1) Introduction: The Problem of Scientific Naming

We have reached a state in political economy where it is common for Western scholars and their followers to attach unstable labels such as state capitalism, authoritarian capitalism, party-state capitalism, and state-permeated capitalism to non-Western countries, with China being the most notable example. Furthermore, they do so as if these terms possess inherent scientific substance and objective necessity. In reality, such labels are often so broad, flexible, and overlapping—both with each other and with various global phenomena—that their use is not only ideologically charged toward Western liberalism but also fundamentally self-contradictory. Perhaps their problem lies in attempting to describe what they cannot understand. They see what they do not notice; they perceive what they do not comprehend.

The problem here, as has become clear, lies not only in the confusing diversity of terms but also in the fact that each of these terms, as a whole, lacks any scientific foundation. They are introduced as descriptions without the construction of coherent systems that would clearly demonstrate where such a label belongs within them. In many cases, authors describe a set of institutional, political, or economic features and then attach a name to the object thus described, without providing any grounds for such a designation. Description is thereby substituted for proof, and naming takes the place of scientific classification.

In this study, I examine this specific issue through a critical analysis of dominant labels. It should be noted that I will largely omit purely politicized labels, such as dictatorship or authoritarianism, though they may be addressed indirectly where necessary. I will begin with the most popular general term, state capitalism, before moving on to its various modifications, including authoritarian capitalism, party-state capitalism, Sino-capitalism, state-permeated capitalism, and related formulations. Finally, I will address alternative designations that attempt to describe non-Western systems as distinct entities rather than mere variants of capitalism, specifically bureaucratic collectivism. The aim is not simply to catalog competing expressions, but to assess the scientific weakness of the classificatory language itself. I do not limit myself here to specific authors; instead, I emphasize the broader problem of labeling. Furthermore, I do not adopt the position of any of the mentioned authors, regardless of whether I agree or disagree with them. While my perspective is grounded in general Marxist thought, it is specifically informed by my own framework—polar Marxism.

Polar Marxism is a development of Marxist theory that uses the dialectical-materialist method and the accumulated work of earlier Marxism, and of Marxist thought in general, while taking into account the experience of modern reality: specifically, the experience of the Soviet Union, China, and, more broadly, the 20th and 21st centuries. In short, it tries to explain the new world through polarity. It introduces the category of "anticapital," thereby expanding Marxism to analyze "noncapitalist" formations within polar capitalism as a whole.

The article is structured as follows. Chapter 2 examines the foundational concept of state capitalism. Chapter 3 focuses on modified labels, such as authoritarian capitalism and party-state capitalism, while Chapter 4 investigates alternative names for distinct systems. Chapter 5 then turns to the philosophical problem of scientific classification before the article concludes by outlining the need for a new terminology in political economy.

2) The Main Culprits

2.1: One Name, Many Meanings

As stated in the introduction, the primary issue with the term "state capitalism" is its inconsistency. It fundamentally refers to disparate objects; different authors employ the same label to describe varying structures, mechanisms, and levels of analysis. One might argue this is a sign of conceptual richness, but in reality, it indicates instability. The same term is used to convey meanings that are not equivalent. For instance, a country may be labeled as state capitalist because the state owns firms, because it directs investment, or because it utilizes the market for its own ends. It might be used because the state subordinates private interests to general political priorities or simply because the country belongs to a specific geopolitical group. These criteria are not just different—they belong to different social worlds. Thus, the problem begins long before examining the definitions themselves, as a major contradiction is already evident: the same term performs multiple functions simultaneously. It attempts to describe ownership, coordination, political power, class domination, geopolitical strategy, and regional difference all under the same heading.

2.2: A Cluster of Incompatible Criteria

Here, I examine specific representatives of the term "state capitalism." Bremmer^[1] asserted that state capitalism occurs when the state utilizes the market for its own political ends—though it remains unclear what the root cause of these goals is; they are treated as if they simply exist. For Musacchio and Lazzarini^[2], state capitalism is identified by broad government involvement through equity ownership, subsidized credit, and corporate privileges. Alami et al.^[3] spoke of administrative capital accumulation, which is again of unknown origin. Sperber^[4] noted that this label is frequently applied to non-Western countries. For Lyons,^[5] it is sufficient for the state to hold strategic stakes, while Janjigian^[6] defines state capitalism as a state that utilizes capitalism for its own purposes to advance its interests. It might seem that these authors are attempting to describe the same thing, as if they all perceive “state capitalism” but merely define it differently. I do not dispute that some underlying essence may exist, but it is certainly not state capitalism. Nevertheless, their definitions employ entirely different categorical frameworks for classification. Some define it through ownership, others through control, and others through the purpose of markets. A fourth group focuses on elite power, capital accumulation, or geopolitical conduct, while others effectively use the term as a civilizational or regional marker. Once this is recognized, the term begins to lose its apparent solidity. It no longer defines a single form or denotes a unique phenomenon; instead, it becomes an expansive cluster of overlapping and often incompatible definitions. The result is a term that is defined in various ways yet retains a semblance of real meaning only because its internal heterogeneity is left unexamined. A concept uniting state ownership, industrial policy, sovereign wealth funds, party control, geopolitical strategy, and non-Western development lacks scientific rigor unless their interconnections are proven. Features are simply listed, and the label is then applied as if it were self-evidently warranted.

2.3: A Historical Displacement of Meaning

But let us look briefly at the original use of the term "state capitalism" to contrast it with its contemporary politicized tone. When we return to the Marxist lineage, we find that the term originally had nothing to do with non-Western countries. In fact, it was used to understand the modern capitalism of that time. When Engels^[7] described the state of his era as the “ideal aggregate capitalist,” he was specifically defining the political concentration of the power of capital within the capitalist state, rather than exotic deviations of capitalism outside the West. One might object that the term is outdated, but I disagree. I contend that the term is not obsolete and that state capitalism is a label that should be applied to all countries of the Western world. Lenin^[8] took this further, stating, "Socialism is merely the next step forward from state-capitalist monopoly.” He reiterated the same point: capitalism inherently forms state capitalism. However, he then indicated that this structure must be seized, so to speak, to result in socialism. In his definition, whether on the “left” or the “right,” one finds state capitalism—it is simply that one is pro-capitalist and the other is pro-socialist. Yet today, state capitalism is reserved exclusively for the non-West and what the West perceives as flawed non-Western forms. Ultimately, once we account for this historical correction, the modern meaning of the word becomes increasingly unstable. It is no longer part of a theory; it simply becomes an ever-shifting label dictated by political conjuncture.

2.4: The Objection from Within

Another classic side of this issue is found in Trotsky,^[9] who stated, "The attempt to represent the Soviet bureaucracy as a class of ‘state capitalists’ will obviously not withstand criticism. The bureaucracy has neither stocks nor bonds. It is recruited, supplemented, and renewed in the manner of an administrative hierarchy, independently of any special property relations of its own. The individual bureaucrat cannot transmit to his heirs his rights in the exploitation of the state apparatus.” Essentially, even then, he pointed out the obvious: how can you use the word “capitalism” where there is no capital or where its power does not exist? I express the exact same concern regarding the use of this word in a modern context, where an apparently obvious characteristic of a system—such as the subordination of capital to the state—is presented as “capitalism” rather than something else. Clearly, one could use the word in the Leninist sense, suggesting that the USSR was “state capitalism not in the service of capital,” but I agree that the term itself describes something that was not there. To agree with this, one does not need to be a follower of Trotsky; one simply needs to possess common sense and think critically rather than speak in narratives.

2.5: Why the Main Label Fails

In conclusion, it must be said that besides Western ideological bias—a quite successful one, since initially this term was used against them—the obvious weakness of the term "state capitalism" is its instability: between meanings and between meanings and reality. It gathers incompatible meanings within itself, jumps across different levels of analysis, and ultimately substitutes description for a proven concept. The term turns out to be such that it seemingly tries to explain something, but in the end, it results in a mere hodgepodge. Therefore, for me, state capitalism is the main culprit. It is the broadest, most elastic, and most authoritative label in the field.

3) Modified Labels

3.1: From the Main Label to Its Repairs

If in Chapter 2 we dealt with this very “unstable king” of labeling terms denoting the non-West, then in this chapter we will discuss the refinement and modification of the term state capitalism when authors realize it is no longer sufficient. Essentially, the question is as follows: what happens if authors begin to realize that a term is becoming too broad, or something of that nature, and consequently they cannot apply it precisely to a specific object—for instance, to a certain country—and thus conclude that a qualifying modifier is necessary? They add new qualifiers, new prefixes, and new distinctions. As a result, we get various authoritarian capitalisms, not just state capitalisms, but party-state capitalisms, state-permeated market economies, uneven and combined state capitalisms, authoritarian mixed capitalisms, and so on. We understand that these are not merely powerful but random innovations. No, these are specifically attempts to fix the weaknesses of the original “king of labels.” This is a crucial point because when we discuss modified labels, we are talking not just about stylization but about a deliberate attempt to escape the weaknesses already mentioned. Ultimately, it turns out they are trying to describe an object that the standard term "state capitalism" cannot explain; therefore, they introduce these terms, which further confirms that neither their new terms nor state capitalism itself truly describes the essence standing behind these seemingly important labels. Consequently, instead of working with this essence and trying to understand it, they simply attempt to invent a more “correct” label—a more refined derivative of state capitalism.

3.2: Regime Modifiers

The first family of modifications consists of so-called refinements based on political regimes. The most obvious of these is authoritarian capitalism. As I stated in the introduction, I will not engage deeply with these designations because they are maximally politicized. Nevertheless, it is worth addressing the use of the word “authoritarianism” here, typically understood to be everything that is not Western democracy. That is why authoritarianism, in the Western understanding, is often essentially synonymous with state capitalism. Sometimes, of course, this synonym drifts further away and turns into “totalitarianism” or “dictatorship.” But broadly speaking, these all belong to the same family of names; the only one among them that possesses even a semblance of meaning is "state capitalism"—though, as you can see, I challenge that in this work. Chen et al.^[10] define it as “a system lacking liberal democratic institutions, norms, and practices, while maintaining a market economy with scope for private firms.” Carney^[11] similarly argues that authoritarian leaders utilize, rather than reject, capitalism to sustain their power. Witt and Redding^[12] use the term "authoritarian capitalism" in relation to China, implying that the Communist Party holds power over the system. However, Xu et al.^[13] extend this logic of authoritarian capitalism to the interconnection between the political system and the economic model as a whole. Essentially, these authors do the following: their main priority is to retain the word "capitalism" in a strongly negative, significantly non-Western sense and then attach the word "authoritarianism" to it. In doing so, both words reinforce each other, specifically highlighting the “deficiency” of Eastern or Global South formations.

3.3: Party, State, and the Search for the Real Agent

The second family of modifiers focuses on the institutional bearer of power. More precisely, they speak of so-called party-state capitalism. Pearson et al.^[14] assert that to accurately understand China, one must view it not merely as state capitalism but specifically as party-state capitalism. Following their logic, we can understand why they introduced this term: in reality, the state and the party in China have extended their roots throughout the entire economy, including within private capital, subordinating the whole economy to their goals, such as regime protection, security, and political control. Nölke et al.,^[15] for their part, introduced the so-called state-permeated market economy. For them, the most important aspect is the operation between state agents and business coalitions, rather than primarily an all-powerful, centralized bureaucracy. Alami et al.’s^[16] concept of uneven and combined state capitalism shifts analysis from static national models to a relational view of connected, co-evolving forms.

Again, as with authoritarian capitalism, these authors are not merely decorating the term “state capitalism”; they are specifically attempting to find the underlying logic to these terms—that which behind these labels, is exactly what they remain.

3.4: When Modification Becomes Confession

Continuing to dive into this quagmire, it becomes clear—again and again—that the emergence and development of these terms are driven by the fact that they cannot adequately describe what they are attempting to understand. They speak of a phenomenon that is very broad and very powerful, yet they cannot grasp it; this is precisely why they invent different names and different ways to cling to it. Every one of their designations remains a label or, at best, a hypothesis. On one hand, they might speak of political regimes; on the other, of party control, sometimes of accumulation, sometimes of institutional embeddedness, and sometimes of global relationality. Ultimately, all these terms differ from one another as they try to compensate for that central defect of the original term. The original term simply cannot stand on its own; it cannot exist by itself, which is why these modifiers are required. But in the end, these modifiers can never reach a stable endpoint. This is because every new modifier focuses on one single aspect while neglecting all others. This is why even hybrid formulations such as Raiklin’s^[17] authoritarian mixed capitalism matter. It would seem like just another descriptor rather than a proper term. Nevertheless, the most important thing here is the confirmation—the confirmation of the same problem. All these terms attempt to describe a phenomenon they do not understand. The words themselves are generally unsuitable for describing this phenomenon. Although they often try to capture certain meanings and do understand them, they ultimately employ terms that break those very meanings.

4) Alternative Systems

4.1: Beyond the Language of Capitalism

Unlike the previous chapters, in this chapter, I will examine authors who chose to avoid the word “capitalism” altogether. There may be various reasons why they decided to move away from this word. Nevertheless, these authors chose not to modify state capitalism or capitalism in a negative sense, but rather to give a different name to the system they observe. Evidently, based on what I have said before, one can conclude that they took this step toward a different name, specifically in an attempt to more closely describe what they see. This is not to say they succeeded, but they tried nonetheless. This suggests they moved a step closer to understanding the truth. We are, of course, speaking only of words, because often all the authors mentioned thus far spoke of important things and cited facts correctly, but then drew interesting conclusions that did not correlate with those facts. Thus, the third chapter is precisely about them. And yes, perhaps these alternative names are not sufficiently complete, and so on, but they nevertheless focus attention quite clearly on the central problem of all these terms: the impossibility of adequately naming what they see.

4.2: Bureaucratic Collectivism

The main alternative designation is so-called bureaucratic collectivism. The term is primarily linked to Rizzi^[18] and Shachtman^[19], later appearing and discussed in related forms by Macdonald.^[20] The most important thing these authors did was not simply come up with the name itself, but the very fact that they moved away from the word “capitalism” and began trying to understand, describe, and ultimately designate a new type of society where the bureaucracy emerges as the ruling stratum. This is logical: if we are talking about an economy dominated by bureaucratic control—collectively, a new form of political-economic domination—then the language should reflect this rather than attempting to draw a backward conclusion. Yes, the term "bureaucratic collectivism" may not fully grasp or precisely describe the exact phenomenon they are attempting to portray. They may face the same problem of focusing on a single aspect of this phenomenon among an infinite multitude of them, just like the previous terms, but it does not devolve into labeling these aspects as simply “state” or any other kind of “bad” capitalism. Evidently, the limitations of this term are apparent, as they do not present a stable scientific framework. This new ruling stratum itself might be over-described, and the concept could ultimately become too broad and indefinite, much like all the previous ones. Nevertheless, I am personally grateful to the authors for deviating, if only for a moment, from the dogma of calling everything non-Western “capitalism” with a modifier in a negative sense.

5) From Labels to Scientific Classification

As has already been noted throughout the whole work, the problem is not that some authors simply prefer one term over another. The problem is that, in general, we have a deep issue with the philosophical basis for classifying the social realities that these terms claim to name.

In the dominant form in which we have inherited political economy today, we cannot adequately study the laws of the system.

Since we were analyzing not Marxism but Western views of the non-Western, we can see overall that, as political economy, this did not come together.

Again, in political economy, you cannot simply take some random characteristic of a society and, on that basis, create a name that would be scientific. A truly scientific theory in political economy has never framed the question in terms of what is visible on the surface. In classical capitalism, for example, we see courts, justice, freedom, and democracy, but in the end, it is clear that capital rules everything if we study the foundations of this system, its basis.

The same applies to non-Western systems. Studying the surface we see is only the first step before going deeper into science. We can see that on the surface, the sun revolves around the Earth. But in order to answer the questions more precisely, because the old understanding cannot clearly describe the system, we have to go deeper and grasp the basis itself. In this case, we are talking about grasping the basis of these non-Western systems.

That is, what forces and what economic laws stand behind what we see. And only on the basis of these laws, once we discover them and understand their logic, will we be able to describe the system scientifically and precisely. And, of course, when I speak of the basis, I primarily mean a certain still-unexplored mode of production.

Someone has to specifically investigate the non-Western mode of production, or at least try to understand whether it is there, and distinguish the surface from this mode of production. Then we have to understand how this surface—for example, in the form of political regimes, structures, bureaucracy, the state, geopolitical position, and so on—is formed out of it.

For both science and Marxism, studying the non-West will be a huge step forward because it is precisely this that will answer the questions and, accordingly, provide tools for action, for practice—the questions of practice that the current system cannot answer because it hides the truth behind labels.

6) Conclusion: Toward Scientific Terminology

One could continue indefinitely attempting to account for all Western and Western-aligned terms, or rather, labels. However, I believe I have already demonstrated my argument directly. The dominant labels do not constitute a consistent scientific vocabulary. The central term, "state capitalism," as has been shown, possesses too many incompatible meanings to function as a stable analytical category. It is used to describe state ownership, political control, the strategic use of markets, administrative capital accumulation, and even more broadly, it is used to brand all non-Western political economies. Thus, a term that covers too many objects cannot serve as a precise scientific designation—not to mention that the original meaning of this word was entirely different and was directed toward the West, rather than the other way around.

Modified labels attempted to solve this problem, but in the end, they only confirmed it. By trying to describe the phenomenon they observe more accurately, they merely confirmed that both they and the term "state capitalism" are insufficient and inadequate. They were simply trying to patch the original term, but the very fact that the original term needs patching already indicates its insufficiency. No matter how many times we try to patch it, we will ultimately arrive nowhere. This is because the term itself is inherently biased from the start; it is fundamentally skewed. For this reason, we will always only capture reality superficially. For instance, the alternative designation discussed in Chapter 4, "bureaucratic collectivism," attempted to move even further away from naming what they see with the word “capitalism” in a negative sense. Yet even they did not provide a definitive answer or a truly scientific theory. Rather, they adopted the same method of selecting one specific aspect and deriving a name from it. But while previous authors took “capitalism” and added an aspect—such as authoritarianism—these authors chose to modify both words.

Ultimately, none of these authors managed to approach the reality of what they see. This is not only because their designations lack meaning, but also because they failed to create a sufficiently scientific framework to describe anything objectively. They simply lack the language at a fundamental level, let alone at the level of labels, to describe anything.

Consequently, to solve this problem and provide a real designation for the non-Western reality we observe, it is necessary to create a genuine, consistent scientific theory capable of capturing all aspects and understanding the essence of the phenomenon, and only then providing a scientific and precise definition, ideally without negative connotations.

Thus, the critique deployed in this work is not an end in itself. In reality, it is a necessary step before we construct a true scientific theory and a genuine scientific term that can describe all the non-Western phenomena we observe. The poverty of terminology is not merely a linguistic problem; it is a broader scientific problem—a problem of scientific classification, of scientific knowledge, and of science within political economy.

1. Ian Bremmer, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? (New York: Portfolio, 2010).

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2. Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G. Lazzarini, “Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and Their Implications for Economic Performance,” Harvard Business School Working Paper, 2012.

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3. Ilias Alami et al., “Geopolitics and the ‘New’ State Capitalism,” Geopolitics, 2021.

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4. Nathan Sperber, “The Many Lives of State Capitalism: From Classical Marxism to Free-Market Advocacy,” History of the Human Sciences 32, no. 3 (2019): 100–124.

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5. G. Lyons, “State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds,” Law and Business Review of the Americas 14 (2008): 119–46.

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6. Vahan Janjigian, “Communism Is Dead, but State Capitalism Thrives” (Forbes, 2010).

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7. Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1878.

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8. Vladimir I. Lenin, “The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It,” 1917.

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9. Leon Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed, 1937.

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10. Ling S. Chen, Xiuyu Li, and Kellee S. Tsai, “Pathways to Authoritarian Capitalism,” 2023.

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11. Richard W. Carney, “Authoritarian Capitalism: Sovereign Wealth Funds and State-Owned Enterprises in East Asia and Beyond,” 2018.

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12. Michael A. Witt and Gordon Redding, “China: Authoritarian Capitalism,” 2012.

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13. Jianhua Xu, Qipu Hu, and Anli Jiang, “Authoritarian Capitalism and Policing Studies in China,” 2020.

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14. Margaret M. Pearson, Meg Rithmire, and Kellee S. Tsai, “China’s Party-State Capitalism and International Backlash: From Interdependence to Insecurity,” 2022.

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15. Andreas N"olke et al., “State-Permeated Capitalism in Large Emerging Economies,” 2019.

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16. Ilias Alami et al., “Geopolitics and the ‘New’ State Capitalism,” 2021.

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17. Ernest Raiklin, After Gorbachev? A Mechanism for the Transformation of Totalitarian State Capitalism into Authoritarian Mixed Capitalism (Washington, DC: Council for Social; Economic Studies, 1989).

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18. Bruno Rizzi, La Bureaucratisation Du Monde (Paris, 1939).

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19. Max Shachtman, The Bureaucratic Revolution: The Rise of the Stalinist State, 1962.

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20. Dwight Macdonald, The Root Is Man, 1953.

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