Kevin Naughton has accurately portrayed much of what he seeks to demonstrate in his essay, and the essay is worthwhile reading simply due to the genealogical aspects. Naughton accurately reconstructs the manner in which the Menshevik emigrés provided the West with its founding image of Lenin and how that image solidified into the textbook version of Lenin via Cold War repetition. As Harding stated in 1977, but few others have accepted, the majority of the scholarship discussed herein has reconstructed how the Menshevik émigrés provided the West with its founding image of Lenin. Draper and Lih are correct that What Is to Be Done? has been interpreted by individuals desiring a blueprint for action based upon the pamphlet and lacking the historical context necessary to prevent them from interpreting the document as such. Naughton correctly identifies that the electoral period of ten years has been systematically removed from the entirety of scholarship that claims to provide a comprehensive analysis of Lenin. In each of these areas, I agree with Naughton.

However, my primary concern is what Naughton does with this. The essay treats the contextualist dismissal of the standard interpretation of WITBD as though the contextualist dismissals had resolved a distinct question, whereas they did not. There are two questions being addressed. The first is textual/receptional: that the 1902 pamphlet represented a radical reinterpretation of Erfurtian assumptions applied to police-state conditions, that the initial readership understood the pamphlet in that light, and that it was outdated by 1906. At present, this interpretation represents one of the best-supported interpretations in the field. The second question is causal/institutional: that the repressive apparatus developed between 1918 and 1921 was a contingent response to external pressures and not a function of anything inherent within the organizational practices of Bolshevism. There is no evidence connecting the first question to the second. Naughton transitions from one to another by virtue of a section break and provides no supporting arguments for this transition.

Naughton also uses two key authors in opposition to themselves. Draper's entire theoretical structure is designed to support the notion that organizational structures produce their own logics irrespective of the intentions of those who construct them. This is what "socialism from below" means analytically as opposed to sloganistically. Additionally, this is exactly what Draper's micro-sect typology attempts to illustrate. Therefore, to cite Draper in support of the idea that one must judge party regimes based upon the democratic principles of their founders is to reverse his position. Similar to Draper, Macnair is cited for the incorrect interpretation of the crisis of British hegemony. However, Macnair's Revolutionary Strategy, which constitutes an extended critique of precisely the exonerationist account of 1921 that Naughton argues for, stands directly opposite to Naughton's position.

The real issue lies with the question that serves as the basis for organizing the essay. "Was Lenin sincere?" is the question of biographers, and accepting this question on their terms surrenders the field prior to even beginning to advance an argument. It is a non-falsifiable assertion in both directions. Sebestyen states that Lenin's expressions regarding democracy were insincere given that his state was non-democratic. Conversely, Naughton posits that Lenin's declarations regarding democracy were sincere given that there are numerous statements made throughout Lenin's lifetime expressing similar sentiments and that they represent a consistent theme. Neither claim can be supported empirically, and neither claim results in any institutional fact. A century of Leninism has occurred in this vein, and this is not why Leninism has generated so little knowledge. Inner lives do not determine state forms.

That which makes this so troublesome is that Naughton's essay includes all of the components necessary to develop a superior argument and rejects using these materials. Naughton cites Figes regarding the decline of the Petrograd workforce from approximately 250,000 to less than 50,000 during the first six months of 1918. Naughton cites Figes regarding mass migration to rural areas, mass disbanding of railroad networks, and mass crisis in production. This is not background color—this is the Russian working class ceasing to exist as a class in its only location with sufficient density to govern. Regardless of conviction, a party that declares itself as an instrument for a class and subsequently determines that the class dissolves into rural areas will replace itself for that class.

This is a materialist explanation—it explains outcomes regardless of individuals' intentions—and it is situated in Naughton's own footnotes. Naughton compiles this information and then proceeds to ignore it as he discusses whether Lenin was a good person.

Similar to ignoring intent-based explanations for outcomes, Naughton ignores material-based explanations for institutional development. For example, the 1921 faction ban appears in only one subordinating clause. Kronstadt receives no mention. Neither the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly nor the creation of the Cheka in December 1917 nor the repression of the Left SRs occurs after the White armies become an actual military force and thus fall outside of the emergency alibi constructed by Naughton. Thusly, these constitute issues raised by sympathetic readers first. Samuel Farber's Before Stalinism addresses these exact issues at book length from within Leninist theory traditions. Similarly, Simon Pirani's research on depoliticizing Moscow workers between 1920 and '24 addresses these same concerns as well with archival data opened after 1991. Neither is referenced.

An essay that is concerned with how scholars fail to engage with revisionist scholarship on Lenin is on shaky ground when it fails to engage with critical scholarship that shares similar premises.

Additionally, there is the comparative section that could be eliminated entirely. Sherman, Lincoln, Roosevelt, Hiroshima. Putting aside that the argument presented by Naughton is untestable in either direction since a standard used to justify excusing the atomic bombing of Nagasaki will justify any behavior, the primary concern is what Naughton concedes. By comparing the Bolsheviks to liberal executive actions during wartime periods, Naughton accepts that the appropriate standards for evaluation are those applicable to a state addressing emergencies from above. This is exactly what the revolution was intended to eliminate.

Therefore, it seems clear that our criticism would be: we similarly condemn Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus and Roosevelt's internment orders. Moreover, it was this very rationale that led to the formation of revolutionary movements such as Bolshevism—i.e., that social relations should not necessitate comparisons to liberal executive actions during wartime periods.

The conclusion possible here is more valuable than Naughton's conclusion, and it leads to a completely opposite conclusion. Assuming Lih and Draper are correct in stating that the party organization formed after 1918 cannot be retroactively justified by reference to WITBD, either as an origin or justification for party organization post-1918, then contextualist demolitions do not serve as an alternative alibi. Instead, they destroy the original alibi. They remove any potential explanation for why 1921 resulted from WITBD. They force us to create an explanatory model based upon what actually transpired with respect to Russia's working class over a period spanning several decades preceding 1921. Naughton states that understanding history will result in greater insight if we assume Lenin was an idealistic individual attempting to realize ideals despite losing control over events surrounding him. History will reveal far more insight if we cease making inquiries into individuals' intentions altogether.

Anthony P. Teso