Joshua Morris writes on the phenomena of sectarianism in the early US Communist Movement. He is currently authoring a book “The Many Worlds of American Communism” with Lexington Books which is expected to be published in late 2021.
While driving around in my neighborhood the other day I came across an intersection and noticed a facet of the driving experience most of us are familiar with: people tend to use the rules taught in driving school as nothing more than guidelines, and people usually make their own decisions on how to follow them on-the-fly and in the moment (unless a cop is around), as opposed to rigorously applying the techniques and lessons they learned. But something else dawned on me—what if all political action is merely a tendency to use rules as guidelines that are then seen as perfectly fine to abandon when they no longer suit the immediate needs of the moment? The problem presented by sectarianism in American Communist history is that of a “tendency of the moment;” that is, a tendency to emphasize tactics for a specific situation or political debate that ignores, or in some cases outright refuses, to connect such tactics to principles that subsequent communists could learn from. What if Left sectarianism is just dual unionism and Right opportunism is entryism in the political sense? Let me explain.
I’ve been writing on factionalism and political disunity among the radical Left in America for close to six years, usually writing on the divisions that existed in the American Communist movement from 1919 – 1957, but also sometimes discussing the factional nature of trade union strategy; such as disputes around dual unionism versus entryism. The day that I had my moment of clarity while driving in my Michigan suburb I had just gotten through a long stint of writing on the Fosterite v. Ruthenberg/Pepper/Lovestonite factions of the Workers (Communist) Party of America (WPA) that erupted between 1924 and 1927. But what I lacked was a connecting thread; a way to explain the division by likening it to something more simple and easy to understand; because despite its portrayals in history the debate was indeed simple. It was a matter of whether or not the Communist Party should be a trade unionist organization that advocated for the creation of a Labor Party (The Fosterite position) or if it should be the Communist Party of America in both the political and the labor sense (the Lovestonite position). The former implied a strong dedication to trade unionism over all other forms of action. The latter implied the wisdom of a politically defined trade union movement led by revolutionaries. After my driving affair, the answer became clearer: sectarianism is a tendency that comes in many forms. Dual unionism, for example, is “left sectarian” when Entryism is known to be more effective. Likewise, emphasis on entryism when it has a track record of failure (such as the Needle Trades Section of the TUEL from 1924 – 1927) appears as “right opportunist” to those emphasizing dual unionism. The critical element is context: Politically, the creation of the CP was a justified act of Left-Wing sectarianism out of the SPA. The subsequent disunity of the CLP/UCP/CPA, on the other hand, contextually was factionalism despite rampant accusations of sectarian tendencies.
Sectarianism and factional quarrels among the Left is a tricky topic. But like most subjects in American Communist history, or even the history of the Pan-Socialist Left, its depiction is most commonly political in nature. Sectarianism differs from factionalism in a simple way: To be a factionalist, one must have the goal or expectation of receiving or obtaining power within the movement or organization. Factionalists, in general, seek new leadership and direction. To be a sectarian, on the other hand, one must devote themself to the creation of a sect within the existing organizational body—the purpose of which is not necessarily severance from the main body nor the acquiesce of power, but rather an internal division that, in a negative way, asserts one strategy over all others. In many instances, the formation of a factional body, or caucus, did not start with an intent of abandoning the parent organization; but rather of one of two paths, either of reform or of a take-over. The process of abandonment of a parent organization, such as the Left Wing’s split from the SPA, is premised by unworkable relations between the factional groups. This is a key difference between factionalism (which generally seeks reform through power and the maintenance of unity) and sectarianism (which generally seeks power, but negates the need for unity). Taking this to its logical conclusion, one could be extremely abstract and suggest that all the existing political spectrum is a dimension of sectarian thought: the existence and historical significance of democratic institutions of government are the result of human conscious awareness of the need for diverse, sometimes antithetical, opinions on civil society. In this notion, political parties exist because under the conditions where a single Party could function (unity is achieved), a sectarian tendency (minority or majority) is bound to develop without party functions that ensure totalitarian control.
This does not imply that political disagreements naturally lead to sectarianism. Indeed, many political disagreements result in factionalism and the effort by one group to eradicate or uproot the basis of a rival faction. Sectarianism, on the other hand, does not seek the eradication of an alternative but rather the subsumption of it beneath a more dominant ideological vision. Only when the subsumption of a rival sectarian caucus is deemed impossible does the sectarian effort then take on the acquiescence of absolute political power. This analysis of sectarianism and factionalism rests on the assumption that they serve conscious and acute ends; namely the building of a more perfect or ideal political movement. What it does not account for, however, is when acts of sectarianism are unconscious and impulsive in their ends; when they are used temporarily and not necessarily linked to any one specific political principle or strategy. A more concrete analysis would address the ways in which Leftist activism utilized sectarianism in the political, labor, and community organizing dimensions at the grassroots and the high echelons of Party/organizational functioning at different times depending on context. Such grassroots efforts, much like their successful organizing tactics, were more impulsive than they were methodical–typically only proving this truism to communists in the aftermath such as Elizabethton and Gastonia. This, for example, is in contrast to John Reed’s (sectarian) defense of dual unionism against the AFL as a learned tradition while Foster’s entryism became the proven and theoretically-driven tactic of the early-to-mid 1920s.1
Dual unionism, or the organization of new militant, radically-led unions, was historically the IWW’s means to break the back of the AFL and was endorsed by then-syndicalist William Z. Foster while he organized between 1912 – 1919. By the early 1920s, however, Foster not only became convinced of the domestic communist movement’s potential, he also embraced a new vision of labor organizing he had learned while participating in the 1919 steel strike. The new concept of entryism he embraced was unique; it was not sectarian in organizational terms, but it was aimed at opposing Right Wing elements in the existing unions of the AFL. It was embraced by both the international and domestic communist movements as an ideal way to organize among American workers, while they simultaneously advocated a united political front with other progressive/center groups despite their Right Wing tendencies. Communist activists within Foster’s labor world of American Communism approached the domestic labor movement with these conditions in mind. The organizers of the TUEL, for example, were keen to maintain a moderate political stance while nevertheless backing more radical and militant demands from its Sections in the needle, metal, and textile trades. As the national Party politics of the TUEL’s financial backers in the WPA shifted gears from a united front policy to running independent candidates for 1924, the labor organizers at the grassroots maintained their entryism and showed little signs of abandoning the strategy—a clear indication that communists organizing in labor viewed sectarian tendencies differently from their more politically-motivated comrades. This is but one facet of the differences not only between two worlds of American Communism, but also of the way sectarianism in general can be expressed between groups in power (leadership) and groups out of power (grassroots) while also being simultaneously expressed among groups in power (Party factionalism).
To encompass the totality of sectarianism in the American Communist movement would require either a streaming miniseries drama that depicts every narrative detail by direct quoting The Daily Worker, or a complex and rigorously researched multi-volume text that mirrors the efforts of Philip Foner’s series on the American Left, but more emphatically addresses the radical and militant nature of communist organizers, versus AFL organizers, versus organizers for the Progressive Party and the Democratic Party. The entire American Communist movement, encompassing trade unionists, political activists, and grassroots community organizers, was born from sectarian and ultimately unworkable relations among leaders of the Socialist Party of America (SPA) and its increasingly powerful Left-Wing majority. The Left-Wing’s subsequent split in summer and fall of 1919 was in no way a conspiracy—though the Federal Government and the press went to exhaustive lengths to portray it as such. The Left-Wing of the SPA dated as far back as 1911 and during the war years it gained popularity and membership as a result of its staunch and sometimes risky condemnation of U.S. participation in World War I. But the split that occurred in 1919 and resulted in two factional communist parties was nevertheless a sectarian struggle; one waged by the Right-Wing leadership of Morris Hillquit in order to expel the various Language Federations from further participation in the SPA against the major leaders and districts of the Left-Wing which commanded a numerical and representative majority of the SPA by Spring 1919. The split should be understood as a forced sectarianism—a Left sectarianism forced by the right, which created the American Communist movement out of unworkable relations within the existing Socialist movement.2
Afterwards, sectarianism was the face of American Communism; now wedged between the interests of the Communist Party of America (CPA) and the Communist Labor Party (CLP). Nevertheless, the movement was still somewhat united around the generalized culture of Leftism among working-class organizers, who tended to share multiple cross-memberships in organizations and at times vacillated between being heavily involved and loosely affiliated with their local movement. The two new organizations thus represented sectarianism as an opposing, or anti-unity, tendency: The CPA maintained its Left sectarianism, while the CLP took on principles akin to Right opportunism. The CPA was led by a large contingency of those who quickly left the SPA after expulsions were announced in the Spring. This included Charles Ruthenberg, Charles Dirba, Nicholas Hourwich, Louis Fraina, and numerous leaders from the expelled language federations. The CLP, on the other hand, was led by John Reed and a small minority faction who rallied behind the rightfully elected leader of the SPA during the Spring elections, Alfred Wagenknecht. When it was clear to Reed and Wagenknecht at the SPA’s Fall convention that communists would be barred from participation in future Party affairs, they rushed to form the CLP—despite the fact that at the same moment the CPA was undergoing its formation in the same city (Chicago). The factionalism at this point had little clear meaning other than Wagenknecht’s objection to the CPA electing new leadership at its founding convention—a contention which is understandable but debatable in hindsight considering the fact that Reed and Wagenknecht’s entire caucus banked on maintaining a presence in the SPA, which they did not achieve. After certain elements of the CPA, in particular Dennis Batt and the Proletarian Party of Michigan, broke away over power struggles less than 20 days into 1920, Charles Dirba and Nicholas Hourwich of the Russian and Latvian Federations moved to establish hegemony over the fledgling movement. The one element in their way was Ruthenberg, who continuously pressed for unity with Reed and Wagenknecht. Suddenly, the factionalism took on meaning (though this meaning was irrelevant to the split from the SPA). Now the sectarian division centered on one simple question: who would be in control of this new communist movement? A predominantly white, English-speaking minority interested in building Party presence in the trade unions? Or a more representative, mixed-language majority who admittedly lacked a serious dedication to anything other than political rhetoric?3
In contrast to the CPA, the CLP was a skeleton of an organization; propped up mainly by its defiant and privately-funded version of The Communist published out of New York. Their resistance to unity with the CPA remained sectarian—on the grounds that Wagenknecht and those who fought until the bitter end with the SPA had the right to majority control. When Ruthenberg reached out for what became known as a “Joint Unity Convention,” Wagenknecht agreed to a 35 delegate split that gave the CPA a majority of 20. Then, suddenly, Ruthenberg received notice from Chicago CPA District Organizer Leonid Belsky, detailing the expulsion of Nicholas Hourwich at the local level by rank-and-file Party members (something that was common prior to the Bolshevization of the Party during the mid-1920s where such expulsions had to be approved by higher Party bodies). Three days later, former Central Executive Committee member I.E. Ferguson reported to Ruthenberg on a possible split in the top echelons of the CPA over support for the rank-and-file decision. Ruthenberg made his move on April 20th, 1920, but he was shot down by a vote of 9 to 4 against. After the vote was made, Ruthenberg demonstrated his own sectarianism by walking out with his supporters, handing the CPA over to Dirba and his allies. Once again, it was on the principle of unworkability with existing leaders, this time of the CPA, who tended to place their own personal, cultural, and ethnic concerns above the general concept of Party unity. This is not to say they did so without warrant—indeed, the treatment of the Language Federations by the white-dominant, English-speaking majority leaders of the SPA made it difficult for East European, Jewish, and small minority of women members of the new communist movement to fully trust the Reed-led English minority. Ruthenberg informed Reed that he and his allies sought unity with the CLP, which they got with the formation of the United Communist Party (UCP) at the so-called “Unity Convention” in Bridgman, Michigan on May 26th.4
Ruthenberg’s joining of the Reed/Wagenknecht minority signaled the rise of new political tendencies in the American communist movement, particularly an emphasis on slating candidates for the 1920 election. Ruthenberg also maintained a strong emphasis on trying to unite with the CPA despite Dirba and his supporters’ ongoing Left sectarianism. Between 1920 – 1921, the CPA under Dirba maintained an armchair revolutionary approach to domestic American politics; usually arguing that the duty of communists was more theoretical in nature than practical. This theory was based on what Soviet historians later called a malaise and hopeless view on the militancy of working-class Americans. The UCP, on the other hand, maintained their more Rightward sectarian divide against the CPA by arguing that communists had a duty to become more involved in the American political scene, including supporting Debs’ nomination for President. On the front of labor, the UCP advocated members get involved with labor via the IWW and emphasized their tactic of dual unionism. This sectarian divide, however, proved too difficult to overcome domestically. The bitter sentiment toward Ruthenberg and Reed that Dirba and Alexander Stoklitsky held ensured that no compromise would be sufficient. Instead, it took the highest power in the international communist movement: The Second Congress of the Comintern (1920). There, the two American factions presented themselves as separate delegations to a session headed by international communist leaders who had little reason to care about their petty sectarian squabbles. After hearing their statements, the first session ruled that the two American parties were to merge immediately; almost dismissing the entire notion that their sectarianism was valid. Dirba made his final stand in a letter to Comintern chairman Gregori Zinoviev, where he argued the “peculiar conditions” of the American Communist movement—referring to the nature of a largely ethnic, non-English speaking majority led by educated whites from New York City—but in the end, he complied and was the first the reach out for unity with the UCP on October 15th, 1920.5
The merger of the UCP and the CPA took place in May 1921, at another unity convention, this time in Woodstock. After two tumultuous years, the divided American Communist movement muted its early factional tendencies. Though this particular form of sectarianism was rigidly suppressed by the Comintern, it did not disappear. Instead, the same groups vied for power within the movement under new conditions and for different reasons, but typically reflecting the same divisional framework of Left sectarianism and Right opportunism. The new factions fell neatly into the merged movement’s two symbiotic organizations: the public and ‘official’ Party organ, the WPA, which was slated to be organized at a founding convention in December, and the underground or ‘illegal’ Communist Party of America (CPA). The formation of the WPA was a component to the unity convention and agreed upon by both former CPAers, UCPers, and international delegates from the Comintern. In the record, the difference between the former CPA and the newly reconstituted (also called “unified”) CPA between the unity convention at Woodstock and the fall were minimal at best. Dirba retained his position of Executive Secretary until he was replaced by L.E. Katterfeld, a former UCP loyalist and supporter of Ruthenberg, in the summer. The Central Committee of the ‘unified’ CPA was split almost evenly between former CPA and former UCP members, including George Ashkenuzi (CPA), John Ballam (CPA), James Cannon (UCP), Dirba (CPA), Abram Jakira (UCP), and Jay Lovestone (UCP). Despite the balance between formerly divisive groups, within a matter of months the factional lines resurfaced around a new debate: the founding convention of the WPA and its legality. The debate became an issue when two ex-CPA leaders, Joseph Stilson and J. Wilenkin, began siding with former UCP members on policies that favored increased public participation in elections as well as public campaigning; of which the WPA was better suited for than the CPA. Together, this 7-person majority dominated the Central Executive Committee of the ‘unified’ CPA, forming a bloc of opposition against former CPA leaders Ashkenuzi, Ballam, and Dirba throughout Spring and early Summer.
When Louis Fraina’s theory of mass action was ditched in Summer/Fall 1921 for a more internationalist perspective of core and periphery regions of capitalist hegemony, it brought with it a new understanding of capitalist global power and the perceived limited strategic abilities of communists living within the hegemonic core of 20th-century capitalism. Specifically, Fraina turned to economic dependency at the international level which linked the localized conditions of the United States to larger and more dramatic shifts in the global economy. For evidence of hegemony, he pointed to the U.S.’s elevated position of power after World War I, particularly its acquiescence of trade deals with Europe and control over raw materials in Latin America. In terms of the ongoing split, this elevated the debate about the role of communists to the international level and Party leaders of all factional groups became even more removed from the day-to-day realities of American workers and rank-and-file unionists than they had ever been. Between July and August, 1921, Ashkenuzi, Ballam, and Dirba showed increasing concern over efforts by the Central Executive Committee to legalize the Party’s American Labor Alliance; which was considered by the 7-person majority a vehicle intended to unite other legal Leftist groups, both AFL and non-AFL affiliated, together in order to facilitate the growth of Leftist opposition to mainstream political groups. Almost immediately, the question of whether or not the CPA should remain an ‘underground’ organization became the hot topic of Central Executive Committee meetings throughout the remainder of the Summer and Fall. Ashkenuzi’s, Ballam’s, and Dirba’s hostility toward legal political activism in this instance once again rested on the notion of unworkability with the symbiotic unity represented by the unified CPA 1921 Constitution. In a staunchly Left sectarian split, the three minority voices made their move on September 17th when they endorsed the Lithuanian Bureau’s vote of 7 to 1 to refuse an order requiring the local membership to reorganize into a legal club that would become part of the WPA by the end of 1921. Between Fall and January 1922, Left sectarian factions popped up across the country, organized on a district-to-district basis to form what became known by December as “the Central Caucus.”6
Much of this new sectarianism built on a fundamental lesson learned in 1920: that communists could hope to be ‘bailed out’ of their sectarian debates via the Comintern. To do so, one merely had to be rhetorically persuasive and put forward a critical assessment of the situation in the United States. After all, despite the immediate failure of Reed’s defiance of Lenin on the issue of dual unionism, he nevertheless succeeded at gaining respect and notoriety among Comintern leaders for standing up for what he believed was right. It is likely not a coincidence that the Comintern subsequently handed the American movement over to the Reed-led, English-speaking minority as opposed to the more numerically-representative CPA headed by Dirba and the expelled Language Federations. Unlike in the previous sectarian divide, however, the need to maintain unity now overshadowed all political debates. By 1921, the Comintern, much like Ruthenberg and Wagenknecht, were wholly uninterested in hyperbolic and abstract calls for more political rhetoric and less public activism. Because both groups sought to achieve practical victories as a means to legitimize their stances in the eyes of the Comintern, this new factional crusade represented a progressive shift in moving away from abstract debates about the purity of theory and instead dove right into a discussion about forming practical and realistic policies to engage with and motivate American citizens. It should not be misunderstood, however, although it was a step forward toward a more practical debate, the sectarian logic that drove the factionalism continued to exist as both sides made conscious efforts to steer the domestic communist movement down a path that would assure factional leaders long-term control.
Part of what facilitated the quick growth of this new sectarianism was the split of the political movement into two Party apparatuses by the start of 1922. As the Central Caucus made their exit between November and December, 1921, the remaining leaders of the CPA went forward with the formation of the WPA between December 24th – 26th, 1921. This made it possible for less radical socialists, sometimes more moderate than the majority of the Party, to support electoral participation while maintaining ties with radicals who denounced such positions as centrist and Right opportunist. The WPA attracted such moderate socialists in large numbers during its initial years, especially as the SPA continued to purge itself of remnant Left Wing elements. As the WPA increased its size and public presence, the leaders of the ‘underground’ CPA grew concerned about the new membership and its potential to drive WPA politics without the need for the CPA. By the end of 1921, much of the harmony established at the Unity Convention eroded and certain CPA leaders, namely those sympathetic to conditions prior to the merger, began to talk of the WPA as a separate organization; using criticisms akin to those laid against the CLP. In the eyes of the Comintern, however, as well as those on the Executive Committee of the WPA, both the WPA and the CPA were the same organization, split into two necessary but practical tiers as a result of the Red Scare.
Whereas the previous division between Right opportunists and Left sectarians emerging out of the SPA’s Left Wing rested upon public questions of which individuals would lead the movement, the new debate heightened this argument about leadership to the notion of which organization—the public WPA or the underground CPA—constituted the ‘true’ communist party. Understood this way, the Central Caucus’ sectarianism was purely idealistic; rooted in their own desires for power and out of a fear of losing the autonomous Language Federations they retained after unity was achieved. In their first announcement as a body, the Caucus charged that the WPA sought to integrate American communists into the liberal mainstream of electoral politics and shuffle them under the fold of the two-party system. Afterward, several CP clubs saw a massive drop off in recruitment and membership totals; going from roughly 20 new members per week to less than 1 in six months and a turnover of over 25%. Complicating the matter, the division was tiered: All of those who went on to form the WPA in December were supportive of legal political activism. Within the CPA, however, Abraham Jakira and Israel Amter denounced what they considered Right opportunism by the newly constituted leaders of the WPA and charged that legal public activism threatened the agency of the underground Party apparatus; giving tithe to the Central Caucus’ claims but stopping short at a sectarian split. After being criticized for “cackling like a goose,” Amter and Jakira took on the title of “Geese” while labeling their opponents “Liquidators” for their supposed desire to liquidate the underground CPA and place the WPA as the head of domestic American Communism.7
While it is appropriate to refer to the Central Caucus’ split as an act of Left sectarianism, it would be inappropriate to suggest that the leaders of the WPA (James Cannon, William Dunne, Jay Lovestone, and Charles Ruthenberg) and the remaining leaders of the underground CPA (Max Bedacht, Alexander Bittelman, James Cannon, Jay Lovestone, Arne Swabeck, and William Weinstone) simultaneously committed an act of Right opportunism. Throughout 1921 and subsequent to the Unity Convention, the decision to become more publicly active and endorse candidates was not an isolated American theory; it was encouraged by the Comintern and other communist parties around the world. The debate over legal, public action was also not confined to American communist circles; in many cases it took staunch words from Lenin to set the record straight that communists should not run away from more public activism, but should embrace it as the means of demonstrating to working people what communists stood for. Because of this, the decision by the “Liquidators” to maintain support for public activism was not Right opportunist. Similarly, the stances of the “Geese” were not Left sectarian, as they maintained general support for the original basis of the CPA: unity of the rival factions. Jakira even went so far as to insist that the Geese’s refusal to split represented the utmost maturity of their faction.
It did not take long into 1922 for the Comintern to condemn the Left sectarian split of the Central Caucus. In January, the international body called for a United Front, asking member Parties to appoint delegates to an enlarged Central Committee plenum and dedicate their constituent domestic memberships to the development of new theory, and endorse social democrats, anarchists, and moderate socialists in order to establish a broad coalition to combat organized capital. The emphasis on theory resonated with both the Geese and the Central Caucus leaders, but the endorsement of moderates and social democrats directly aligned with the political stances of the Liquidators at the international level. The Central Caucus responded by holding an “emergency” convention, which called upon all delegates of the former, pre-unified CPA (including those members still holding positions in either the WPA or CPA). At the convention, Dirba was elected Party leader while Ballam was made the Caucus’ delegate to the Comintern. Since Dirba had access to the Comintern’s funding, he consolidated the Party’s financial assets, which amounted to $1,157.20 (roughly $17,000 in 2020 dollars), leaving the WPA/CPA nearly bankrupt. In response, both WPA and the remaining CPA leaders warned the Central Caucus of the Comintern’s instructions to maintain Party unity as well as accept the strategies of a United Front, which required legal political action. To assure the various districts of the Party that the WPA and CPA were in fact two sides of the same organization, Weinstone demanded that all public WPA meetings be first agreed upon by private meetings of the underground CPA and instructed district organizers to maintain support for underground sessions and meetings. Dirba made his reply to the WPA’s call for unity late in January, refusing to accept the Comintern’s ruling. The Central Caucus began distributing leaflets to denounce the WPA as a “palpable fraud” made up of “impostors and charlatans.”8
The Comintern learned of the full scope of this sectarian divide through L.E. Katterfeld, who represented the CPA in the newly-created Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee. This time, the Comintern declared both sides were at fault: The WPA failed to hold a CPA convention prior to its formation in December, in order to retain the agency of the underground organization, and the Central Caucus equally failed to maintain the demand for unity and instead engaged in Left sectarianism. When Ballam and Dirba prepared their response, they insisted that the split was an effort to maintain the traditions of the CPA as agreed upon at the Unity Convention of May 1921. Making vague references to CPA leaders’ hosting of negotiations with non-Party organizations such as SPA Left Wingers, the Workers’ Council, and the Finnish Socialist Federation, the Central Caucus depicted their actions as akin to resisting reformism. Comintern delegates likely realized—rather quickly—that most of these concerns merely reiterated the same factional divides over power believed to have been resolved at the Unity Convention. The fact that the Central Caucus believed the CPA and WPA to be two distinct organizations was made clear by their 8th assertion: that the Unity Convention’s agreements dictated no member of the CPA was permitted to join any other political party, and that members who held cross membership in the WPA and CPA were in violation of that agreement. Without realizing it, Ballam and Dirba admitted they were guilty of Left sectarianism, since the Unity Convention dictated that unity of the organization trumped all other concerns. One could not split away from the main organization and simultaneously lay claim to upholding the virtues of the Unity Convention. Comintern delegate Solomon Lozovsky set the tone for the debate by denouncing those who sought to argue instead of committing themselves to the everyday struggles of workers. To oppose the United Front, as the Central Caucus did, was to postpone the class war for the purpose of justifying abstract, philosophical assertions. All subsequent efforts by Ballam to defend the Central Caucus’ position fell on deaf ears in Moscow.9
Ballam made one last-ditch effort to explain the position of the Central Caucus in Spring, but was met with harsh criticism by Comintern leaders. This time, he and the entire membership of the Central Caucus faction faced expulsion from the international communist movement if they did not immediately concede the point. Ballam reluctantly accepted the decision, returned to the United States, and informed his factional cohorts of the situation. The first of the Central Caucus to fold was the leadership of the Lithuanian Federation—the very group which instigated the split—on June 21st. The entire ordeal was ended at a second Unity Convention, once again held in Bridgman, Michigan, in August 1922. Though this second convention resulted in arrests, as the Bureau of Investigation caught wind of the event and mounted a raid to charge members with violating Michigan’s anti-syndicalist laws, the affair succeeded at redefining the concept of Party unity and establishing the tolerable limits of public and underground activism so as to prevent members from worrying over power struggles between the two sides of the movement. This of course did not end political factionalism, but it advanced it to a shuffle of power within one organization (the Workers (Communist) Party) and the threat of a Left sectarian or Right opportunist split was resolved for the remainder of the First and Second periods.10
The situation just presented in the early annals of American Communist History gives an idea of how sectarianism is not just a political tendency among the Left; it is a Leftist strategy employed when, for better or worse, certain elements of a movement present a barrier which cannot be resolved politically. Specifically, the perception of unworkable relations by certain leaders proved sufficient to justify not only the positive act of Left sectarianism against the SPA’s Right Wing leadership but it also proved sufficient to justify the negative act of Left sectarianism and Right opportunism by leaders of the new American communist movement. With regard to the Left Wing split against the SPA Right Wing, sectarianism served the purpose of legitimizing a more radical political and labor movement. In the efforts of the CPA and subsequently the Central Caucus, the sectarian acts served less a practical purpose than it upheld the personal preferences of leaders; an error that was never mistaken by grassroots members of both factional groups. The strategy and tactic of dual unionism, like Left sectarianism, similarly argues the significance of unworkable relations between organizers and union leaders. Likewise, the concept of entryism shares with Right opportunism the hope that collaborative organizational work can achieve gains not possible through dual unionism. What has been long considered to simply be two tactical tendencies among labor organizers is, in fact, a generalized tendency among The Left; regardless of if the organizational work is labor or political, legal or underground.
Today we live in a capitalist world where division is not merely preferable to the powers that be, it is profitable. The Left sectarian and Right opportunist tendencies of the Left have themselves become commodified, copywritten, packaged, and resold to leaders and organizers as tools to utilize daily as opposed to tactics to employ at strategic moments in order to secure net gains for working people. Rather than embrace such tendencies as tools that can be used at any particular moment, we should heed the lessons of past events to understand that sectarianism can serve a practical purpose, just like any other political tendency; but as Marxists we must accept that the application of sectarianism depends on the conditions we are presented with. We must be able to see the rationality of deploying such a tactic like Left sectarianism to the SPA, while also recognizing the need to denounce the same tactic when applied to the WPA/CPA by the Central Caucus. Similarly, we must be able to recognize when groups are and are not guilty of Right opportunism, such as the Liquidators’ defense of public action. To fail to do so, or to insist upon the need for sectarianism in the moment, will lead to the same factional divisions that wrought the formation of the American Communist movement from 1919 – 1923. Looking back to my experience in my Michigan suburb, what we need is not individuals willing to sacrifice their principles for the sake of the moment. Rather, we need individuals committed to understanding that, at times, certain acts of division can be revolutionary while at other times it can be wholly reactionary. The only means to understand which is which is to assess whether the action impacts you (or the group in question) or if it, at the very least, seeks to impact working people as a whole.
- Second Congress of the Communist International: Minutes of the Proceedings, vol. 1 & 2 (London: New Park, n.d.).
- C.J. Atkins, “Building a Party of Action: C.E. Ruthenberg, First Leader of the CPUSA,” in Faith in the Masses: Essays Celebrating 100 Years of the CPUSA, ed. Tony Pecinovsky (New York: International Publishers, 2020), 57; B.Y. Mikhailov, N.V. Mostovets, and G.N. Sevostyanov, eds., “Emergence of the Communist Party,” in Recent History of the Labor Movement in the United States, 1918-1939, First (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 45–46.
- “Organization Proclamation of the Proletarian Party of America” (1000 Flowers Publishing, March 15, 1920), Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org), http://www.marxisthistory.org/history/usa/parties/ppa/1920/0315-ppa-orgproclamation.pdf; “Report on CPA Sub-District 4C (Detroit) to Executive Secretary C.E. Ruthenberg from SDO ‘E.A. Carroll,’” March 25, 1920, Jay Lovestone Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, http://www.marxisthistory.org/history/usa/parties/cpusa/1920/0325-carroll-toruth.pdf.
- Leonid Belsky, “Letter to C.E. Ruthenberg in New York from Leonid Belsky in Chicago,” March 28, 1920, Jay Lovestone Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, http://www.marxisthistory.org/history/usa/parties/cpusa/1920/0328-belsky-toruthenberg.pdf; “Letter to C.E. Ruthenberg in New York from I.E. Ferguson in Chicago,” April 11, 1920, Jay Lovestone Papers, Hoover Institution Archives, http://www.marxisthistory.org/history/usa/parties/cpusa/1920/0411-ferguson-toruth.pdf.
- David Damon, “Communist Party Criticism,” The Communist: Official Paper of the Communist Party of America 2, no. 5 (May 8, 1920): 2; Charles Dirba, “Letter to the Executive Committee of the Communist International in Moscow from the Central Executive Committee of the CPA in New York,” October 19, 1920, RGASPI, Comintern Archives, https://www.marxists.org/history/usa/parties/cpusa/1920/10/1019-ceccpa-toecci.pdf; Charles Dirba, “Letter to the United Communist Party in New York from Charles Dirba, Executive Secretary of the Communist Party of America in New York,” October 15, 1920, Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org), https://www.marxists.org/history/usa/parties/cpusa/1920/1015-dirba-toucp.pdf.
- Louis Fraina, “America As a World Power,” The Communist: Official Organ of the Communist Party of America 1, no. 2 (August 1921): 6–11; John J. Ballam, “Report of the Secretary of the Central Caucus to the National Conference of the Communist Party of America” (1000 Flowers Publishing, December 25, 1921), RGASPI, f. 515, op. 1, d. 60, 1. 65., Comintern Archives, http://www.marxisthistory.org/history/usa/parties/cpusa/1922/0107-ballam-ccfsecreport.pdf; “Historical Timeline of the Central Caucus, CPA” (1000 Flowers Publishing, September 17, 1921), RGASPI, Comintern Archives, http://www.marxisthistory.org/history/usa/parties/cpusa/1922/0106-ccf-timeline.pdf.
- Max Bedacht, “Letter to Theodore Draper in New York City,” December 13, 1954, Theodore Draper Papers, Box 30, Hoover Institution Archives; “Historical Timeline of the Central Caucus, CPA.”
- “For the United Front of the Proletariat: The Call for the First Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI,” The Worker 4, no. 208 (February 2, 1922): 1–2.
- “Statement to the Communist International Issued to John J. Ballam [‘John Moore’]by the CEC of the Central Caucus Faction’s Communist Party of America” (1000 Flowers Publishing, January 22, 1922), RGASPI, Comintern Archives, http://www.marxisthistory.org/history/usa/parties/cpusa/1922/0122-ccf-statementtoci.pdf; Solomon A. Lozovsky, “Supporters and Opponents of the United Front,” The Red Labor Union International 12 (February 1922): 3–7.
- “Statement to the Membership of the Communist Party of America by the CEC” (1000 Flowers Publishing, April 24, 1922), Herbert Romerstein Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, http://www.marxisthistory.org/history/usa/parties/cpusa/1922/0424-cec-tomembers.pdf; C Karpus, “Declaration to the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of America, Section of the Communist International” (1000 Flowers Publishing, June 21, 1922), RGASPI, Comintern Archives, http://www.marxisthistory.org/history/usa/parties/lfed/lithuanian/1922/0621-ccflithfed-declaration.pdf; John J. Ballam, “Report of ‘John Moore,’ Delegate of the Minority Faction of the CP of A to the Comintern, to the CEC” (1000 Flowers Publishing, June 27, 1922), RGASPI, Comintern Archives, http://www.marxisthistory.org/history/usa/parties/cpusa/1922/0627-ballam-reporttocec.pdf.