Letter: What Makes a Democratic Republic?

by Nicolas D Villarreal, Nov. 17, 2026

Responding to recent discussion on the democratic republic, Nicolas D. Villarreal argues that genuine self-rule requires the abolition of the professional officer corps and bureaucracy and calls for uprooting the infantilizing culture of professionalism within the socialist movement itself.

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After catching up on the recent discussion in the Cosmonaut letters section regarding the Democratic Republic and Marxist Unity Group’s stance on it, I wanted to interject on an aspect of the Democratic Republic which I felt was not being commented upon despite it being essential to the question at hand. The question, that is, of what precisely separates the Democratic Republic from existing bourgeois democracy, including in contemporary states with unicameral parliamentary systems.

Put simply, abolishing the American electoral college, Senate, and Presidency through a new constitution would not be sufficient to establish a democratic republic, although it would create a true bourgeois democracy unburdened by the last legacies of aristocratic privilege and oligarchy. The one element of a Democratic Republic which remains absolutely essential and not implemented by any country in the world today is the abolition of the professional bureaucracy and officer corps, and their replacement by a popular militia. This demand has, unfortunately, gone from one of the most immediate and practical demands to one which many seem to think is almost utopian, or relegated to a distant, higher form of communism to which Marx referred in the Critique of the Gotha Program. Kautsky even remarked at some point that he believed the people’s militia would necessarily need to be adopted broadly by bourgeois republics due to the threat of coups by figures such as the first and third Napoleon.[1] Unfortunately for Kautsky and the rest, this analysis was deeply premature, and built on extrapolating the tendencies of the pre-professional state to the post-professional one, and quite ironic in one sense: it was only because Marx’s canonical writings on the state focused almost entirely on France that Kautsky came to this conclusion; had Marx started with his native Prussia where the modern professionalized state was born and had been developing since the early 19th century, all Marxists would have been aware of the logic of this post-professionalized world. There is perhaps, however, little wonder that Marx would optimistically focus on the revolutionary convulsions in France where the working class made the greatest advances, rather than in Prussia, where they were summarily crushed by a disciplined military that experienced no defections to the masses. Equally, there is little wonder that the bourgeois republics the world over would seek to emulate the Prussian professionalized officer corps rather than the French national guard.

This is not a triviality. There’s a good reason a popular militia is not reducible to a popular conscript military, such as the one seen in South Korea today. The professional officer corps means that the organization, socialization, and ideological training of these officers are centered around acting as servants to society at large, without ever questioning the supposed representatives of society presented to them. It’s in this way that the South Korean military was readily deployed on orders of the President to declare martial law in an attempt to disband the parliament. Fortunately, this coup attempt was poorly organized, and the legislature was able to meet and declare an end to the martial law. However, the guarantee of the professional officer corps is quite simply that, had the order been given without the apparent possibility that the legislature could dispute it, the military forces would have opened fire on the civilian lawmakers and protestors.

Writing in the aftermath of the failed German revolution, her final writing, Rosa Luxemburg identified the immaturity of the masses of soldiers and the military as the first reason for the failure, the “weak link” in the revolutionary cause:

Was the ultimate victory of the revolutionary proletariat to be expected in this conflict? Could we have expected the overthrow of Ebert-Scheidemann and the establishment of a socialist dictatorship? Certainly not, if we carefully consider all the variables that weigh upon the question. The weak link in the revolutionary cause is the political immaturity of the masses of soldiers, who still allow their officers to misuse them, against the people, for counterrevolutionary ends. This alone shows that no lasting revolutionary victory was possible at this juncture. On the other hand, the immaturity of the military is itself a symptom of the general immaturity of the German revolution.[2]

In order for the whole people to rule, the whole of the people must take on the responsibilities of the violence-producing apparatuses of the state. In all cases of civil-military intrigue, or whenever the riot police line up in front of the institutions of power against the mass of the people, it becomes clear that such a society is not one where the people are sovereign. All such instances are premised upon popular impotence. Thus, when Teso in his letter brings up the reactionary turns of parliaments in Sweden, Norway and Finland despite them lacking the undemocratic features of the American system, we are still not speaking of populations which have achieved self-rule. Of course, in a true Democratic Republic with a people’s militia we can still expect the possibility of confrontations between groups, including protests and riots confronting the organized militia force, but unlike in the current era of “liberal democracy” this would take the form of a confrontation between the majority and the minority, of people with actual political convictions and political adults in the form of citizens aware of the consequences of their actions.

Today, confrontations between police and the people are not between politically mature adults with the full rights and duties of free citizens; they are confrontations between a rabble pleading their case to a distant authority and the armed servants of that same distant authority. This is plain to see with the recent events in France, where even the respectable peaceful protestors merely demanded government action on educational infrastructure or the cost of living, and where the police treated these protestors, including teenage schoolchildren, as a hostile force which needed to be suppressed. As for the supposed radicals with the Black Bloc and their intellectual partisans at Endnotes, who see their goal as undermining state authority at all costs and the spontaneous establishment of something, anything, new, there is perhaps no better example of political immaturity. Protestations from the intellectuals that they are merely supporting such struggles as far as they can without directing them in any particular way can best be understood as simply another exhortation to not think, to not take responsibility.[3] An exhortation which is truly dime-a-dozen.

So too does this question of political immaturity extend far beyond the realm of the repressive state apparatus, into the idyllic world of liberal civil society. Professionals have spread from isolated fiefdoms of the officer corps, government bureaucracy, or guilds of lawyers and doctors, into practically every ideological state apparatus: media organizations, union staff, schools, NGOs, etc. Perhaps only the family and the church remain somewhat outside professional socialization, though clerics and priests are themselves the historical precursors to modern professionals. Both institutions are on the decline regardless. The result of this takeover of civil society by professionals is that these same attitudes found among the military officers and government bureaucrats towards the governed masses now proliferate to every individual in a position of authority. This is not, primarily, the result of a nebulous sort of cultural hegemony of professionalism, but because most individuals in positions of authority now are liberal education professionals, who have been ideologically disciplined and socialized their entire lives into these particular roles. Thus, whether it is journalists, teachers, social workers, or even the leadership of totally voluntary civil society groups such as charities, the ACLU, or even the DSA, we encounter the same attitude: those within the corporate body exercising authority confront the masses, the membership and the laypeople not as fellow peers and adults, but as the impersonal representative of a far-off authority chiding those incapable of managing their own affairs. Where, then, is this authority for something as trivial as these civil society groups, which can be as small as a few dozen individuals? If it is not found in either the leadership or in the members, then it is nowhere at all.

Indeed, it is absolutely necessary to hammer home the point that this infantilizing attitude of professionalism has fractally infected even the tiniest unit of organization in civil society, particularly among college-educated individuals. Here we must return to where this conversation began, as a question related to the Marxist Unity Group, a DSA caucus which is, by all accounts, the chief theoretical partisan of the Democratic Republic within the American left. Therefore, I was quite unnerved to see this aspect of the Democratic Republic found within the demand for a popular militia (the deprofessionalization of the state apparatus) not held up as the chief differentiator between a real Democratic Republic and the bourgeois unitary parliamentary republics found in Northern Europe. However, it was only later, when the discipline process by MUG of a member named Omar revealed that this attitude of professional authority had infected even DSA caucuses which should oppose it in principle, that I concluded there was a deeper underlying problem for the political project of creating a democratic republic. Regardless of the facts of the case, the discipline process over social media posts saw MUG arbiters (a bureaucratic role) speaking as if they were a school vice principal lecturing an unruly student[4], speaking not with the authority of a majority which has taken a disciplinary vote (which hadn't happened yet) or directly as a disagreement between peers, but with the indirect authority of a professional speaking on behalf of some larger, absent sovereign body. What is ridiculous about this sort of behavior is that the sovereign body of a democratic group is never “missing”; it is always the public being addressed. There are no “state secrets” within a democratic organization except where directly voted upon as permissible, no private bureaucratic channels except where specifically articulated so that the individuals that make up that democratic body can accept it. And even if a democratic body has permitted all this, a truly democratic culture would still not find permissible this authoritarian, professional attitude by bureaucrats, as this attitude demeans and infantilizes every individual who allegedly make up the sovereign body. In the case of MUG in particular, it runs totally counter to its stated political project of creating a Democratic Republic of politically mature equals. While not an active member of the group, I find the goal of the Democratic Republic to be absolutely essential to contemporary socialist politics. I have been disappointed, however, by the culture of DSA at large, which seems at times to be antithetical to this goal, perhaps unsurprisingly due to the overwhelming presence of liberal educated professionals among its ranks. The fact that such professionals are politically left-leaning has often worked to tamp down criticism of the authoritarian and alienating role they play in reproducing the ideological apparatuses of the bourgeois state.

Here I am not making an argument like that of the PMC critics that this professional strata has class interests totally contrary to the working class. These arguments have only obscured the reality of this problem. Rather, by focusing exclusively on class interests to explain the situation, both the anti-PMC critics and left-wing professionals have neglected analysis of the process of reproducing social relations as a whole and the role of ideology in doing so. This is no small thing, as it is via the process of socialization by various institutions that we learn to play our role in reproducing this class society. The post-structuralist and intersectional game of theoretical telephone during the 2010s turned this original structuralist insight into a hollowed-out truism, but it can become salient again if we pay attention to the details. Liberal educated professionals must become conscious of how this process of socialization made them who they are, and what role professionalism plays in reproducing the broader state apparatus. Only then can they consider doing something else. In this case, that “something else” is the formation of a genuine democratic political culture. If such a culture cannot be cultivated even within a faction of a socialist organization, then there is little hope for it being operationalized within an entire state, where, just as the (re)production of state violence is a collective responsibility, so is ideological (re)production.

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  1. Kautsky, Karl. 2019. Karl Kautsky on Democracy and Republicanism. BRILL. Pg 209-210

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  2. Luxemburg, Rosa. n.d. “Rosa Luxemburg: Order Prevails in Berlin (January 1919).” Www.Marxists.Org. Accessed November 14, 2026. https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1919/01/14.htm.

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  3. “It is customary, for in media res analyses, to conclude with platitudes and hollow injunctions about where a movement is heading: a pre-cooked “What Is to Be Done?” addressed to readers of leftist texts, as though the will of activists could redirect the dynamic of a riot. We will spare ourselves this futile exercise. It falls to proletarian high school students to go on tracing their insolent lines of flight; they do it better than activists do. Before any real balance sheet of the movement can be drawn, all that remains for us is to actively support them, to join them as far as possible in their struggles without substituting ourselves for them.” ; Artifices. 2026. “Leaving the Contemporary Era.” Endnotes.Org.Uk, Endnotes, October 10. https://www.endnotes.org.uk/dossiers/dazed-and-confused/leaving-the-contemporary-era.

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  4. Omar. 2026. “A Fractal of Jewish Exceptionalism.” Substack.Com. Omar. November 13, 2026. https://theatheistomar.substack.com/p/a-fractal-of-jewish-exceptionalism.

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About
Nicolas D Villarreal –

Nicolas D Villarreal writes Research and Analysis in Political Theory, Economics, History, Semiotics, and Philosophy, as well as the occasional work of fiction, at Pre-History of an Encounter.