV), or the Sustainability Network (REDE); and the most anti-coalitionist far-left parties without electoral success, such as Popular Unity (UP) and the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB); have not even been mentioned here for the sake of conciseness.

Similar to how anti-democratic practices in US elections and its constitution necessitate forgoing a third-party strategy, aspects of Brazilian democracy encourage a multitude of similar parties. Parties are given free airtime on radio and TV depending on their popularity, and the Partisan Fund allocates federal funding in a manner encouraging politicians to found their own parties or join smaller ones to control the allocation of such resources. In an electoral environment as personality-driven as Brazil, it becomes second nature for parties of all stripes to maximize their own capital rather than resolve differences and unify.

The Left in Brazil is not split into multiple parties because of irreconcilable ideological conflict. A common programme to transform Brazil would act at the center of unity, not two-word descriptions or dead ideologues that do indeed contradict each other. Nor is it because the Left parties represent incompatible social classes. The bourgeois of Brazil is firm in their anti-communism and to discriminate between the strata of the proletariat runs contrary to the wide-reaching nature of the successful communist parties of the early 20th century. College students, agriculture workers, pensioners, and the racialized poor all have a place in the socialist movement. I argue that the singular party does not exist because the theoretical necessity of unification is unrecognized by the actors involved, especially when the conditions of the Brazilian republic that encourage many parties obscure them.

Pro-factionalism as a model is already in application in PT and PSOL, but the conclusions of it as an ideology provide an impetus for historical legacies and past grudges of personalities to be put aside to create a singular party. A singular party with a rigorously deliberated platform devised by the masses would energize the working class of Brazil and clearly differentiate itself from the jumble of the cronyist centrão. The extreme diversity of Brazil’s proletariat in thought, identity, and livelihood is represented through tendencies, which converge on the same conclusion—a more beautiful Brazil can be achieved. Whether it is called the Partido Socialista Democrático dos Trabalhadores or something else,^[43] it would have the capacity to accomplish far more than electoral coalitions temporarily promise—a mass awakening in class consciousness. I have faith that this party could eventually nullify any divide between coalitionism and purism by rendering either position unnecessary—as this awakening would spur revolution.

The tendency system of this mass party would already be developed from assimilating its former components. Structurally, it would retain previous model’s successes in programmatic unity while progressing past shortcomings in their pluralism. The model of PT lacks vibrancy in its democratic structure—the operation of their tendencies are far less public than they should be, and vocal dissent could stand to be more permitted, even if its electoral discipline is understandable. Inversely, the infrastructure of PSOL indicates the necessity of central organization beyond that of being a connective-tissue between factions. While it is more than possible to join PSOL nuclei and participate in base groups while being internally unaffiliated, much of PSOL’s activities and operation are tied to individual tendencies- in contrast to the DSA where chapter activism is much less tied to its caucuses. Ideally, the robust central structure of PT will be combined with the bold idealism of PSOL to create a party mobilizing all of its cadre, whether they are in tendencies or not.

I make no prediction as to how this party will attain uncontested power in Brazil, nor will I make such a prediction for any party anywhere. This article promotes the democratization of the party and the state, regardless if this party is installed through electoral and legal means, through peaceful mass uprising, or through violent revolution. Inevitably, the ruling party, no matter how it rose, will evolve. What is not inevitable is the direction in which they evolve. Anti-factionalism has ensured this direction is degeneration. Rather than denying that this evolution exists, pro-factionalism embraces this internal struggle. These struggles are not distractions, but arguably even prerequisites for revolution. The Bolsheviks were created by a factional struggle within the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. Lenin himself declared that the “the experience of two tactics is actually teaching a lesson to the proletarian masses,” and that the influence of one or the other tendency will be traced in a hundred practical questions of different kinds.

One can view anti-factionalism within the vanguard party as among the most crucial errors of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the modern day Communist Party of China. It is precisely by this suppression that reactionaries and opportunists came to power. The ability to form organized opposition is not a panacea or an immunization to reaction within a party; but it essentially enables the formation of an intellectual struggle to retain the dictatorship of the proletariat in the years following a revolution and the generations after that of the first revolutionaries.

This struggle is to be welcomed—Marxists believe in ruthless criticism of all that exists. Ruthless criticism can only come from a genuine democracy that allows the collective construction of a line that will reach this ideal, a process that will continue throughout every phase of the socialist project. Historical materialism rejects great men theory and the holiness of any one cult of personality; a class-conscious vanguard party of the masses must therefore be democratic or it is not a party of the masses at all. To repeat a phrase but without any intention of backtracking on the promise of freedom: Let a hundred flowers bloom. Let a hundred schools of thought contend!

1. Vladimir Lenin, “But Who Are the Judges?,” Marxists Internet Archive, 1907, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1907/nov/05b.htm.

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2. Doug Lorimer, The Collapse of Communism in the USSR: Its Causes and Significance (Resistance Books, 1997).

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3. See the following for an evaluation on the lasting legacy of anti-factionalism in the CPGB-PCC: Mike Macnair, “End the cycle of splits,” Weekly Worker, May 23, 2012, https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/915/end-the-cycle-of-splits/.

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4. Party Central Committee, “Khrushchev Expels the Anti-Party Group,” Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, 1957, https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1956-2/the-anti-party-group/the-anti-party-group-texts/khrushchev-expels-the-anti-party-group/.

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5. Joseph Stalin, “The Foundations of Leninism,” Marxists Internet Archive, 1924, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1924/foundations-leninism/ch08.htm

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6. Gebeyehu Temesgen Duressa, The Marxist concept of national question and the analysis of Ethiopian reality during the Derg regime (1974 to 1991) (Cogent Arts & Humanities, 2024), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311983.2024.2347056.

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7. This is according to Wikipedia, which might be outdated and include some parties that no longer exist or exclude more obscure parties: “List of communist parties in Nepal,” Wikipedia, accessed 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_communist_parties_in_Nepal.

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8. China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Master Narratives and Post-Mao Counternarratives (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002).

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9. That Faint Light, “The Emergence of the Ultra-Left: A Case Study of Shengwulian,” A People’s History of the Cultural Revolution, 2012, https://thatfaintlight.wordpress.com/2012/07/14/a-peoples-history-of-the-cultural-revolution/.

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10. Shireen Akram, “China's Ties With Israel Are Hindering the Palestinian Struggle for Freedom,” Truthout, December 1, 2024, https://truthout.org/articles/chinas-ties-with-israel-are-hindering-the-palestinian-struggle-for-freedom/.

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11. Khine L. Kyaw, “China's Premier Vows Support for Myanmar in Junta Chief Meeting,” Bloomberg, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-11-07/china-s-premier-vows-support-for-myanmar-in-junta-chief-meeting; Amani Matabaro, “China's Illegal Mining Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Harvard Kennedy School, 2025, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr/publications/chinas-illegal-mining-operations-democratic-republic-congo.

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12. “Workers' rights and labour relations in China,” China Labour Bulletin, 2023, https://clb.org.hk/en/content/workers%E2%80%99-rights-and-labour-relations-china.

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13. Riyaz ul Khaliq, “‘River to the Sea:’ Chinese Students Express Solidarity with Palestine,” Anadolu Ajansı, June 11, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/river-to-the-sea-chinese-students-express-solidarity-with-palestine/3246762.

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14. Chris Buckley, “In China's Chongqing, dismay over downfall of Bo Xilai,” Reuters, March 16, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-chongqing-idUSBRE82F0H120120316/

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15. See the Communist Party of China’s explanation for their prohibition on internal factions, spelled out explicitly in Article 56: Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, “The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued the Regulations on Disciplinary Measures of the Communist Party of China,” China Government Network, December 27, 2023, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/202312/content_6922758.htm.

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16. See the article below for an argument that imposing economic liberalization, as in China and Vietnam, is a primary goal of the US embargo on Cuba: Samuel Farber, “The Alternative in Cuba,” Jacobin, December 22, 2014, https://jacobin.com/2014/12/cuba-castro-obama-embargo/.

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17. Although recent actions by the Trump administration have strained relations, generally for the past few decades the United States have had normalized trade relations with China and Vietnam. See: Jacob G. Hornberger, “Cuba and Vietnam, What's the Difference?,” Counterpunch, February 22, 2023. https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/02/22/cuba-and-vietnam-whats-the-difference/; CFR.org Editors, “The Contentious U.S.-China Trade Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship.

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18. A similar view on democratic centralism by British communist Mike Macnair can be found here: Mike Macnair, “Reclaiming democratic centralism,” Weekly Worker, May 23, 2019, https://weeklyworker.co.uk/worker/1252/reclaiming-democratic-centralism/.

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19. Again, this is according to Wikipedia. Some of these parties occasionally cooperate with other entities: “Communist parties in Italy,” Wikipedia, accessed 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Communist_parties_in_Italy.

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20. The program of the New Popular Front can be found here: Nouveau Front Populaire, “Contrat de législature,” La France Insoumise, June 2024, https://lafranceinsoumise.fr/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Programme-nouveaufrontpopulaire.pdf

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21. Christophe Ayad, “En France, un mouvement propalestinien phagocyté par LFI,” Le Monde, August 10, 2024, https://www.lemonde.fr/guerre-au-proche-orient/article/2024/10/08/en-france-un-mouvement-propalestinien-phagocyte-par-lfi_6346594_6325529.html.

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22. Florian Mattern, “Rongé par les divisions, le Nouveau Front populaire n’est ‘plus que l’ombre de lui-même’,” Courrier international, January 21, 2025, https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/vu-de-l-etranger-ronge-par-les-divisions-le-nouveau-front-populaire-n-est-plus-que-l-ombre-de-lui-meme_226806

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23. Vladimir Lenin, “The State and Revolution,” Marxists Internet Archive, 1917, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/ch01.htm.

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24. See Vladimir Lenin’s works on the necessity of a singular communist party: Lenin, “Theses on Fundamental Tasks of The Second Congress Of The Communist International,” Marxists Internet Archive, 1920, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/jul/04.htm.

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25. Lenin himself made it clear that the vanguard party of Russia was not in emulation of any precedent before it. See: Lenin, “What Is To Be Done?,” Marxist Internet Archive, 1905, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/iii.htm.

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26. In the first draft of this article I included a full case study of Die Linke as a positive example of pro-factionalism. I eventually decided to omit Die Linke as they have shown deficiencies in permitting tendencies to assert for a stronger stance against the genocide of Gaza—though all five of these organizations deserve further exploration.

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27. While the RSP has a codified right to factions and tendencies, many of its members see factions as manifestations of organizational faults or a lack of political education.

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28. Some organizations and internal tendencies have rejected PT-esque coalitionism while also embracing pro-factionalism, such as Akcja Socjalistyczna and multiple left caucuses of the DSA. See: Amanda Levi, “What Does Akcja Socjalistyczna Want?,” Cosmonaut, August 14, 2024, https://cosmonautmag.com/2024/08/what-does-akcja-socjalistyczna-want/; Jack L, “Coalitions of the Liberal and Socialist Left,” Cosmonaut, July 21, 2022, https://cosmonautmag.com/2022/07/coalitions-of-the-liberal-and-socialist-left/.

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29. See below for an overview of the internal politics of the 1930s Socialist Party of America: Jacob Zumoff, “The Left in the United States and the Decline of the Socialist Party of America, 1934–1935,” Labour / Le Travail 85 (2020), https://www.lltjournal.ca/index.php/llt/article/download/6019/6941.

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30. Doug Greene, A Failure of Vision: Michael Harrington and the Limits of Democratic Socialism (Collective Ink, 2022).

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31. A comprehensive overview of the caucus system of the Democratic Socialists of America can be found here: Bryce S, “A Guide to DSA Politics,” DSA Libertarian Socialist Caucus, January 31, 2025, https://dsa-lsc.org/2025/01/31/a-guide-to-dsa-politics/; A more concise list with major ideologies and areas of focus can be found here: Aidan B, “A Bite-Sized Intro To DSA Factions,” The Rose Garden, August 6, 2025, https://rosegardendsa.substack.com/p/a-bite-sized-intro-to-dsa-factions.

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32. Mitchell Cohen, “Democratic Socialism, Israel and the Jews: An Interview with Michael Harrington,” Fathom, 1975, https://fathomjournal.org/democratic-socialism-israel-and-the-jews-an-interview-with-michael-harrington-1975-with-new-preface-by-mitchell-cohen-2020/.

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33. The NPC of the DSA is currently weighing whether to censure or expel AOC for supporting the Iron Dome. See: Peter Sterne, “Is the DSA on a collision course with AOC?,” City & State New York, August 13, 2025, https://www.cityandstateny.com/politics/2025/08/dsa-collision-course-aoc/407434/.

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34. Daniel Rosenberg, From Crisis to Split: The Communist Party USA, 1989–1991 (American Communist History, 2019).

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35. John D. French, Lula and His Politics of Cunning: From Metalworker to President of Brazil (University of North Carolina Press, 2020).

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36. A rather comprehensive overview of PT’s tendencies can be found on Portuguese Wikipedia. See: “Tendências do Partido dos Trabalhadores – Wikipédia, a enciclopédia livre,” Wikipédia, accessed April 6, 2025, https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tend%C3%AAncias_do_Partido_dos_Trabalhadores.

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37. A detailed evaluation by the DSA’s Constellation caucus of PT’s socialist governance can be found here: Luca Dhagat and Niko Johnson-Fuller, “How Should DSA Engage With the Latin American Left?,” Socialist Forum, November 6, 2023,https://socialistforum.dsausa.org/issues/fall-2023/how-should-dsa-engage-with-the-latin-american-left/.

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38. An internal Marxist-Leninist current does exist within the PDT, although its tendency system is much less critical to its governance than PSOL or PT. See: “Perguntas Frequentes,” Ação Popular Revolucionária, accessed 2025, https://www.apopular.net/p/perguntas-frequentes.html

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39. Rainer Bragon, “Folha de S.Paulo - PT no divã: PT ignora apelos e expulsa quarteto radical do partido,” Folha, December 15, 2003, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc1512200302.htm.

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40. See PSOL’s own internal constitution establishing the importance of factional democracy to it as a party: “Estatuto,” PSOL Bahia, accessed 2025, https://www.psolbahia50.org/c%C3%B3pia-partido.

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41. An overview can be found of PSOL’s tendencies on Portuguese Wikipedia. See: “Tendências do Partido Socialismo e Liberdade– Wikipédia, a enciclopédia livre,” Wikipédia, accessed 2025, https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tend%C3%AAncias_do_Partido_Socialismo_e_Liberdade.

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42. Kristina Hinz, “The rise of Brazil’s neo-Pentecostal narco-militia,” openDemocracy, May 6, 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/rise-narco-militia-pentecostal-brazil-en/.

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43. “Worker’s Democratic Socialist Party.” Coming up with a party name that has not been used already in Brazil was a much harder task than it should have been.

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